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Overview 
 
 
 
 
 
WHAT THE COMMISSION STUDIED 
 
The United States Sentencing Commission 
(“the Commission”) submits this report to Congress1 
on the impact of United States v. Booker2 on federal 
sentencing in order to assist Congress in its efforts to 
ensure certain and fair sentencing that avoids 
unwarranted sentencing disparities while maintaining 
sufficient flexibility,3 as envisioned in the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”).  In preparing this report, 
the Commission reviewed case law, analyzed 
sentencing data,4 and studied scholarly literature.   
                                                 
1  The Commission submits this report pursuant to its 
general authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 994-995, and its 
specific authority under 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(2), which 
provides that the Commission shall have authority to “make 
recommendations to Congress concerning modification or 
enactment of statutes relating to sentencing, penal, and 
correctional matters that the Commission finds to be 
necessary and advisable to carry out an effective, humane 
and rational sentencing policy.” 
 
2  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 
3  See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (“The purposes of the 
United States Sentencing Commission are to . . . provide 
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when 
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken 
into account in the establishment of general sentencing 
practices[.]”). 
 
4  The Commission maintains a comprehensive, 
computerized data collection system and acts as the 
clearinghouse for federal sentencing information pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 995(a)(14), (15).  The Commission relies on 
this database for its ongoing monitoring and evaluation of 
 
 
The Commission also sought the views of stakeholders 
in the federal criminal justice system in a variety of 
ways, including conducting seven regional public 
hearings,5 an additional hearing on post-Booker 
                                                                                  
the guidelines, many of its reports and research projects, and 
for responding to hundreds of data requests received from 
Congress and other criminal justice entities each year.  
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(w), within 30 days of entry of 
judgment in every felony and class A misdemeanor case, the 
Commission receives:  (1) the judgment and commitment 
order; (2) the statement of reasons; (3) the plea agreement, if 
any; (4) the indictment or other charging information; and 
(5) the presentence report (unless waived by the court).  For 
each case, the Commission routinely collects hundreds of 
pieces of information, including defendant demographics, 
statute(s) of conviction, application of (or relief from) any 
statutory mandatory minimum penalty, sentencing guideline 
applications, sentences imposed, and the reasons for any 
sentence that departs or varies from the guidelines range.  A 
detailed description of the methodologies the Commission 
used to analyze the data for this report is in Part C, available 
online. 
 
5  The Commission held seven regional public hearings 
coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the enactment of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to solicit the views of 
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, 
academics, and others on a variety of federal sentencing and 
criminal justice topics.  These hearings were held in Atlanta, 
GA (Feb. 10-11, 2009), Stanford, CA (May 27-28, 2009), 
New York, NY (July 9-10, 2009), Chicago, IL (Sept. 9-10, 
2009), Denver, CO (Oct. 20-21, 2009), Austin, TX (Nov. 
19-20, 2009), and Phoenix, AZ (Jan. 20-21, 2010).  Witness 
statements and transcripts for the public hearings are 
available online at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/.  
Summaries of the testimony relating specifically to post-
Booker sentencing issues can be found in Part F of this 
report, available online. 
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sentencing held in February 2012,6 a survey of federal 
district judges,7 and considering comments from its 
advisory groups8 as well as representatives from all 
three branches of government.   
The Commission also undertook statistical 
analyses of federal sentencing data for five offense 
types (drug trafficking, firearms, immigration, fraud, 
and child pornography) and one commonly applied 
guideline (career offender).  In fiscal year 2011, four 
of these offenses (immigration, drug trafficking, 
firearms, and fraud) constituted over three quarters of 
federal offenses.  The offense types studied in this 
report comprised nearly 80 percent of federal criminal 
cases in fiscal year 2011.   
The Commission commonly analyzes 
sentences by comparing the sentence imposed in a 
case with the applicable guideline range provided in 
the Guidelines Manual for that case.  Through this 
analysis, the Commission routinely groups sentences 
into one of four categories:  (1) sentences that fall 
within the guideline range; (2) sentences that are 
above the top of the guideline range; (3) sentences that 
are below the bottom of the guideline range 
attributable at least in part to a request from the 
government; and (4) sentences that are below the 
bottom of the guideline range but are not attributable 
to a request from the government.9  In this report, 
                                                 
6  The Commission held a hearing on federal sentencing 
options after Booker in Washington, DC on February 16, 
2012.   Witness statements and transcripts for this public 
hearing are available on the Commission’s webpage at 
www.ussc.gov.  Summaries of the testimony can be found 
in Part F of this report, available online. 
 
7  In early 2010, the Commission conducted a survey of 
federal district judges to solicit their views on a variety of 
sentencing topics.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS OF 
SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES: JANUARY 
2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (June 2010) [hereinafter 2010 
JUDGES’ SURVEY], available on the Commission’s webpage 
at www.ussc.gov.  A summary of the survey responses 
related to post-Booker sentencing issues can be found in 
Part F of this report, available online. 
 
8  The Commission has three standing advisory groups:  the 
Practitioners Advisory Group, the Probation Officers 
Advisory Group, and the Victims Advisory Group.  
Information on each of these advisory groups can be found 
on the Commission’s webpage at www.ussc.gov. 
 
9  See Table N, “National Comparison of Sentence Imposed 
and Position Relative to the Guideline Range,” U.S. SENT’G 
sentencing trends are discussed using these four broad 
categories: “within range;” “above range;” 
“government sponsored below range;” and “non-
government sponsored below range.”  
 In some analyses in this report, the 
Commission further divides government sponsored 
below range sentences into three subgroups.  First, 
“substantial assistance departures” are those sentences 
where the government requested a sentence below the 
guideline range on account of the defendant’s 
substantial assistance to the government in connection 
with the investigation or prosecution of another 
person.  Second, “Early Disposition Program (or EDP) 
departures” are sentences where the government 
sought a sentence below the guideline range because 
the defendant participated in the government’s Early 
Disposition Program, through which cases are resolved 
in an expedited manner.  Both substantial assistance 
and EDP departures are specifically authorized by 
statute and are incorporated into the Guidelines 
Manual through specific policy statements.  “Other 
government sponsored below range” sentences are all 
other below range sentences imposed at the request of 
the government for a reason other than substantial 
assistance or EDP.  “Other government sponsored 
below range” sentences are not specifically authorized 
by any statute, and are not incorporated into the 
Guidelines Manual through any guideline or policy 
statement.  
The Commission also analyzed sentencing 
data from individual judges in order to determine 
intra-district sentencing patterns across time, and 
examined appellate court decisions collected annually 
since 1994.  Finally, the Commission updated and 
expanded its prior multivariate analysis of 
demographic differences in federal sentencing 
outcomes, most recently published in March 2010.10   
The Commission’s sentencing data analyses 
spanned a broad time frame, from October 1995 
through September 2011.  In most instances, four 
periods were examined:  the Koon period (June 13, 
1996 through April 30, 2003), the PROTECT Act 
                                                                                  
COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS (2011) [hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK]. 
 
10  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN 
FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE 
BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
(March 2010) [hereinafter MULTIVARIATE REPORT]. 
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period (May 1, 2003 through June 24, 2004), the 
Booker period (January 12, 2005 through December 
10, 2007), and the Gall period (December 11, 2007 
through September 30, 2011).  The Commission 
selected these periods based on Supreme Court 
decisions and legislation that influenced federal 
sentencing in fundamental ways.  Specifically, in 
United States v. Koon,11 the Supreme Court defined 
the level of deference due to district courts’ decisions 
to sentence outside the guideline range and determined 
that such decisions should be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.  In passing the PROTECT Act12 nearly 
seven years later, Congress restricted district courts’ 
discretion to impose sentences outside the guideline 
range, and required that courts of appeals review such 
decisions de novo, or without any deference to the 
district court’s decision.  In Booker, the Supreme 
Court struck down two statutory provisions in the SRA 
that made the guidelines mandatory, and also defined 
the standard of review for sentences on appeal.  In 
Gall v. United States,13 the Court further defined the 
appellate standard of review.  
 
WHAT THE COMMISSION FOUND 
 
The sentencing guidelines have remained the 
essential starting point in all federal sentences and 
have continued to exert significant influence on federal 
sentencing trends over time.  The most stable 
relationship between the guidelines and sentences 
imposed occurred in some of the most frequently 
prosecuted offenses, including drug trafficking, 
immigration, and firearms offenses.  In other types of 
offenses, such as fraud and child pornography, the 
influence of the guidelines appeared to have 
diminished over time in several measurable ways, 
including decreasing rates of sentences imposed within 
the sentencing guideline ranges, and increasing rates 
of non-government sponsored below range sentences 
(those below range sentences imposed at the judges’ 
discretion and not in response to a government 
motion).  Increasing rates of below range sentences 
sponsored by the government for reasons other than 
substantial assistance, as well as differences in 
prosecutorial practices across districts, also have 
                                                 
11  518 U.S. 81 (1996).   
 
12  Pub. L. No. 108-21 (2003). 
 
13  552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
contributed to decreasing rates of within range 
sentences and increasing variation in sentencing for 
some offenses. 
Regional disparities have increased, as 
evidenced by the variation in rates of within range 
sentences among the circuits and districts.  Further, the 
Commission’s analysis of individual judge data 
showed that the identity of the judge has played an 
increasingly important role in sentencing outcomes in 
many districts.  
The Commission also found that demographic 
characteristics are now more strongly correlated with 
sentencing outcomes than during previous periods, 
although the Commission does not suggest that this 
correlation indicates race or gender discrimination on 
the part of judges.  This troubling trend also has been 
replicated in multivariate analyses performed by other 
researchers, albeit to different magnitudes.  
Finally, the courts of appeals have not 
promoted uniformity in sentencing to the extent the 
Supreme Court anticipated in Booker.  The appellate 
courts lack adequate standards and uniform procedures 
in spite of a number of Supreme Court rulings 
addressing them, and the ultimate outcome of the 
substantive review of a sentence may depend in part 
on the circuit in which the appeal is brought.  
Additionally, only a small percentage of sentences are 
appealed, and usually only by the defendant. 
The trends described in this report have 
developed gradually since Booker.  In the aggregate, 
federal sentences have shown general stability, as seen 
in the Commission’s analysis of sentence lengths and 
their relation to the minimum of the guideline range 
over time.  Nonetheless, unwarranted disparities in 
federal sentencing appear to be increasing.  Judges are 
following the dictates of the Supreme Court in Booker 
and subsequent decisions in different ways, with some 
judges weighing factors such as the characteristics of 
the offense and the offender differently than other 
judges in similar cases.  Indeed, the role of the 
guidelines has become less pronounced, in part 
because of a series of Supreme Court cases 
emphasizing the advisory nature of the guidelines and 
the traditional importance of individual offender 
characteristics in sentencing, and the requirement, as 
stated by the Court, that judges independently consider 
the characteristics of the offense and the offender 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  The Commission’s 
recommendations are aimed at strengthening the 
guideline system so that the sentencing guidelines can 
help move sentencing in the direction Congress 
3
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intended in the SRA in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution and Supreme Court decisions.  
 
ORGANIZATION 
 
 This report is submitted in six parts.  Part A, 
available both in print and online, presents a 
condensed background of major legal events in federal 
sentencing, describes the results of the Commission’s 
data analyses, and discusses the Commission’s 
proposals for strengthening the federal sentencing 
guidelines system. 
  The following additional sections containing 
more detailed information and supporting data are 
available only online, on the Commission’s website 
(www.ussc.gov):   
Part B of this report features exhibits listing 
some of the leading Supreme Court and circuit court 
opinions on key pre- and post-Booker sentencing-
related issues and summarizes viewpoints on appellate 
procedure from circuit court opinions, the 
Commission’s training seminar, public hearings, and 
the 2010 survey of district judges.  Part B also 
provides additional data on sentencing appeals.  
Part C explains both the methodology used in 
many of the report’s data analyses and how to interpret 
the charts and graphs used throughout this report.  This 
part analyzes in detail data from federal courts, 
focusing on five offense types and one commonly 
applied guideline: drug trafficking, immigration, fraud, 
firearms, child pornography, and the career offender 
guideline.  Additional charts and graphs for each 
offense type and guideline follow.   
Part D analyzes non-government sponsored 
below range sentence rates of individual judges, and 
intra-district disparity in those rates.  Plots depicting 
the rates of non-government sponsored below range 
sentences and the extent of the reduction for each 
judge in each district are in Part D, as well as 
explanatory notes on how to interpret the plots.   
Part E updates the multivariate regression 
analysis used for the Commission’s 2010 report on 
Demographic Differences in Federal Sentencing 
Practices to determine whether there continues to be a 
correlation between sentencing outcomes and 
demographic characteristics.  In conducting this 
analysis the Commission used, as it did in the 2006 
Booker Report,14 a research tool common in the social 
and behavioral sciences.  Multivariate regression 
analysis is used to examine data where multiple factors 
may contribute to an observed outcome, such as the 
sentencing of federal offenders.  The principal benefit 
of this tool is that it accounts, or controls, for the effect 
of each factor in the analysis.  Each factor can then be 
separately assessed, and the extent to which each 
factor influences the outcome can be measured.  The 
analysis describes the magnitude of any differences 
observed, focusing on four separate time periods.  This 
section also presents additional multivariate analyses, 
including analyses of three major offense types: drug 
trafficking, firearms, and fraud. 
Part F discusses other stakeholders’ views on 
sentencing reform, including testimony from the 2009-
2010 regional public hearings on the 25th anniversary 
of the SRA and the February 2012 public hearing on 
post-Booker sentencing.  Summaries of the public 
hearings and of the Commission’s 2010 survey of 
district judges are also in Part F.   
Appendices containing additional data and 
more detailed descriptions of the methodologies used 
in the analyses follow the relevant sections in the 
online content. 
 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
In light of the extensive data analyses, the 
review of case law, and other relevant information 
presented in this report, the Commission makes the 
following findings: 
 
The number of federal offenders has 
substantially increased, and most federal 
offenders have continued to receive substantial 
sentences of imprisonment. 
 
The number of federal offenders has increased 
substantially over the 16 years studied in this report, 
and most have continued to receive substantial 
sentences of imprisonment.  In fiscal year 1996, 
37,091 federal offenders were sentenced, compared to 
76,216 in fiscal year 2011.15  The percentage of federal 
                                                 
14  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 BOOKER REPORT]. 
 
15  The dataset used for this report differs from that used in 
the Commission’s 2011 SOURCEBOOK.  An explanation of 
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offenders sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment 
without any alternative to incarceration as a part of the 
sentence also has increased over this period from 76.9 
percent in fiscal year 1996, to 87.8 percent in fiscal 
year 2011.  In fiscal year 1996, 10.9 percent of federal 
offenders were sentenced to probation only, 7.4 
percent were sentenced to a combination of probation 
and some form of confinement (e.g., home detention 
or other confinement), and 4.8 percent were sentenced 
to a combination of incarceration and community 
confinement.  In fiscal year 2011, 5.8 percent of 
federal offenders received a sentence of probation 
only, and 6.4 percent received either a combination of 
probation and some form of confinement, or a 
combination of incarceration and community 
confinement. 
For offenses in the aggregate, the average 
length of the sentence imposed during the Gall period 
was 49 months, the same as during the Koon period, 
but a few months shorter than during the PROTECT 
Act period (53 months) and the Booker period (54 
months).  The decrease from the Booker period was 
due in part to the increasing prevalence of immigration 
offenses, which generally resulted in lower sentences 
than other offenses.  During the PROTECT Act 
period, for example, immigration offenses were 18.9 
percent of the federal caseload, whereas in the Gall 
period, immigration offenses were 29.0 percent.  
Average sentences for illegal entry offenders have 
decreased over time due in part to guideline 
amendments lowering penalties and in part to 
increasing rates of EDP departures.   
Average sentences for drug trafficking 
offenders were shorter during the Gall period (75 
months) than during the Booker period (83 months), 
due largely to reduced penalties for crack cocaine 
trafficking offenders.  From the Koon period to the 
Gall period, sentences for child pornography non-
production offenders (including trafficking, receipt, 
and possession) increased nearly three-fold, from 34 
months to 93 months.  Sentences for fraud offenders 
nearly doubled, from 13 months in the Koon period, to 
25 months in the Gall period.  In child pornography 
and fraud offenses, these increases were due to both 
increased seriousness of offenses over time, and 
statutory and guideline increases.  Sentences for 
                                                                                  
the criteria used to define the dataset in this report is in the 
Methodology section of Part A, infra at 52, and in the 
Methodology section of Part C, available online. 
 
firearms offenders were also highest during the Gall 
period, at 59 months, compared to 56 months in the 
Koon period. 
 
The guidelines have remained the essential 
starting point for all federal sentences and have 
continued to influence sentences significantly.  
 
The Supreme Court has held that courts must 
begin the sentencing process by properly determining 
the applicable guideline range.16  During the Gall 
period, 80.7 percent of federal sentences were either 
within the guideline range (53.9% of sentences) or 
below the range pursuant to a government motion 
(26.8% of sentences).  Less than one-quarter (17.4%) 
of sentences were non-government sponsored below 
range sentences.  Average sentences for almost every 
offense type analyzed in this report were lower than 
average guideline minimums due to both government 
sponsored and non-government sponsored below range 
sentences.  
 Nonetheless, trends in average sentences 
generally have followed average guideline minimums 
over time.  For offenses in the aggregate, when the 
average guideline minimum has increased or 
decreased due to changes in the seriousness of the 
offense, the criminal history of the offenders, or 
amendments to the guidelines, the average sentence 
also has increased or decreased in like proportion.   
 
The influence of the guidelines, as measured by 
the relationship between the average guideline 
minimum and the average sentence, has 
generally remained stable in drug trafficking, 
firearms, and immigration offenses, but has 
diminished in fraud and child pornography 
offenses.  
 
Although trends in average sentences for all 
offenses generally have followed average guideline 
minimums over time, there have been noticeable 
differences by offense type.  In drug trafficking, 
firearms, and immigration, three offense types which 
comprised more than two-thirds of federal offenses in 
fiscal year 2011, the influence of the guidelines has 
remained stable over time.  For these offenses, average 
sentences have increased or decreased in response to 
                                                 
16  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007); 
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49−50. 
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increases and decreases in average guideline 
minimums, resulting in a consistent parallel 
relationship over time.  In drug trafficking offenses, 
although average sentences have been lower than 
average guideline minimums, much of the difference 
between the average guideline minimum and the 
average sentence has been due to the prevalence of 
government sponsored below range sentences for 
substantial assistance.   
In contrast, in fraud and child pornography 
offenses, the average guideline minimum and the 
average sentence have diverged, and the divergence 
has grown over time.  For both offense types, as the 
average guideline minimum has increased, the average 
sentence has remained flat by comparison.  In these 
cases, the difference between the average guideline 
minimum and the average sentence has been largely 
due to increasing rates of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences, leading to the conclusion that 
the influence of the guidelines has diminished for 
fraud and child pornography offenses.   
Similarly, in career offender cases, of which 
94.7 percent were drug trafficking, robbery or firearms 
offenses in fiscal year 2011, the average sentence 
diverged from the average guideline minimum during 
the Gall period.  The percentage difference between 
the average guideline minimum and the average 
sentence was greatest in fiscal year 2011, at 24.9 
percent.  The increasing difference has been 
attributable to increases in the rates of both 
government sponsored and non-government sponsored 
below range sentences. 
 
For most offense types, the rate of within range 
sentences has decreased while the rate of below 
range sentences (both government sponsored 
and non-government sponsored) has increased 
over time. 
 
For most offense types, the rate of within 
range sentences has decreased because of increases in 
the rates of both government sponsored and non-
government sponsored below range sentences.  In drug 
trafficking and firearms offenses, the rates of both 
government sponsored and non-government sponsored 
below range sentences have increased.  In immigration 
offenses (illegal entry in particular) the decrease in 
within range rates has been primarily attributable to 
government sponsored EDP departures.  These 
programs were formally authorized by the PROTECT 
Act but had been informally used before then in a 
number of districts, and had generally been reported 
by the Commission as “other downward departures,” 
and not attributed to the government.  In child 
pornography non-production offenses (including 
trafficking, receipt, and possession offenses) where the 
average guideline minimum and the average sentence 
have noticeably diverged, the rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences now exceed those of 
within range sentences.   
 
The influence of the guidelines, as measured by 
the relationship between the average guideline 
minimum and the average sentence, and as 
measured by within range rates, has varied by 
circuit. 
 
For all offense types studied, the degree of 
influence of the guidelines has varied by circuit.  For 
offense types in the aggregate, the average sentence 
has largely paralleled the guideline minimum in the 
majority of circuits, but in several circuits, the average 
sentence and average guideline minimum have 
diverged, most notably during the Gall period.  Even 
in drug trafficking and firearms offenses, where the 
influence of the guideline has remained most stable at 
a national level, the degree of parallelism has varied 
by circuit.  The circuit-level variation has been more 
pronounced for child pornography and fraud offenses.  
Within range rates have varied by circuit, as 
well as by offense.  The decrease in within range rates 
has been driven by different factors, depending on the 
circuit and the type of offense.  For example, the rates 
of government sponsored below range sentences have 
been highest in the Ninth Circuit because of EDP 
departures in both immigration and marijuana 
trafficking offenses.  In fraud and child pornography 
offenses, within range rates have decreased in every 
circuit, but more in some circuits than in others.  For 
example, for fraud offenses in the Second Circuit, 
rates of non-government sponsored below range 
sentences have been higher than the rates of within 
range sentences.  This pattern has not occurred for 
fraud offenses in any other circuit. 
6
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The rates of non-government sponsored below 
range sentences have increased in most districts 
and the variation in such rates across districts 
for most offenses was greatest in the Gall period, 
indicating that sentencing outcomes increasingly 
depend upon the district in which the defendant 
is sentenced. 
 
For most offense types, the rates of non-
government sponsored below range sentences were 
highest and more varied during the Gall period than 
during any previous periods.  For drug trafficking, 
firearms, fraud, immigration (illegal entry) and child 
pornography (non-production) offenses, both the rates 
of non-government sponsored below range sentences 
and the variation in rates across the districts increased 
in the Booker period compared to the PROTECT Act 
period, and again in the Gall period compared to the 
Booker period.  The difference in rates was greatest for 
child pornography non-production offenses (including 
trafficking, receipt, and possession) and was smallest 
in drug trafficking and firearms offenses.  Therefore, 
for most offenses, the district in which the defendant 
was sentenced played a greater role in the sentencing 
outcome during the Gall period than during any 
previous periods. 
  
For offenses in the aggregate, the average extent 
of the reduction for non-government sponsored 
below range sentences has been approximately 
40 percent below the guideline minimum during 
all periods (amounting to average reductions of 
17 to 21 months); however, the extent of the 
reduction has varied by offense type.  
 
For offenses in the aggregate, the extent of 
non-government sponsored below range reductions has 
remained relatively constant over time, hovering near 
40 percent below the guideline minimum during all 
four periods.  Average guideline minimums have 
changed over time; therefore, the 40 percent reduction 
below the guideline minimum represented reductions 
of between 17 and 21 months below the guideline 
minimum depending on the period.   
The extent of the reduction below the 
guideline minimum has varied by offense type.  For 
example, in child pornography non-production 
offenses (including receipt, trafficking, and possession 
offenses) the average guideline minimum more than 
tripled, from 36 months in the Koon period to 115 
months in the Gall period.  In terms of months, the 
reduction from the guideline minimum nearly tripled 
from 15 months below the guideline minimum in the 
Koon period to 44 months below the guideline 
minimum in the Gall period.  As a percentage of the 
guideline minimum, however, the extent of the 
reduction decreased over time, from 55.7 percent 
below the guideline minimum in the Koon period, to 
40.4 percent below the guideline minimum in the Gall 
period.  In contrast, the reductions in illegal entry 
offenses have held steady at 12 months below the 
guideline minimum in the PROTECT Act, Booker, and 
Gall periods.   
 
Prosecutorial practices have contributed to 
disparities in federal sentencing. 
 
Differences in charging and plea agreement 
practices at the district level have contributed to 
sentencing disparities.  For example, in its 2011 report 
to Congress on mandatory minimum penalties,17 the 
Commission reported wide variations in prosecutorial 
practices surrounding the filing of notices of enhanced 
mandatory minimum penalties in drug trafficking 
offenses, the charging of multiple violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) which requires mandatory minimum 
sentences to be served consecutive to underlying drug 
trafficking offenses or crimes of violence, and the use 
of binding plea agreements to specify the sentence.18  
Differences in these practices may not be evident in 
the documents provided to the Commission, but they 
influence the resulting sentence and reduce both 
uniformity and transparency in the sentencing process.  
One inconsistency in prosecutorial charging decisions 
occurred in child pornography offenses, where 
interviews conducted with federal prosecutors and a 
review of sentencing documents revealed that 
prosecutors inconsistently charged possession of child 
pornography, which does not carry a mandatory 
minimum penalty, and receipt of child pornography, 
which carries a 5-year mandatory minimum penalty.19 
                                                 
17  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING  (Oct. 2011)  
[hereinafter 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT]. 
 
18  Id. at 109-10, 111-14. 
 
19  Id. at 114. 
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Moreover, differences in the way government 
sponsored departures and variances have been applied, 
specifically with respect to EDP and other government 
sponsored below range sentences, have contributed to 
unwarranted disparity.  Of the three types of 
government sponsored below range sentences 
(substantial assistance, EDP, and other government 
sponsored), substantial assistance departures have 
been the most common and typically have led to the 
greatest reductions in sentence length (more than 40 
months below the guideline minimum for offenses in 
the aggregate during every period studied).  
Substantial assistance departure rates have generally 
decreased over time.  However, the rate of EDP 
departures has increased substantially over time, as 
such programs have become more prevalent and have 
applied to more offense types.  A recent policy change 
in the Justice Department in which all districts were 
required to create an EDP program for illegal entry 
offenses suggests that such departures will become 
even more common in the future.  Compared to 
substantial assistance departures, EDP departures have 
resulted in relatively modest reductions in sentence 
length (10 months below the guideline minimum 
during the Gall period) consistent with the fact that 
USSG §5K3.1 (Early Disposition Programs (Policy 
Statement)) limits EDP departures to no more than a 4-
level reduction.  The rates of other government 
sponsored below range sentences have increased but 
have remained low compared to the rates of both 
substantial assistance and non-government sponsored 
below range sentences.   
 
Variation in the rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences among judges 
within the same district has increased in most 
districts since Booker, indicating that sentencing 
outcomes increasingly depend upon the judge to 
whom the case is assigned. 
 
The Commission reviewed the rates of non-
government sponsored below range sentences of 
individual judges and found great variation even 
within the same district.  Although trends differed 
depending on the district, in two-thirds of districts, the 
variation in non-government sponsored below range 
rates among judges was smallest during the PROTECT 
Act period and largest during the Gall period.  In some 
districts, the rates of non-government sponsored below 
range sentences of judges with similar size caseloads 
differed by 30 percent or more.  Although the analysis 
did not compare judges within a specific division or 
courthouse within each district, the rates of non-
government sponsored below range sentences were 
sufficiently varied within each district to cause 
concern that similar offenders committing similar 
crimes were sentenced differently depending upon the 
judge.  Generally, the extent of the reduction below the 
guideline minimum varied during all time periods 
studied, but did not appear to be influenced by 
Supreme Court decisions or statutory changes over 
time. 
 
Appellate review has not promoted uniformity in 
sentencing to the extent the Supreme Court 
anticipated in Booker. 
 
In Booker, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that appellate review of sentences for reasonableness 
would not “provide the uniformity that Congress 
originally sought to secure,” but nonetheless 
anticipated that appellate review “would tend to iron 
out sentencing differences.”20  The Commission’s 
review of case law and sentencing appeals data 
suggests that the current system of appellate review is 
not an adequate tool to promote uniformity in 
sentencing.  In response to Supreme Court cases 
following Booker, circuit courts have adopted different 
approaches to reviewing sentences, and panels of 
judges in different circuits have reached different 
conclusions regarding the substantive reasonableness 
of similar sentences.  In addition, the infrequency of 
sentencing appeals, particularly by the government, 
has limited the influence of the appellate process on 
sentencing uniformity. 
 
Demographic factors (such as race, gender, and 
citizenship) have been associated with sentence 
length at higher rates in the Gall period than in 
previous periods. 
 
The Commission’s updated multivariate 
regression analysis showed, among other outcomes, 
that Black male offenders have continued to receive 
longer sentences than similarly situated White male 
offenders, and furthermore that this difference in 
sentence length was greatest during the Gall period.  
In addition, female offenders have received shorter 
                                                 
20  543 U.S. at 263. 
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sentences than similarly situated male offenders.  
Alternative analyses performed by other researchers 
have replicated the pattern identified in the 
Commission’s analysis, although to a somewhat lesser 
degree, that certain demographic differences were least 
pronounced during the PROTECT Act period and 
most pronounced during the Gall period.  Because 
judges make sentencing decisions based on many legal 
considerations, such as violence in an offender’s past, 
or an offender’s employment history, which are not 
controlled for in the Commission’s multivariate 
regression analysis, these results should be interpreted 
with caution and should not be taken to suggest race or 
gender bias on the part of judges.   
 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Commission continues to believe that a 
strong and effective guidelines system best achieves 
the purposes of the SRA.  Consistent with its October 
12, 2011 testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, the Commission 
believes that Congress should consider the following 
recommendations to strengthen the guidelines system, 
provide more effective substantive appellate review, 
and generally promote the goals of the SRA: 
 
 Develop more robust substantive appellate review 
by requiring a presumption of reasonableness on 
appellate review of within range sentences, greater 
justification for sentences further outside the 
guideline range, and heightened review of 
sentences based on policy disagreements with the 
guidelines;  
 
 Reconcile the statutes that restrict the 
Commission’s consideration of certain offender 
characteristics when promulgating guidelines that 
meet the purposes of sentencing, with statutory 
interpretations that require courts to consider more 
expansively those same offender characteristics at 
sentencing; 
  
 Codify the three-step sentencing process, as 
incorporated in the guidelines and consistent with 
the process the Supreme Court established in Gall, 
which requires courts to determine properly the 
applicable guideline range (see § 3553(a)(4)), 
consider guideline departures and policy 
statements (see § 3553(a)(5)), and then consider 
the remaining section 3553(a) factors taken as a 
whole in determining the sentence to be imposed, 
including whether a variance is warranted; and  
 
 Resolve the uncertainty about the weight to be 
given to the federal sentencing guidelines by 
requiring courts to give substantial weight to the 
guidelines at sentencing. 
 
The Commission believes these proposals, if 
adopted, would promote the purposes of the SRA, 
while respecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights.  As envisioned by the SRA, the Commission 
will continue to refine the guidelines in response to 
feedback and information it receives from the criminal 
justice community and data it collects from sentencing 
documents.  The Commission also understands that 
more substantial reforms may be necessary in the 
future should these reforms fail to reduce existing 
unwarranted disparities. 
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History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 198421 (“SRA”) in response to 
widespread sentencing disparity in federal sentencing.  
The SRA ushered in a new era of federal sentencing 
through the creation of the Commission and the 
promulgation of federal sentencing guidelines.  For 
nearly twenty years, courts were required to impose 
sentences within the applicable guideline range unless 
the court found the existence of an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind or to a degree not 
adequately taken into consideration by the 
Commission in formulating the sentencing 
guidelines.22   
In 2005, the Supreme Court’s two-part 
decision in United States v. Booker23 began yet another 
era of federal sentencing by rendering the federal 
sentencing guidelines “effectively advisory.”24  In 
Booker, the Court held that enhancing a sentence 
under the federal sentencing guidelines based on the 
sentencing judge’s determination of a fact (other than 
a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or 
admitted by the defendant violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.25  The Court 
remedied the Sixth Amendment violation by excising 
                                                 
21  Title II, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-473 (1984). 
 
22  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), excised by United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 
23  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 
24  Id. at 245. 
 
25  Id. at 244. 
 
the provisions of the SRA that the Court held made the 
sentencing guidelines “mandatory,” thereby rendering 
the guidelines advisory in nature.26   
Since Booker the Supreme Court has issued 
eight decisions directly related to the operation of the 
federal sentencing guidelines.27  Together these 
decisions have not only significantly affected the 
sentencing practices of the district courts but also have 
reinstated a deferential standard of review in the 
appellate courts.  Nonetheless, the Commission and 
the guidelines continue to play an important role in 
federal sentencing.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Booker:  
 
[T]he Sentencing Commission 
remains in place, writing Guidelines, 
collecting information about actual 
district court sentencing decisions, 
undertaking research, and revising the 
Guidelines accordingly.28 
                                                 
26  Id. at 245. 
 
27  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Irizarry v. United States, 553 
U.S. 708 (2008); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 
(2009) (per curiam); Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350 
(2009); Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010); 
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).  In 
addition, the Court recently agreed to resolve a conflict 
among the circuit courts of appeals regarding whether the 
Ex Post Facto clause applies to the sentencing guidelines.  
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
 
28  543 U.S. at 264. 
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In light of its continued statutory mandate and 
the continued importance of the guidelines, the work 
of the Commission remains significant and has 
become increasingly complex.  The size of the federal 
docket has grown each year since the Booker decision, 
and the Commission has increased its efforts to 
provide meaningful guidance to the courts and 
practitioners and to ensure that the guidelines continue 
to reflect the statutory purposes of sentencing. 
The Commission continues to promulgate 
sentencing guidelines that courts must properly 
consider and guideline ranges that courts must 
properly determine in all federal criminal cases.29  
Since Booker, the Commission has promulgated 96 
amendments to the guidelines, including 44 
amendments implementing new legislation.  Before 
promulgating amendments, the Commission carefully 
considers data, public comment, and other relevant 
information.30  The Commission continues to collect, 
analyze, and report sentencing data systematically to 
detect new criminal trends, to determine whether 
federal crime policies are achieving their goals, and to 
serve as a clearinghouse for federal sentencing 
statistics.31  The Commission resolves conflicting 
judicial interpretations of the guidelines by studying 
appeals court decisions on sentencing issues and 
promulgating guideline amendments to ensure uniform 
interpretation.    
The Commission’s data collection and 
reporting duties required the Commission to review 
nearly 400,000 charging and sentencing documents for 
more than 86,000 cases in fiscal year 2011,32 enabling 
quarterly dissemination of trend analyses, and specific 
analyses requested by Congress, the courts, and the 
Executive branch.  The resulting, steadily expanding 
database is an invaluable source of information for the 
criminal justice community.33  Since Booker, the 
                                                 
29  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). 
 
30  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). 
 
31  See 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12)−(16).  See also, Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 369 (1989). 
 
32  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK, at 3.  
 
33  See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of 
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments in Reducing 
Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 63, 65 (1993).   
 
Commission has published research papers on 
demographic differences in federal sentencing 
practices, recidivism of crack cocaine offenders 
released after the Commission’s 2007 crack cocaine 
amendment, a comprehensive survey of federal district 
court judges, and a report on mandatory minimum 
penalties.34   
Feedback from other parties in the criminal 
justice system is also part of the evolutionary work of 
the Commission.  The Commission regularly invites 
and considers written public comment on its priorities 
and proposed amendments, among other issues.  The 
Commission also actively solicits public input in the 
form of regular public hearings, the work of its 
standing advisory groups, and formal surveys, among 
other approaches.   
Finally, the Commission provides specialized 
training to judges, probation officers, staff attorneys, 
law clerks, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other 
members of the federal criminal justice community on 
federal sentencing issues, including application of the 
guidelines.35  During fiscal year 2011 the Commission 
conducted seminars and programs in most of the 94 
judicial districts in the country, training roughly 7,000 
individuals.   
In addition to fulfilling its core functions, the 
Commission has been called upon to testify at three 
congressional hearings on post-Booker sentencing.36  
                                                 
34  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MULTIVARIATE REPORT; 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: FEDERAL COCAINE SENTENCING 
POLICY (May 2007); 2010 JUDGES’ SURVEY; 2011 
MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT. 
 
35  See 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(17)−(18). 
 
36  Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security., 
109th Cong. 14−23 (2005) (Statement of Ricardo H. 
Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n); United States v. 
Booker: One Year Later―Chaos or Status Quo?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security, 109th Cong. 4−23 (2006) (Statement of Ricardo H. 
Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n); Uncertain Justice: 
The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission Six Years after U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security, 112th Cong. 10−100 (2011) (Statement of Patti B. 
Saris, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n). [hereinafter 2011 Chair 
Statement to Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland 
Security]. 
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Against a backdrop of renewed interest in federal 
sentencing, the Commission submits this report as a 
continuation of its efforts to inform all three branches 
of government and other interested parties on the 
impact of Booker and its progeny on federal 
sentencing. 
 
CREATION OF THE COMMISSION AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDELINES 
The SRA responded to an emerging consensus 
that the federal sentencing system resulted in such 
“glaring disparities” that it was in need of major 
reform.37  Prior to the SRA, judges possessed almost 
unlimited and unguided authority to fashion an 
appropriate sentence.  Criminal statutes set broad 
ranges of minimum and maximum punishments, but 
no statute listed the purposes of sentencing.  As a 
result, each judge was left to decide the various goals 
of sentencing, the relevant aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and the way in which those factors 
would be combined in determining a specific sentence.  
Neither party had any meaningful right of appellate 
review because sentences were limited only by 
statutory minimums and maximums.38 
Studies at the time revealed that judges at 
different ends of the spectrum held widely divergent 
views on the purposes of sentencing, with some judges 
emphasizing rehabilitation and others emphasizing 
“just deserts.”39  Not surprisingly, because each judge 
was “left to apply his own notions of the purposes of 
sentencing,” the federal sentencing system exhibited 
“an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders 
convicted of similar crimes.”40  Average sentences 
                                                 
37  See S. REP. NO. 97-307, at 956 (1981) (“glaring 
disparities . . . can be traced directly to the unfettered 
discretion the law confers on those judges and parole 
authorities [that implement] the sentence”); H.R. REP. NO. 
98-1017, at 34 (1984) (“The absence of Congressional 
guidance to the judiciary has all but guaranteed that . . . 
similarly situated offenders . . . will receive different 
sentences.”). 
 
38  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38-39, 40. 
 
39  Id. at 41 n.18  (1983) (citing INSLAW Inc., and 
Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Federal Sentencing: 
Toward a More Explicit Policy of Criminal Sanctions, III-4 
(1981)). 
 
40  S. REP. No. 97-307, at 955. 
varied across the nation for many federal offenses, 
sometimes by a number of years.41  A study of district 
court judges in the Second Circuit given identical files 
based on actual cases and asked how they would 
sentence the defendants revealed “astounding” 
variations in the sentences imposed.42  
Sentencing prior to the SRA also lacked 
transparency and certainty.  No statute required judges 
to explain the reasons for the sentence, and the time 
defendants would actually serve in prison was not 
announced in open court.43  Instead, after the 
defendant began serving the sentence, the United 
States Parole Commission decided when the defendant 
would be released based largely on its judgment about 
when an offender’s rehabilitation was complete.44  The 
release of offenders based on inconsistent ideas among 
parole hearing officers regarding the potential for 
rehabilitation exacerbated the lack of uniformity in 
sentencing.45  In addition, this system of indeterminate 
sentencing by its nature did not allow public access to 
the reasons underlying the court’s sentencing decision 
or the United States Parole Commission’s decision 
about when to release an offender.46  In 1984, 
Congress responded to these concerns by enacting the 
SRA, which sought to eliminate unwarranted disparity 
in sentencing and address the inequalities created by 
indeterminate sentencing.47   
 
                                                 
41  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41 n.21. 
 
42  Id. at 41.  The sentences imposed on the same bank 
robber ranged from 5 to 18 years in prison.  Sentences in a 
case of filing a false tax return ranged from 3 months in 
prison, plus a $5,000 fine, to 3 years in prison plus a $5,000 
fine.  Id. at 42-43.  In the case of an offender convicted of 
securities fraud, one judge imposed a sentence of 2 years in 
prison, another imposed a sentence of 3 years of probation, 
and yet another judge imposed only a $2,500 fine.  Id. 
 
43  Id. at 39. 
 
44  Id. at 38. 
 
45  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, COMMISSION REPORT ON THE 
OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM, at 9 (1991) (citing 
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978)). 
 
46  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 39. 
 
47  S. REP. NO. 97-307; H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017 (1984); 28 
U.S.C. § 994(k). 
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Sentencing Reform in the SRA 
 
In the SRA, Congress set forth four purposes 
of sentencing, any of which might take precedence in 
an individual case, but none of which would take 
precedence in the broader scheme of sentencing:48 
 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the 
law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence 
to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care or other 
correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner[.]49 
 
The provision regarding the need for the 
sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense” reflected the retributive 
“just deserts” concept.  “[I]t is another way of saying 
that the sentence should reflect the gravity of the 
defendant’s conduct.”50  The concept of deterrence 
was seen as an especially important consideration.  For 
example, the fact that “[m]ajor white collar criminals 
often [were] sentenced to small fines and little or no 
imprisonment . . . create[d] the impression that certain 
offenses . . . [could] be written off as a cost of doing 
business.”51  The provision regarding protecting the 
public expressed Congress’s concern about “those 
offenders whose criminal histories show[ed] repeated 
serious violations of the law.”52  Finally, while 
imprisonment was “not an appropriate means of 
promoting correction and rehabilitation[,]”53 
                                                 
48  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 75-77. 
 
49  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
 
50  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 75. 
 
51  Id. at 76. 
 
52  Id. 
 
53  18 U.S.C. § 3582(a); see also Tapia v. United States, 131 
S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (2011) (“[Section] 3582(a) tells courts 
rehabilitation was “a particularly important 
consideration in formulating conditions for persons 
placed on probation.”54  The SRA also established that 
sentences should be “sufficient but not greater than 
necessary” to meet the purposes set forth in                   
§ 3553(a)(2), including the seriousness of the offense, 
deterrence, protection of the public, and needed 
correctional treatment.55   
The SRA established a robust right of appeal56 
and meaningful appellate review of federal sentences 
for the first time.57  The right of appeal supported 
compliance with the guidelines in a number of ways.  
First, the courts of appeals were tasked with ensuring 
that the guidelines were properly determined in 
individual cases.  Section 3742 did not allow appeals 
by either party of sentences within a properly 
determined guidelines range.  Specifically, 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3742(a) provided that a defendant may appeal if the 
sentence: 
 
(1) was imposed in violation of 
law; (2) was imposed as a result 
of an incorrect application of the 
sentencing guidelines or; (3) is 
greater than the sentence specified 
in the applicable guideline range    
. . . ; or (4) was imposed for an 
offense for which there is no 
sentencing guideline and is plainly 
unreasonable.58 
                                                                                  
that they should acknowledge that imprisonment is not 
suitable for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation.”). 
 
54  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76. 
 
55  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence 
sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.”). 
 
56  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 
57  See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96 (“Before the Guidelines system, 
a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for 
all practical purposes, not reviewable on appeal.”); 
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) 
(reiterating “the general proposition that once it is 
determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth 
in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is 
at an end.”). 
 
58  18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
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Section 3472(b) extended to the government the right 
to appeal on the same bases, except that it could only 
appeal those sentences that were “less than the 
sentence specified in the applicable guideline range.”59  
Appellate review of departures was deemed 
“essential” to ensuring proper application of the 
guidelines,60 and, therefore, district courts were 
required to state on the record the reasons for the 
sentence so that the courts of appeals would have full 
information about how courts reached their sentencing 
decisions.61   
Further, legislative history of the SRA reveals 
that Congress intended the right of appeal to go hand 
in hand with the guidelines system: 
 
The Committee believes that section 
3742 creates for the first time a 
comprehensive system of review of 
sentences that permits the appellate 
process to focus attention on those 
sentences whose review is crucial to 
the functioning of the sentencing 
guidelines system, while also 
providing adequate means for 
correction of erroneous and clearly 
unreasonable sentences.62  
 
Congress also anticipated that the 
Commission’s work would inform appellate courts.  
“[I]t is expected that the policy statements will be 
consulted at all stages of the criminal justice system, 
including the appellate courts, in evaluating the 
                                                 
59  18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).   
 
60  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 151.   
 
61  Id. at 60.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).  Judges could 
depart from the guidelines in any case upon a finding that 
“an aggravating or mitigating circumstance [was] present in 
the case that was not adequately considered in the 
formulation of the guidelines[.]”  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51.  
See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). 
 
62  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 155.  From the outset, Congress 
intended the courts of appeals to support general compliance 
with the guidelines, which in turn would reduce 
unwarranted disparity.  The SRA established two principle 
determinants in sentencing: “the prior records of offenders 
and the criminal conduct for which they are to be 
sentenced.”  Id. at 161. 
 
appropriateness of the sentence and corrections 
program applied to a particular case.”63 
The Commission and a set of guidelines that 
judges were required to follow were central to the 
sentencing reform envisioned by Congress.  “The 
[congressional] Committee resisted [the] attempt to 
make the sentencing guidelines more voluntary than 
mandatory” because studies and testimony before 
Congress noted that voluntary guidelines in the states 
had a “poor record” and “were completely ineffective 
in reducing sentencing disparities.”64  Congress 
studied guidelines systems adopted by the states and 
considered Minnesota’s guideline system to be 
successful for three main reasons:  the guidelines were 
required, not voluntary; the guidelines reflected policy 
judgments about what any given sentence ought to be, 
rather than merely reflecting past sentencing practices; 
and appellate review of sentences outside of the 
guideline range “assure[d] judicial compliance.”65  To 
achieve Congress’s statutory purposes of sentencing, 
the SRA created the Commission as an independent 
agency within the judicial branch66 and directed it to 
promulgate guidelines that were required to be used 
for sentencing within the prescribed statutory 
maximum.67 
Congress also envisioned the guidelines 
system to be flexible “in providing the sentencing 
                                                 
63  Id. at 167-68. 
 
64  Id. at 79. 
 
65  Id. at 62. 
 
66  Established as “as an independent commission in the 
Judicial Branch of the United States,” the Commission 
comprises seven voting members (including the Chair) 
appointed by the President “by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.”  The Act provides that “[a]t least 
[three] of the [Commission’s] members shall be Federal 
judges selected after considering a list of six judges 
recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of 
the United States” and no more than four members of the 
Commission can be members of the same political party.  
The Attorney General, or the Attorney General’s designee, 
and the Chairman of the United States Parole Commission 
are designated as ex officio non-voting members.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 991(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (Pub. L. No. 98-
473; 98 Stat. 2032 [set out in an Effective and Applicability 
Provisions note under this section]). 
 
67  See 28 U.S.C. § 994. 
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judge with a range of options from which to fashion an 
appropriate sentence”68 and noted that the guidelines 
would not “remove all of the judge’s sentencing 
discretion.”69  While Congress envisioned “that most 
cases [would] result in sentences within the guideline 
range,” there would be “appropriate” instances when 
sentences fell outside the applicable guideline range.70  
Reflecting the balance struck between the goals of 
certainty and uniformity in sentencing and the need to 
retain sufficient flexibility to individualize sentences, 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) codified the limited authority of 
sentencing courts to impose a sentence outside the 
sentencing guideline range: 
 
[T]he court shall impose a sentence of 
the kind, and within the range, 
referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless 
the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that 
described.71 
 
The SRA’s Directives to the Commission 
 
In meeting those purposes set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), Congress specifically charged the 
Commission with establishing federal sentencing 
guidelines that provided certainty, fairness, national 
uniformity, and avoided unwarranted disparities 
among defendants with similar criminal records who 
were found guilty of similar conduct.72  At the same 
time, the guidelines were to maintain sufficient 
                                                 
68  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 50. 
 
69  Id. at 51. 
 
70  Id. at 52.  Congress specifically noted that it believed a 
sentencing judge “has an obligation to consider all the 
relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside 
the guidelines in an appropriate case.”  Id. 
 
71  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), excised by United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 
72  28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A).   
 
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when 
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors of a 
kind or to a degree not adequately taken into account 
in the guidelines. 73  Finally, Congress also charged the 
Commission with assessing whether sentencing, penal, 
and correctional practices are meeting the purposes of 
sentencing.74  It was anticipated that the guidelines 
would “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement 
in knowledge of human behavior as it relate[s] to the 
criminal justice process.”75  The guidelines were seen 
as “an unprecedented opportunity in the Federal 
system to look at sentencing patterns as a whole to 
assure that the sentences imposed are consistent with 
the purposes of sentencing.”76  It was expected that the 
guidelines would result in proportional punishment by 
“treat[ing] all classes of offenses committed by all 
categories of offenders consistently.”77  
Anticipating that the guidelines would evolve 
over time in response to data and public comment, 
Congress “necessarily contemplated that the 
Commission would periodically review the work of 
the courts, and would make whatever clarifying 
revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial 
interpretations might suggest.”78  The first 
Commission also acknowledged that the courts’ 
sentencing decisions would significantly inform its 
work on the guidelines over time: 
 
The Commission is a permanent body, 
empowered by law to write and 
rewrite guidelines, with progressive 
changes, over many years.  By 
monitoring when courts depart from 
the guidelines and by analyzing their 
stated reasons for doing so, the 
Commission, over time, will be able 
to create more accurate guidelines that 
                                                 
73  28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). 
 
74  28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2). 
 
75  28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C). 
 
76  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51. 
 
77  Id. 
  
78  Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991). 
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specify precisely where departures 
should and should not be permitted.79 
 
Directives: Categories of Offenses and Offenders 
 
The SRA directed the Commission to 
consider, and take into account to the extent they are 
relevant, seven factors in its formulation of offense 
categories: (1) the grade of the offense; (2) the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime; 
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the 
crime; (4) the community view of the gravity of the 
offense; (5) the public concern generated by the crime; 
(6) the deterrent effect that a particular sentence may 
have on others; and (7) the current incidence of the 
offense.80    
The SRA directed the Commission to develop 
sentencing ranges applicable for specific categories of 
offenses involving particular categories of offenders.  
Congress expected that “there [would] be numerous 
guidelines ranges, each range describing a somewhat 
different combination of offender characteristics and 
offense circumstances,” including “several guideline 
ranges for a single offense varying on the basis of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.”81  
Congress intended that there would “be a complete set 
of sentencing guidelines that covers in one way or 
another all important variations that commonly may be 
expected in criminal cases, and that reliably breaks 
cases into their relevant components and assures 
consistent and fair results.”82   
More specifically, the SRA required that the 
sentencing ranges be consistent with all pertinent 
provisions of title 18 of the United States Code, and 
that they not include sentences in excess of the 
statutorily prescribed maximum sentence.83  It also 
directed that, for sentences of imprisonment, “the 
maximum of the range established for such a term 
shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more 
than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, 
                                                 
79  USSG Ch.1, Pt.A(4)(b) (Apr. 13, 1987). 
 
80  28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(1)−(7). 
 
81  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 168.   
 
82  Id. 
 
83  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 375 (1989); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1). 
 
if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, 
the maximum may be life imprisonment.”84  
 
Directives: Sentence Length 
 
The SRA contained several directives related 
to sentence length for certain types of offenses and 
offenders.  For example, legislative history reflected 
concern that white collar offenders were often 
“sentenced to small fines and little or no imprisonment 
. . . creat[ing] the impression that certain offenses are 
punishable by a small fine that can be written off as a 
cost of doing business.”85  Accordingly, the 
Commission was required to ensure that the guidelines 
reflected the fact that, “in many cases, current 
sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of 
the offense.”86  The Commission, therefore, was not 
“bound by such average sentences” but rather was 
required to “independently develop a sentencing range 
that is consistent with the purposes of sentencing 
described in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United 
States Code.”87   
The SRA also directed that the sentencing 
guidelines require a term of confinement at or near the 
statutorily prescribed maximum sentence for certain 
crimes of violence and for drug offenses, particularly 
when committed by recidivists.88  The SRA further 
directed the Commission to assure a substantial term 
of imprisonment for an offense constituting a third 
felony conviction, for a career felon, for an individual 
convicted of a managerial role in a racketeering 
enterprise, for a crime of violence by an offender on 
release from a prior felony conviction, and for an 
offense involving a substantial quantity of narcotics.89  
Various aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
                                                 
84  28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).  The Sentencing Reform Act 
originally provided that the maximum of the range shall not 
exceed the minimum by more than “25 per centum,” but this 
language was amended in 1986 to its present language.  See 
Pub. L. No. 99-363, § 2 (1986). 
 
85  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76. 
 
86  28 U.S.C. § 994(m). 
 
87  Id. 
 
88  28 U.S.C. § 994(h). 
 
89  28 U.S.C. § 994(i). 
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such as multiple offenses and substantial assistance to 
the government, were to be reflected in the sentencing 
guidelines.90   
 
Directives: Offender Characteristics 
 
The SRA addressed offender characteristics in 
three provisions.  Section 994 of Title 18 governed 
how the Commission should treat certain offender 
characteristics in the guidelines, listing eleven 
additional factors for the Commission to consider in 
formulating the guidelines and policy statements, to 
the extent that they had any relevance “to the nature, 
extent, place of service, or other incidents of an 
appropriate sentence”: age; education; vocational 
skills; mental and emotional condition; physical 
condition; previous employment record; family ties 
and responsibilities; community ties; role in the 
offense; criminal history; and degree of dependence 
upon criminal activity for a livelihood.91   The SRA 
required that the Commission ensure that the 
guidelines be “entirely neutral” as to the race, sex, 
national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of 
offenders,92 and instructed that the sentencing 
guidelines should reflect the general inappropriateness 
of considering the education, vocational skills, 
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, 
and community ties of offenders.93    
Section 3553(a)(1) of Title 18 directed courts 
to consider “the history and characteristics of the 
defendant,” among other factors, in determining the 
                                                 
90  28 U.S.C. § 994(l) and (n), respectively. 
 
91  28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(1)−(11).  The legislative history 
provides additional guidance for the Commission’s 
consideration of the statutory factors.  For example, the 
history indicates Congress’s intent that the “criminal history 
. . . factor includes not only the number of prior criminal 
acts – whether or not they resulted in convictions – the 
defendant has engaged in, but their seriousness, their 
recentness or remoteness, and their indication whether the 
defendant is a ‘career criminal’ or a manager of a criminal 
enterprise.”  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 174.  The promulgated 
guidelines include these and other criminal history measures 
that necessarily may require judicial factfinding extending 
well beyond the ascertainment of the fact of prior 
convictions.  See USSG Ch.4 (Nov. 2012). 
 
92  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d). 
 
93  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e). 
 
particular sentence to be imposed on that defendant.94   
After considering all of these factors, including the 
guidelines and policy statements, the court was 
required to sentence a defendant within the applicable 
guideline range unless the court found that there 
existed “an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of 
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described.”95   
Finally, section 3661 of Title 18 recodified 18 
U.S.C. § 3577 without change: 
 
No limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of 
a person convicted of an offense 
which a court of the United States 
may receive and consider for the 
purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence.96 
 
Implementation of the SRA’s Directives 
 
In considering sentencing guidelines to 
implement the SRA, the Commission was required to 
resolve a host of important policy questions.97  For 
example, the Commission had to decide whether 
appropriate punishment would be defined primarily on 
the principles of just deserts or crime control.  
Consistent with the SRA’s rejection of a single 
doctrinal approach in favor of one that would attempt 
to balance all the objectives of sentencing, the 
Commission did not choose one theory over the 
                                                 
94  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
 
95  18 U.S.C § 3553(b)(1). 
 
96  18 U.S.C. § 3661.  The Commission incorporated this 
statute into the guidelines at USSG §1B1.4 (“In determining 
the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or 
whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the 
court may consider, without limitation, any information 
concerning the background, character and conduct of the 
defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. See             
18 U.S.C. § 3661.”). 
 
97  See USSG Ch.1, Pt.A(1)(4) (Nov. 2012). 
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other.98  Instead, the guidelines embody aspects of 
both just deserts and crime-control philosophies of 
sentencing.99   
 
Implementation of Directives: Categories of Offenses 
 
Categorizing offenses was a difficult task due 
to the complexity of the federal criminal code.  The 
code contained “‘innumerable statutes dealing with 
such basic offenses as theft and fraud’” that were 
“‘scattered about hither and yon among various titles 
of the United States Code’” resulting in “‘conflicting 
court interpretations.’”100  The first Guidelines Manual 
listed more than 700 penal statutes or subsections 
thereof in Appendix A (Statutory Index),101 and the 
2012 Guidelines Manual references more than 1,200 
different statutes or subsections thereof.102  Because 
the major goal of the SRA was to increase uniformity 
in sentencing while not sacrificing proportionality, the 
sentencing guidelines had to authorize appropriately 
different sentences for criminal conduct of 
significantly different severity.103   
The Commission examined existing state 
guidelines systems’ methods of categorizing offenses 
and offenders.104  The Commission rejected the 
approaches many states used, concluding that “[s]tate 
guidelines systems which use relatively few, simple 
categories and narrow imprisonment ranges . . . are ill 
suited to the breadth and diversity of federal 
                                                 
98  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON 
INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 
at 16 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON 
INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
 
99  Id.  
 
100  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS: STATUTORY PENALTIES PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
AND COMPILATIONS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL OFFENSES at vi 
(1989) (quoting Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Law and Proc. of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 
101  See USSG App. A (Apr. 13, 1987). 
 
102  See USSG App. A (Nov. 2012). 
 
103  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE 
INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES at 13 (1991).   
 
104  Id. at 14.   
 
crimes.”105  For example, under many states’ systems, 
“a single category of robbery . . . lumped together 
armed and unarmed robberies, robberies with and 
without injuries, [and] robberies of a few dollars and 
robberies of millions,” and thus “would have been far 
too simplistic to achieve just and effective [federal] 
sentences, especially given the narrowness of the 
permissible sentencing ranges.”106  Consequently, the 
Commission determined that the sentencing guidelines 
should be descriptive of generic conduct rather than 
track statutory language.107   
The Commission ultimately decided to create 
a system requiring a court to consider, within 
constraints, the defendant’s real offense conduct and 
the defendant’s criminal history.  The Commission 
created a sentencing table with 43 offense levels and 
six criminal history categories.  The offense level 
(located on the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table) is 
determined based upon the offense conduct and the 
particular harms associated with the defendant’s crime.  
The offense level increases based upon the severity of 
the offense committed as well as the number of 
identified harms associated with the commission of the 
offense.  For example, in a drug crime, the base 
offense level is determined by the type and quantity of 
drug involved in the offense of conviction and related 
criminal conduct (whether charged or uncharged).  
The base offense level is enhanced, for example, if the 
crime involved a firearm.108  A defendant’s role in the 
offense or other conduct can result in an increase or 
decrease of the offense level.109  Determination of the 
sentence also requires a determination of the 
defendant’s criminal history (located on the horizontal 
axis of the Sentencing Table).110  Once the offense 
level and criminal history are calculated, the 
applicable sentencing range is determined by use of 
the sentencing table.111    
                                                 
105  Id. 
 
106   Id. at 13. 
 
107  See USSG Ch.1, Pt.A(1)(A)(4)(a) (Nov. 2012). 
 
108  USSG §2D1.1(b)(1) (Nov. 2012). 
 
109  See USSG Ch.3 (Nov. 2012) for other adjustments that 
apply to a wide variety of offenses. 
 
110  See USSG Ch.4 (Nov. 2012). 
 
111  See USSG Ch.5, Pt.A (Nov. 2012). 
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Like Congress, the Commission recognized 
that departures would play an important role in the 
guideline system because of the “difficulty of 
foreseeing and capturing a single set of guidelines that 
encompasses the vast range of human conduct 
potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.”112  In the 
initial guidelines, the Commission provided the 
following guidance on the use of departures: 
 
The Commission intends the 
sentencing courts to treat each 
guideline as carving out a “heartland,” 
a set of typical cases embodying the 
conduct that each guideline describes.  
When a court finds an atypical case, 
one to which a particular guideline 
linguistically applies but where 
conduct significantly differs from the 
norm, the court may consider whether 
a departure is warranted.113 
 
The Commission also anticipated that some individual 
offender characteristics such as age, education and 
vocational skills, and family ties and responsibilities 
could “constitute grounds for a departure in an unusual 
case.”114 
 
Implementation of Directives: Sentence Length 
 
In incorporating data on then extant 
sentencing practices in accordance with 28 U.S.C.       
§ 994(m), the Commission examined data for nearly 
100,000 federal convictions, which included a 
description of the offense, a characterization of the 
defendant’s background and criminal record, the 
method of disposition of the case, and the sentence 
imposed, including both sentences of imprisonment 
and those of probation.115  The Commission 
                                                                                  
 112  USSG Ch.1, Pt.A(4)(b) (Apr. 13, 1987). 
 
113  Id. 
 
114  Id.; USSG §§5H1.1, p.s. (Age), 5H1.2, p.s. (Education 
and Vocational Skills (Policy Statement)), 5H1.6, p.s.  
(Family Ties and Responsibilities, and Community Ties) 
(Apr. 1987).  See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) and (e). 
 
115  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON 
INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, at 16, 21.   
 
considered more detailed information for more than 
10,000 defendants, including their presentence 
investigation reports and the time actually served by 
those defendants sentenced to prison.116  The 
Commission also examined the United States Parole 
Commission’s guidelines and resulting statistics, 
public commentary, and information from other 
relevant sources to determine existing sentencing 
practices and to detail the specific characteristics of 
offenses and offenders that judges considered salient at 
sentencing.117   
In determining then extant sentence lengths, 
the Commission identified offenders who were 
sentenced to prison, then computed average sentence 
lengths for those offenders.  The Commission also 
considered the estimated percentage of defendants 
sentenced to probation for the offense.118  The 
Commission used both sentence length for those 
sentenced to prison, and the estimated percentage of 
defendants sentenced to probation, to determine then 
extant sentencing practices.  This information 
“provided a concrete starting point and identified a list 
of relevant distinctions that, although of considerable 
length, [was] still short enough to create a manageable 
set of guidelines.”119   
Although the guideline ranges for many 
offenses incorporated then extant sentencing practices, 
the Commission was cognizant of the fact that past 
sentencing practices were merely a starting point.  The 
first Guidelines Manual, for example, set sentence 
ranges equal to or higher than the average time served 
under then extant sentencing practices for many white 
collar offenses.120   
                                                 
116  Id.  
 
117  See id. at 16. 
 
118  See id. at 23-24, 27-34.  For example, then extant 
sentencing practices resulted in a range of 2 to 8 months of 
imprisonment for an unsophisticated embezzlement of less 
than $1,500, if a prison term was imposed.  Id. at 24.  
However, a prison term was imposed in only about 24 
percent of such cases, with probation imposed in the other 
76 percent.  Id.  “Because of this, the average time served by 
all first-time embezzlers convicted at trial of stealing [was] 
actually about 1 month (rather than 2-8 months).”  Id.   
 
119  Id. at 16. 
 
120  For example, under then extant sentencing practices, a 
defendant convicted of a sophisticated fraud involving a loss 
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The Commission also examined public views 
on offense seriousness and sentencing policy in 
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4) and (5), which 
require the Commission to consider, and take account 
only to the extent that they do have relevance, the 
“community view of the gravity of the offense”  and 
the “public concern generated by the offense” in 
formulating the guidelines.  With respect to the 
community view of the gravity of the offense, 
Congress explained how changes in community norms 
concerning particular criminal behavior might “justify 
increasing or decreasing the recommended penalties 
for the offense.”121  Moreover, Congress 
acknowledged that there may be circumstances in 
which the Commission might find it appropriate to 
consider regional differences in community views 
                                                                                  
of between $60,001 and $400,000 would receive a sentence 
of 15-21 months of imprisonment if sentenced to prison, and 
74 percent of sophisticated fraud defendants with these loss 
amounts were sentenced to prison.  See U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON INITIAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, at 33.  Use of the 1987 
Guidelines Manual resulted in a guideline range of 12-18 
months’ imprisonment for a first-time offender with a loss 
of $50,001-$100,000 (offense level 13 with more than 
minimal planning increase); a guidelines range of 15-21 
months for a loss of $100,001 to $200,000 (offense level 14 
with more than minimal planning increase); and a guideline 
range of 18-24 months for a loss of $200,001 to $500,000 
(offense level 15 with more than minimal planning 
increase).  USSG §2F1.1 (Apr. 1987).  For defendants 
convicted of embezzling less than $2,000, the 1987 
Guidelines Manual provided for guideline ranges which 
authorized sentencing judges to impose probation in lieu of 
confinement.  This range was lower than then extant 
sentencing practices for those embezzlement offenders 
sentenced to prison.  USSG §2B1.1 (Apr. 1987).  
 
121   S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 170.  Congress provided two 
examples of action by the Parole Commission to “suggest 
the kinds of situations in which the Commission might wish 
to reflect the community view of an offense in its 
guidelines: the Parole Commission has in recent years 
lowered the guidelines parole dates applicable to simple 
possession of marihuana, and, following the Vietnam War, 
lowered the guidelines parole dates for draft violations.”  Id.  
Congress suggested that “similarly, if there were a 
substantial increase in the rate of commission of a very 
serious crime, the public concern generated by that increase 
might cause the Commission to conclude that the guidelines 
sentences for that offense should be increased.”  Id. at 170-
71.   
 
when drafting guidelines that would apply 
nationwide.122  Despite its acknowledgement of 
community norms, Congress made clear its goal of 
nationwide consistency.  Therefore, if regional 
differences in community views were to be considered 
at all, they were to be considered by the Commission, 
not by individual judges.   
In addition to reviewing contemporaneous 
legal and social science research about public 
assessments of crime and punishment,123 the 
Commission held a public hearing on the issue of 
offense seriousness in April 1986, at which a wide 
variety of interested organizations and individuals 
shared their views.124  In preparation for the hearing, 
                                                 
122  Id. at 170 n.408.  (“It is expected that, while nationwide 
consistency in Federal cases is generally desirable, in certain 
situations the Commission may find it appropriate to draft 
the guidelines to take account of considerations based on 
pertinent regional differences.”).   
 
123  See, e.g., SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, PUBLIC AND 
INMATE ASSESSMENT OF PRISON SENTENCES, Fed. 1980 
(Oregon State Univ. Corvallis); David Smith & C. McCurdy 
Lipsey, Public Opinion and Penal Policy, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 
113-124 (May 1976); Craig Boydell & Carl Grindstaff, 
Public Opinion Toward Legal Sanctions for Crimes of 
Violence, 65 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 113-116 
(1974); Charles Thomas, Robin Cage, & Samuel Foster, 
Public Opinion on Criminal Law and Legal Sanctions, J. 
CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 110-116 
(1976); Don Gibbons, Joseph Jones, & Peter Garabedian, 
Gauging Public Opinion about the Crime Problem, 18 
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 134-146 (April 1972); Phoebe 
Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital 
Punishment, 29 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, 116-69 (Jan. 
1983); John Doble, Crime and Punishment: The Public’s 
View (Public Agenda Found., June 1987); Tony Poveda, 
The Fear of Crime in a Small Town, 18 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 147-53 (April 1972); National Criminal 
Justice Association, Opinion Study Shows Public Concern 
With Sentencing, Prison Issues, JUSTICE RESEARCH (August 
1987); Joseph E. Jacoby & Christopher S. Dunn, NATIONAL 
SURVEY ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Bowling Green State Univ. Oct. 27, 
1987). 
 
124  Representatives from the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, the Federal Probation Officers 
Association, the Federal Public Defender Association, the 
National Rifle Association, the American Civil Liberties 
Union – National Prison Project, the National Interreligious 
Service Board for Conscientious Objectors, the Washington 
Legal Foundation, the Institute for Government and Politics, 
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the Commission requested written feedback from more 
than 325 circuit and district court judges, United States 
Attorneys, federal public defenders, defense attorneys, 
probation officers, criminal justice organizations, and 
editorial page editors of 40 of the largest newspapers 
in the country, sending each individual and 
organization both general offense seriousness 
questions as well as a more detailed questionnaire on 
individual offense scenarios.125  The Commission 
followed up on the offense seriousness questionnaire 
with a survey of more than 1,700 citizens throughout 
the United States on their perceptions of federal 
sentences.126   The survey, conducted in 1993 and 
1994, “identified links between the public’s just 
punishment perceptions and elements of the guideline 
calculations[.]”127 
Also with respect to sentence length, the 
Commission implemented the directive in 28 U.S.C.   
§ 994(h) by promulgating §4B1.1 (Career Offender).  
The career offender guideline prescribed an increased 
sentence for an adult defendant convicted of a “crime 
of violence” or a “controlled substance offense” if the 
defendant had previously been convicted of at least 
two other such felony offenses.  The guideline 
provided that such defendants would have a Criminal 
History Category of VI and an offense level that 
depended upon the statutory maximum for the offense 
of conviction.  The offense levels ranged from 12 to 37 
so that the guideline range for a career offender would 
be at or near the applicable statutory maximum. 
The background commentary to §4B1.1 
explained the Commission’s view of the relationship 
between the provisions of the SRA, including 28 
                                                                                  
Crime Magazine, and the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers testified at the April 1986 hearing.  See 
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PUBLIC HEARING ON OFFENSE 
SERIOUSNESS, Washington, D.C. (transcript) (April 1986). 
 
125  See Memorandum from Paul K. Martin to 
Commissioners & Staff Director, “Offense Seriousness 
Questionnaire,” (March 24, 1986); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
PUBLIC HEARING ON OFFENSE SERIOUSNESS, transcript at 5. 
 
126  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESEARCH BULLETIN, JUST 
PUNISHMENT: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES , at 1, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/Miscellan
eous/199703_Just_Punishment.PDF. 
 
127  Id.  
 
U.S.C. § 994(h), and §4B1.1 as promulgated by the 
Commission.  The “definition of a career offender 
track[s] in large part the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(h),” but the Commission “has modified this 
definition in several respects to focus more precisely 
on the class of recidivist offenders for whom a lengthy 
term of imprisonment is appropriate and avoid 
‘unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar criminal conduct.’”128  In creating §4B1.1, the 
Commission acted “in accord with its general 
guideline promulgation authority under 28 U.S.C.       
§ 994(a)-(f), and its amendment authority under 28 
U.S.C. § 994(o) and (p)” and its view that “Congress’s 
choice of a directive to the Commission rather than a 
mandatory minimum sentencing statute” indicated 
Congress’s intent that the Commission ensure that the 
provision was appropriately tailored.129 
 
Implementation of Directives: Offender 
Characteristics 
 
The Commission recognized that, similar to 
the difficulty noted in establishing guidelines to cover 
every possible offender and offense characteristic, 
“[c]ircumstances that may warrant a departure from 
the guidelines cannot . . . by their very nature, be 
comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance.”130  
Therefore, when the Commission promulgated the 
initial set of guidelines, with some specific 
exceptions,131 it did not restrict the kinds of factors 
that, whether or not mentioned in the guidelines, could 
constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.132   
                                                 
128  USSG §4B1.1, comment. (backg’d) (Nov. 2012) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)). 
 
129  Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-255, at 175). 
 
130  USSG §5K2, p.s. (General Provisions) (Apr. 1987). 
 
131  See, e.g., USSG §5H1.10, p.s. (Race, Sex, National 
Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status) (Apr. 
1987).  The Commission subsequently promulgated 
amendments prohibiting the court from considering 
additional factors as grounds for departure in §5H1.12, p.s. 
(Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar Circumstances) 
(Nov. 1992) and §5K2.19, p.s. (Post-Sentencing 
Rehabilitative Efforts) (Nov. 2000). 
 
132  USSG Ch.1, Pt.A(4)(b) (Apr. 1987). 
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)133 and (e),134 
the Commission did, however, adopt several policy 
statements in Chapter Five, Parts H and K limiting the 
relevance of certain offender characteristics to the 
determination of whether a sentence should be outside 
the applicable guideline range.  The Commission 
deemed education, vocational skills, employment 
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community 
ties “ordinarily not relevant in determining whether a 
departure is warranted,” although several of these 
factors were considered relevant in determining the 
conditions of probation or supervised release.135  
Those factors also could be considered in an 
exceptional case, and courts had full discretion to 
consider them in determining the sentence within the 
applicable guideline range.  In contrast, in response to 
section 994(d),136 the Commission deemed race, 
gender, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic 
status “not relevant in the determination of a 
sentence.”137  
 
                                                 
133  28 U.S.C. § 994(d) directs the Commission to take into 
account, “only to the extent that they do have relevance,” 
the defendant’s:  (1) age; (2) education; (3) vocational skills; 
(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such 
condition mitigates the defendant’s culpability or to the 
extent that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant; (5) 
physical condition, including drug dependence;  (6) 
previous employment record; (7) family ties and 
responsibilities; (8) community ties; (9) role in the offense; 
(10) criminal history; and (11) degree of dependence upon 
criminal activity for a livelihood.  Section 994(d) further 
directs the Commission to “assure that the guidelines and 
policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, 
national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of 
offenders.” 
 
134  28 U.S.C. § 994(e) directs the Commission to “assure 
that the guidelines and policy statements,  in recommending 
a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, 
reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the 
education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties 
and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.” 
 
135  See, e.g., USSG §§5H1.1, p.s. (Nov. 2009), 5H1.2, p.s. 
(Nov. 2009), 5H1.3, p.s. (Nov. 2009), 5H1.6, p.s. (Nov. 
2009).  
 
136  28 U.S.C. § 944(d). 
 
137  USSG §5H1.10, p.s. (Nov. 2012). 
 
EVOLUTION OF THE GUIDELINES 
 
The Commission expected that its work on the 
sentencing guidelines would be evolutionary138 and 
that it would gather and analyze data from actual 
practice, receive feedback through testimony, 
sentencing and appellate decisions, and various forms 
of public comment, and revise the guidelines over 
time.  Since the promulgation of the original set of 
sentencing guidelines through the present, the 
Commission has amended the sentencing guidelines 
over 750 times in response to court decisions, 
legislation, public comment, and the Commission’s 
own evaluations of the need to change the 
guidelines.139   
Departures were considered an important 
mechanism by which the Commission could receive 
and consider feedback from courts regarding the 
operation of the guidelines.  The Commission, 
therefore, foresaw that a high or increasing rate of 
departures for a particular offense, for example, might 
indicate that the guideline for that offense does not 
take into account adequately a particular recurring 
circumstance and should be amended accordingly, or 
that the severity or proportionality of the guidelines for 
particular offenses or offenders should be adjusted.  
The Commission envisioned that such feedback from 
the courts would enhance its ability to fulfill its 
ongoing statutory responsibility under the SRA to 
periodically review and revise the guidelines.140  
                                                 
138  USSG Ch.1, Pt.A, intro. comment. (“The Commission 
emphasizes, however that it views the guideline-writing 
process as evolutionary.  It expects, and the governing 
statute anticipates, that continuing research, experience, and 
analysis will result in modifications and revisions to the 
guidelines through submission of amendments to 
Congress.”).  See also Stephen Breyer, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon 
Which They Rest [hereinafter Breyer, Key Compromises], 17 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8 (1988). 
 
139  Generally, amendments to the sentencing guidelines are 
submitted to Congress by May 1 of each year and take effect 
not later than November 1 of that year, unless Congress 
otherwise provides.  See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p). 
 
140  See 18 U.S.C. § 994(o) (“The Commission periodically 
shall review and revise, in consideration of comments and 
data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated 
pursuant to the provisions of this section.”). 
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Recent changes in crack cocaine penalties141 
exemplify both the evolutionary nature of the 
guidelines and the role of feedback in the form of 
departures and public comment.  Cocaine sentencing 
policy came under extensive criticism from public 
officials, private citizens, criminal justice practitioners, 
researchers, and interest groups challenging the 
efficacy of the 100:1 difference in penalty levels 
between powder and crack cocaine and its 
disproportionate impact on the African American 
community.  In response to these concerns, the 
Commission proposed changes to the sentencing 
guidelines for cocaine offenses and subsequently 
submitted three reports to Congress containing its 
recommendations for reform.142  In 2007, the 
Commission reduced penalties for crack cocaine 
offenders, then did so again after Congress enacted the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,143 which reduced crack 
cocaine penalties by increasing the quantity thresholds 
triggering mandatory minimum penalties for crack 
cocaine offenses and by eliminating the mandatory 
minimum penalty for simple possession of crack 
cocaine.   
 
PRE-BOOKER SUPREME COURT CASE LAW  
AND STATUTORY CHANGES 
 
For nearly 20 years after the guidelines came 
into effect, federal judges were required to impose 
sentences within the applicable guideline range144 
                                                 
141  USSG App. C, amend. 706  (effective Nov. 1, 2007). 
 
142  See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (May 2007), at  
2, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/. 
  
143  Pub. L. No. 111-220 (Aug. 3, 2010). 
 
144  See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379,  391 
(1989) (upholding the constitutionality of  the Commission 
and of the guidelines, noting that “[d]eveloping 
proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a 
virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of 
intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an 
expert body is especially appropriate,” and that  “[j]ust as 
the rules of procedure bind judges and courts in the proper 
management of the cases before them, so the Guidelines 
bind judges and courts in the exercise of their uncontested 
responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases.”). 
 
unless the judge departed pursuant to a guideline 
departure provision, or the judge found the existence 
of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance present 
to a degree not adequately taken into consideration in 
the guidelines, or there existed a circumstance not 
adequately taken into consideration by the 
Commission in formulating the sentencing 
guidelines.145  A series of Supreme Court cases 
rejected challenges to the guidelines’ operation.146  
However, two important events would set the stage for 
later developments.   
First, in 1996, the Supreme Court issued an 
important decision regarding the appellate review of 
sentences, Koon v. United States.147  Koon established 
an abuse of discretion standard for appellate courts 
reviewing trial courts’ application of the guidelines to 
the facts and rejected a de novo standard of review for 
district court judges’ departure decisions, holding that 
departure decisions by district courts are owed 
deference.  In doing so, the Court cited the 
“institutional advantage” district courts have over their 
colleagues on the courts of appeals,148 and observed 
that departure decisions are fact-specific inquiries 
requiring the sentencing judge to determine whether a 
case is “within the heartland given all the facts of the 
case.”149  The Court suggested that Congress “did not 
intend, by establishing limited appellate review, to vest 
in appellate courts wide-ranging authority over district 
court sentencing decisions.”150   
                                                 
145  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), excised by Booker, 543 U.S. at 
250. 
 
146  See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) 
(allowing use of acquitted conduct to enhance the 
defendant’s sentence); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 
87 (1993) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the 
enhancement provision for obstruction of justice violated 
the defendant’s right to testify in his or her own defense).  
 
147  518 U.S. 81 (1996).  For a more detailed examination of 
the Koon decision, see U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (in Response to Section 401(M) 
of Pub. Law 108-21), at 5-7 (2003) [hereinafter 
DEPARTURES REPORT]. 
 
148  518 U.S. at 98-99. 
 
149  Id. at 100. 
 
150  Id. at 97. 
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The Court pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4), 
which provided that “[t]he court of appeals shall give 
due regard to the opportunity of the district court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept 
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are 
clearly erroneous.”151  The Court further noted that the 
statute was amended in 1988 to require courts of 
appeals to “give due deference to the district court’s 
application of the guidelines to the facts.”152  
Therefore, the appellate court’s role was to ensure that 
the district court had not abused its discretion in 
concluding that specific facts sufficed to remove the 
case from the heartland of similar cases.153 
Second, in 2003, Congress enacted the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act (“the PROTECT 
Act”),154 which restricted the use of departures by 
sentencing courts and changed the appellate standard 
of review for cases in which departures were imposed.  
The legislative history of the PROTECT Act reflects 
congressional concern that the increasing rate of 
downward departures from the sentencing guidelines 
at the time was undermining the goals of the SRA, 
particularly the goals of providing certainty and 
uniformity in sentencing and of avoiding unwarranted 
disparity.155   
The PROTECT Act restricted the availability 
of departures, most notably for defendants convicted 
of sexual abuse crimes involving children.  In addition, 
the PROTECT Act sought to reduce the overall rate of 
departures by increasing the specificity with which 
sentencing courts had to justify sentences outside the 
guideline range.  Congress amended 18 U.S.C.            
§ 3553(c) (Statement of reasons for imposing a 
sentence) by requiring a court imposing a sentence 
outside the prescribed guideline range to state “the 
                                                 
151  Id. 
 
152  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)).  By contrast, the 
Court held in Braxton v. United States that the Commission 
had unique authority to resolve conflicts between the circuit 
courts over how to interpret guideline provisions.  500 U.S. 
344 (1991). 
 
153  Koon, 518 U.S. at 100. 
 
154  Pub. L. No. 108-21 (2003). 
 
155  See 149 CONG. REC. H3061 (Apr. 10, 2003). 
 
specific reason” for departing “with specificity in the 
written order of judgment and commitment[.]”156 
The PROTECT Act included several 
directives to the Commission, among them a directive 
to promulgate guideline amendments “to ensure that 
the incidence of downward departures are [sic] 
substantially reduced.”157  The Commission responded 
to these directives and statutory changes with two 
amendments implementing the PROTECT Act’s direct 
amendments to the guidelines158 and an eight-part 
emergency amendment that modified nine guideline 
provisions.159  The amendment also created the early 
disposition departure (or “fast track”) called for in the 
PROTECT Act at §5K3.1 (Early Disposition 
Programs) (Policy Statement) and a new guideline at 
§1A3.1 (Authority) setting forth the statutory authority 
for the Commission and the guidelines.  The 
amendments’ overall effect was to limit the 
availability of departures by prohibiting certain factors 
as grounds for departure, restricting the availability of 
certain departures, narrowing when certain permitted 
departures were appropriate, and limiting the extent of 
                                                 
156  18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). 
 
157  Pub. L. No. 108-21, section 401(m).  The Commission 
had “been aware of and concerned about the increasing 
incidence of downward departures” before the enactment of 
the PROTECT Act and had already taken certain steps to 
address specific areas of concern.  DEPARTURES REPORT at 
71.  Between 1999 and 2001, the Commission addressed 
divisions among the courts of appeals regarding certain 
types of departures and acted to reduce departures in illegal 
entry cases.   Id. at 71-72; see also USSG App. C, amend. 
602, 603, and 632 (effective Nov. 2001). 
 
158  USSG App. C, amend. 649 (effective Apr. 30, 2003) and 
650 (effective May 30, 2003). 
 
159  USSG §§5K2.0, p.s. (Grounds for Departure), 5H1.4, 
p.s. (Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol 
Dependence or Abuse; Gambling Addiction), 5H1.6, p.s. 
(Family Ties and Responsibilities), 5H1.7, p.s. (Role in the 
Offense), 5H1.8, p.s. (Criminal History), 5K2.10, p.s. 
(Victim’s Conduct), 5K2.12, p.s. (Coercion and Duress), 
5K2.13, p.s. (Diminished Capacity), 5K2.20, p.s. (Aberrant 
Behavior), 4A1.3, p.s. (Departures Based on Inadequacy of 
Criminal History Category), and 6B1.2, p.s. (Standards for 
Acceptance of Plea Agreements).  See USSG App. C, 
amend. 651 (effective Oct. 27, 2003). 
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departures.160  In addition, the Commission addressed 
the new statutory requirement that sentencing courts 
provide specific written justification for departures.161   
The PROTECT Act fundamentally changed 
the appellate review standard established in Koon by 
amending 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) to provide that all 
departures from the guideline range would be subject 
to de novo review.162  In addition, the PROTECT Act 
established factors that courts of appeals had to 
consider when reviewing a sentence, including 
whether the sentence: 
 
(1) was imposed in violation of law;  
 
(2) resulted from the incorrect 
application of the guidelines;  
 
(3) is outside the guideline range, and 
the sentencing court did not provide 
an adequate statement of reasons; 
 
(4) departs from the guideline range 
based on a factor that does not 
advance the objectives in                     
§ 3553(a)(2), is not authorized under   
§ 3553(b), or is not justified by the 
facts of the case; 
 
(5) departs to an unreasonable degree, 
taking into account § 3553(b); or  
 
(6) was imposed for an offense for 
which there are no guidelines and is 
plainly unreasonable.163 
 
THE BOOKER DECISION 
 
In January 2005, the Supreme Court issued its 
landmark decision rendering the federal sentencing 
                                                 
160  DEPARTURES REPORT at 71-72; see also USSG App. C, 
amend. 651 (effective Oct. 27, 2003).   
 
161  DEPARTURES REPORT at 71-72; see also USSG App. C, 
amend. 651 (effective Oct. 27, 2003).  
  
162  Pub. L. No. 108-21, section 401, codified in 18 U.S.C.   
§ 3742(e).  
  
163  18 U.S.C. § 3472(e).   
 
guidelines “effectively advisory.”  In United States v. 
Booker, the Supreme Court addressed two questions: 
 
(1) Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by 
the imposition of an enhanced sentence under 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines based 
on the sentencing judge’s determination of a 
fact (other than a prior conviction) that was 
not found by the jury or admitted by the 
defendant. 
 
(2)  If the answer to the first question is “yes,” . . . 
whether, in a case in which the Guidelines 
would require the court to find a sentence 
enhancing fact, the Sentencing Guidelines as a 
whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of 
severability analysis, such that the sentencing 
court must exercise its discretion to sentence 
the defendant within the maximum and 
minimum set by statute for the offense of 
conviction.164 
 
 The Court answered the first question in the 
affirmative, holding that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior 
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence 
exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts 
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be 
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”165  A different majority of the Court 
answered the question of the appropriate remedy for 
the constitutional violation.  The Court concluded that 
the Sixth Amendment requirement that a jury find 
certain sentencing facts was incompatible with certain 
components of the SRA, and excised the provisions 
that made the sentencing guidelines mandatory.166   
In determining that these provisions could be 
excised, the Court rejected two remedies suggested by 
the government and the dissenting justices.  First, the 
Court rejected the Government’s proposed remedy that 
would “render the Guidelines advisory in ‘any case in 
which the Constitution prohibits’ judicial factfinding” 
and “leave them as binding in all other cases.”167  The 
                                                 
164  543 U.S at 229 n.1. 
 
165  Id. at 244. 
 
166  Id. at 245. 
 
167  Id. at 266.   
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Court held that leaving the guidelines binding in some 
cases but not in others “would impose mandatory 
Guidelines-type limits upon a judge’s ability to reduce 
sentences, but it would not impose those limits upon a 
judge’s ability to increase sentences.”168  The Court 
held that this one-way limit and the complexity of a 
sometimes-mandatory system would not advance the 
congressional objective of uniformity in sentencing.169 
Second, the Court rejected the dissent’s 
proposal to graft a jury factfinding requirement onto 
the provisions of the SRA, holding that such a 
requirement “would so transform the scheme that 
Congress created that Congress likely would not have 
intended the Act as so modified to stand.”170  The 
Court reasoned that Congress would prefer an advisory 
guidelines system that maintained “a strong 
connection between the sentence imposed and the 
offender’s real conduct” to a system that would 
“engraft onto the existing system today’s Sixth 
Amendment ‘jury trial’ requirement.”171  According to 
the Court, Congress’ important objectives included 
honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in 
sentencing.172   
In fashioning a remedy to the Sixth 
Amendment violation, the Court excised only two of 
the SRA’s provisions.173  First, the Court excised 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which required courts to impose 
a sentence within the applicable guideline range in the 
absence of circumstances justifying a departure.  The 
Court determined that “the existence of [this section] 
is a necessary condition of the constitutional 
violation.”174  Second, the Court excised 18 U.S.C.      
§ 3742(e), which the PROTECT Act had amended to 
provide a de novo standard of review for departures 
                                                 
168  Id. 
 
169  Id. at 266-67. 
 
170  Id. at 249. 
 
171  Id. at 248. 
 
172  Id. at 264. 
 
173  Id. at 258-61.  The remaining portions of the Act require 
a sentencing court to consider guideline ranges but permit a 
court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory 
concerns.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 
174  543 U.S. at 259. 
 
from the guidelines.  The Court observed that excising 
the standard of review did “not pose a critical problem 
for the handling of appeals” because “a statute that 
does not explicitly set forth a standard of review may 
nonetheless do so implicitly.”175  Taking into account 
the “related statutory language” and the “sound 
administration of justice,” as well as “the past two 
decades of appellate practice in cases involving 
departures,” the Court returned to the pre-PROTECT 
Act version of section 3742, which provided for 
review of sentences for reasonableness in light of the  
§ 3553(a) factors.176   
The Court rejected criticism questioning the 
practicality of the reasonableness standard of review, 
noting that Commission data showed that 
reasonableness review of departures and sentences 
imposed for non-guidelines offenses accounted for 
16.7 percent of appeals in 2002.177  The Court also 
rejected the argument that the application of the 
reasonableness standard of review would “‘produce a 
discordant symphony’ leading to ‘excessive sentencing 
disparities,’ and ‘wreak havoc’ on the judicial 
system.”178  Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that 
reasonableness review might not “provide the 
uniformity that Congress originally sought to secure,” 
but noted that reasonableness review “would tend to 
iron out sentencing differences.”179 
With respect to the continued role of the 
Commission, the Court noted that:  
 
The Sentencing Commission will 
continue to collect and study appellate 
court decisionmaking.  It will continue 
to modify its Guidelines in light of 
what it learns, thereby encouraging 
what it finds to be better sentencing 
practices.  It will thereby promote 
                                                 
175  Id. at 260 (emphasis in original). 
 
176  Id. at 260-61.  In Koon, the Supreme Court held that 
departure decisions by district courts were due deference 
and that appellate courts should use an abuse of discretion 
standard in reviewing trial courts’ application of the 
guidelines to the facts.  518 U.S. at 91. 
 
177  543 U.S. at 263. 
 
178  Id. (quoting id. at 312-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 
179  Id. at 263. 
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uniformity in the sentencing 
process.180   
 
Furthermore, “[t]he system remaining after excision, 
while lacking the mandatory features that Congress 
enacted, retains other features that help to further these 
objectives.”181  Even so, the Court recognized that 
Booker would not be the final word on the new 
sentencing regime: 
 
Ours, of course, is not the last word: 
The ball now lies in Congress’ court. 
The National Legislature is equipped 
to devise and install, long term, the 
sentencing system, compatible with 
the Constitution, that Congress judges 
best for the federal system of 
justice.182 
 
                                                 
180  Id. 
 
181  Id. 
 
182  Id. at 265. 
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The Sentencing Process After Booker 
 
 
 
 
 
THE THREE-STEP PROCESS 
 
In Gall v. United States,183 the Supreme Court 
described the proper procedure for post-Booker 
sentencing.  First, a sentencing court must properly 
determine the guideline range pursuant to 18 U.S.C     
§ 3553(a)(4).  Second, the court must consider whether 
any of the guidelines’ departure policy statements 
apply pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5).  Third, the 
court must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3553(a) taken as a whole before determining the 
sentence to be imposed, including whether a variance 
is warranted.  Although the guidelines now incorporate 
the three-step process,184 courts take different 
approaches to applying it, particularly with respect to 
consideration of departure provisions and offender 
characteristics. 
 
The First Step: Proper Determination of the 
Guideline Range 
 
Courts must begin the sentencing process by 
properly determining the applicable guideline range.185  
Determination of the guideline range continues to 
include factfinding by the court to resolve disputed 
issues.186  Moreover, the burden of proof for judicial 
factfinding continues to be proof by a preponderance 
of evidence, and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt,  
                                                 
183  552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007). 
 
184   See USSG §1B1.1(a)−(c) (Application Instructions). 
  
185  See Rita, 551 U.S. at 351; USSG §1B1.1(a). 
 
186  See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64 (1st 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Sheikh, 433 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as some defendants had argued shortly after Booker.187  
District courts may still consider reliable hearsay188 
and acquitted conduct189 in resolving factual disputes 
to determine the guideline range. 
Although this first step remains largely 
unchanged after Booker, one issue on which courts 
have disagreed is whether the Ex Post Facto clause 
bars application of a guideline range that was 
increased after the defendant committed the crime.  
The Seventh Circuit190 concluded that the Ex Post 
Facto clause does not bar application of the Guidelines 
Manual in effect at the time of sentencing even if the 
guideline range is higher than the range provided by 
the Manual in effect on the date of the offense.  The 
Seventh Circuit reasoned “that the ex post facto clause 
should apply only to laws and regulations that bind 
rather than advise.”191  Five other circuits have held 
that the Ex Post Facto Clause bars such increases in  
                                                 
187  See, e.g., United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Garcia-Gonon, 433 F.3d 587 (8th 
Cir. 2006). 
 
188  See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (holding Booker did not change the rule that a 
sentencing court may base sentencing determinations on 
reliable hearsay).  See also United States v. Brown, 430 
F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We see nothing in Booker that 
would require the court to determine the sentence in any 
manner other than the way the sentence would have been 
determined pre-Booker”).   
 
189  See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 
2006) (en banc). 
 
190  United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 
191  Id. at 795. 
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sentences.192  The Supreme Court has agreed to review 
this division among the circuits.193 
 
The Second Step: Consideration of Departure 
Provisions 
 
Once the court has correctly determined the 
guideline range, the court must consider whether to 
apply any of the guidelines’ departure policy 
statements raised by the parties,194 including such 
commonly applied departures as the substantial 
assistance departure at §5K1.1, the fast track departure 
at §5K3.1, the departure at §4A1.3 for overstatement 
of criminal history, and the cultural assimilation 
departure for illegal entry offenders.195   In observing 
that much of the sentencing process has remained 
                                                 
192  See United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 
2008); United States v. Ortiz, 621 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2010); and 
United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2010).  
In addition, the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have 
remanded for resentencing cases in which the district court 
applied a later version of the guidelines that imposed a 
harsher punishment than the version in effect when the 
offense was committed.  See United States v. Wood, 486 
F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Reasor, 418 F.3d 
466 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Forrester, 616 F.3d 929 
(9th Cir. 2010).  Two other circuits, the Eighth and the 
Tenth, have, in dicta, agreed with the majority view and 
rejected Demaree.  See United States v. Carter, 490 F.3d 
641 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 
832 (10th Cir. 2008).  Finally, the First Circuit, while 
avoiding the constitutional issue, has followed “a 
commonsense protocol” under which courts “ordinarily 
employ the guidelines in effect at sentencing only where 
they are as lenient as those in effect at the time of the 
offense; when the guidelines have been made more severe in 
the interim, the version in effect at the time of the crime is 
normally used.”  United States v. Ricardo-Rodriguez, 630 
F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 
193  Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012). 
 
194  See, e.g., United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (abrogated on other grounds by Tapia v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011) (courts must “formally rule 
on the motions of both parties and state on the record 
whether they are granting a departure and how that 
departure affects the Guidelines calculation[.]”). 
 
195  USSG §1B1.1(b). 
 
unchanged after Booker, the Eighth Circuit has stated 
that “after determining the appropriate sentencing 
range, the district court must decide if a traditional 
departure is appropriate under Part K or §4A1.3.”196  
The Third Circuit similarly requires “that the entirety 
of the Guidelines calculation be done correctly, 
including rulings on Guidelines departures.”197  Citing 
section 3553(a) and Booker, the Third Circuit 
explained that this requirement is “[n]ot for 
jurisdictional reasons, but rather because the 
Guidelines still play an integral role in criminal 
sentencing.”198  A number of circuits recognize that 
departures are part of the guideline analysis, and that if 
a district court does not conduct a departures analysis, 
the guideline sentence cannot be properly considered 
as part of the § 3553(a) analysis either at sentencing or 
on appeal.199   
Although courts are required to consider 
departure policy statements, the use of departures, as 
opposed to variances, has continued to decrease, as 
parties increasingly have relied on the section 3553(a) 
                                                 
196  United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 631 (8th 
Cir. 2006).  
 
197  United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
 
198  Id. 
 
199  Id. at 838-39 (“district courts must still calculate what 
the proper Guidelines sentencing range is, otherwise the 
Guidelines cannot be considered properly”); United States 
v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Only after the 
district court has conducted the advisory guidelines analysis, 
including a determination of the appropriateness of 
downward or upward departures under the guidelines, 
should the court then decide whether the guidelines sentence 
comports with the sentencing factors set for in 18 U.S.C.     
§ 3553(a)”) (emphasis in original); United States v. 
McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (“To effectuate 
the Supreme Court’s mandate, district courts are still 
required to consider the appropriate Guideline sentencing 
range.  Within this Guideline calculation is the 
determination of whether a Chapter 5 departure is 
appropriate.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. 
Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (“the 
sentencing judge must consider the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the applicable Guidelines range 
and available departure authority”); United States v. 
Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(characterizing erroneous application of a downward 
departure as “sentencing error”). 
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factors rather than on guideline departure 
provisions.200  The Seventh Circuit has held that 
departures are “obsolete,” and that sentences based on 
departure provisions should be examined in the same 
way as variances based on factors outside the 
guidelines, that is, under the general rubric of section 
3553(a).201 
The trend toward examining sentences based 
on departure provisions under the general rubric of 
section 3553(a) is reflected in circuits other than the 
Seventh.  While not holding that departures are 
obsolete, the Sixth Circuit has held that a district 
court’s consideration of departures is less important 
after Booker:   
 
[B]ecause the Guidelines are no 
longer mandatory and the district 
court need only consider them along 
with its analysis of the section 3553(a) 
factors, the decision to deny a 
Guidelines-based downward departure 
is a smaller factor in the sentencing 
calculus.  Furthermore, many of the 
very factors that used to be grounds 
for a departure under the Guidelines 
are now considered by the district 
                                                 
200  In fiscal year 2007, courts imposed 8,433 non-
government sponsored below range sentences.  Those 
relying at least in part on departure grounds numbered only 
2,770 (32.8% of all non-government sponsored below range 
sentences), while 4,957 (58.8% of all non-government 
sponsored below range sentences) were explicitly based on 
Booker or § 3553(a) and not on any guideline departure 
ground.  In fiscal year 2008, courts imposed 9,972 non-
government sponsored below range sentences, and those 
resting at least in part on departure grounds numbered 2,459 
(24.7%), while those based solely on Booker and § 3553(a) 
numbered 6,678 (67.0%).  In the years that followed, those 
percentages were: fiscal year 2009, 19.0% departures (2,403 
out of 12,655 cases) compared to 73.9% Booker/ § 3553(a) 
variances (9,358 out of 12,655 cases); fiscal year 2010, 
17.5% departures (2,552 out of 14,565 cases) compared to 
76.3% Booker/ § 3553(a) variances (11,116 out of 14,565 
cases); and fiscal year 2011, 19.6% departures (2,893 out of 
14,762 cases) compared to 77.0% Booker/ § 3553(a) 
variances (11,371 out of 14,762 cases).   
 
201  See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Padilla, 602 F.3d 802 
(7th Cir. 2010).  The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to 
have held that departures are “obsolete.”   
 
court — with greater latitude — under 
section 3553(a).202 
 
The importance of considering departures in 
the second step of sentencing is also questionable in 
the Ninth Circuit.  In United States v. Mohamed, the 
Ninth Circuit stated: 
 
We think the better view is to treat the 
scheme of downward and upward 
“departures” as essentially replaced by 
the requirement that judges impose a 
“reasonable” sentence . . . The use and 
review of post-Booker departures 
would result in wasted time and 
resources in the courts of appeal, with 
little or no effect on sentencing 
decisions.  After all, if a district court 
were to employ a post-Booker 
“departure” improperly, the 
sentencing judge still would be free on 
remand to impose exactly the same 
sentence by exercising his discretion 
under the now-advisory guidelines.  
Such a sentence would then be 
reviewed for reasonableness, in which 
case it is the review for 
reasonableness, and not the validity of 
the so-called departure, that 
determines whether the sentence 
stands.203 
 
In United States v. Gutierrez-Hernandez, a 
panel of the Fifth Circuit parted company with the 
Ninth Circuit on this issue, vacating the sentence and 
remanding the case to the district court because the 
court “erred in the application of the departure 
provisions.”204  Yet in a subsequent case upholding a 
sentence that was more than two times the upper end 
of the guideline range, the Fifth Circuit seemingly 
disavowed that holding: “[t]o the extent that . . . 
Gutierrez-Hernandez could arguably be construed to 
require a district court to apply the Guidelines’ 
                                                 
202  United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
 
203  459 F.3d 979, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 
204  581 F.3d 251, 255-256 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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departure methodology before imposing a non-
Guidelines sentence, this passage in Gutierrez-
Hernandez is dicta.”205  The Fifth Circuit upheld the 
non-guideline sentence even though the district court 
did not utilize departure methodology in reaching its 
decision.206 
 
The Third Step: Consideration of § 3553(a) 
Factors 
 
In the third step of the sentencing process, the 
court must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3553(a) taken as a whole before imposing the 
sentence,207 and “impose a sentence sufficient but not 
greater than necessary” to meet the purposes of 
sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).  The 
factors the court must consider are ―  
 
(1) the nature and circumstances of 
the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence 
imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the 
law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other 
                                                 
205  United States v. Gutierrez, 635 F.3d 148, 153 (5th Cir. 
2011). 
 
206  The Fifth Circuit emphasized cases decided before 
Gutierrez-Hernandez, in which the court of appeals 
“determine[d] only whether the non-Guidelines sentence at 
issue was reasonable, not whether the district court was 
required to perform a calculation of departure [].  Indeed, 
our opinion in Smith expressly states that ‘we do not 
examine whether an upward departure or an enhancement 
was available under the Guidelines.’”  635 F.3d at 152. 
 
207  See USSG §1B1.1(c); see also United States v. Hughes, 
401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stone, 
432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Talley, 
431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 
correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the 
sentencing range established for― 
(A) the applicable category of 
offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant as set forth in 
the guidelines issued by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United 
States Code, and that are in effect on 
the date the defendant is sentenced; 
or 
 (B) in the case of a violation of 
probation or supervised release, the 
applicable guidelines or policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to section 
994(a)(3) of title 28, United States 
Code; 
(5) any pertinent policy statement 
issued by the Sentencing Commission 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) that 
is in effect on the date the defendant is 
sentenced; 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to 
any victims of the offense.208   
 
The sentencing court need not give prior 
notice of its intent to vary,209 nor categorically recite 
each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors on the record 
when it imposes a sentence.210  Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
208  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)−(7). 
 
209  In Irizarry v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
the requirement in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32(h) that the sentencing court provide advance notice to the 
parties when departing from the applicable guideline range 
applies only to guideline departures and not to post-Booker 
variances: “[t]he due process concerns that motivated the 
Court to require notice in a world of mandatory Guidelines 
no longer provide a basis for [such a requirement].”  553 
U.S. 708, 714 (2008). 
 
210  See, e.g., McBride, 434 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2006); United 
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record must include sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
the court’s consideration of these factors.  
Consequently, the court’s consideration of the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors has become an essential part 
of the sentencing process.211  However, with respect to 
consideration of sections 3553(a)(4) and (5), no circuit 
has specified what weight to give the Commission’s 
guidelines and policy statements,212 and the circuits 
have not given district courts uniform direction on this 
issue.  
 
CONSIDERATION OF OFFENDER 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The Supreme Court’s renewed emphasis213 on 
the importance of the history and characteristics of the 
                                                                                  
States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court 
to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of 
the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) 
factors”); but see United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 
673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) ( “A rote statement that the judge 
considered all relevant factors will not always suffice; the 
temptation to a busy judge to impose the guidelines 
sentence and be done with it, without wading into the vague 
and prolix statutory factors, cannot be ignored.”). 
 
211  See, e.g., United States v. Till, 434 F.3d 880, 887 (6th 
Cir. 2006).   
 
212  See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1184-85 
(11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting “any across-the-board 
prescription regarding the appropriate deference to give the 
Guidelines” and opting to allow sentencing courts to 
“determine, on a case-by-case basis, the weight to give the 
guidelines, so long as that determination is made with 
reference to the remaining section 3553(a) factors the court 
must also consider in calculating the defendant’s 
sentence.”).  A district court must “give respectful 
consideration to the judgment embodied in the guidelines 
range that he computes.”  United States v. Higdon, 531 F.3d 
561, 562 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Stewart, 
590 F.3d 93, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2009) (“if the district court has 
ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed 
pertinent in § 3553(a), it has abused its discretion.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 
213  See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (a sentencing court must 
“consider all of the § 3553(a) factors” and “must make an 
individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”); 
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101 (“In sum, while the statute still 
requires a court to give respectful consideration to the 
Guidelines, [] Booker permits the court to tailor the sentence 
defendant is not easily reconciled with section 994 of 
title 28.  For example, in United States v. Pepper, the 
Court noted that sentencing courts should “conduct an 
inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to 
the kind of information [they] may consider, or the 
source from which it may come.” 214  On the other 
hand, Congress directed the Commission to 
promulgate guidelines consistent with the SRA’s 
proscriptions and limitations on offender 
characteristics in section 994(d) and (e).215 
The Supreme Court has not made clear 
whether the proscriptions and limitations imposed by 
Congress to which the Commission must adhere in 
considering the section 3553(a) factors also limit the 
courts’ consideration of offender characteristics under 
section 3553(a).  While the Constitution constrains 
sentencing judges from considering the “forbidden 
factors” of race, sex, national origin, and creed,216 
courts now freely consider, for example, a defendant’s 
educational background and employment record, 
factors that Congress, in section 994(e), deemed 
                                                                                  
in light of other statutory concerns as well[.]”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
 
214  131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011) (citing United States v. Tucker, 
404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)). See also Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 
(“[A sentencing judge] may hear arguments by prosecution 
or defense that the Guidelines sentence should not apply, 
perhaps because (as the Guidelines themselves foresee) the 
case at hand falls outside the ‘heartland’ to which the 
Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply, USSG 
§5K2.0, perhaps because the Guidelines sentence itself fails 
properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, or perhaps 
because the case warrants a different sentence regardless, 
see Rule 32(f).”). 
 
215   See discussion at 17, 21-22 supra. 
 
216  See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 n.8 (“Of course, 
sentencing courts’ discretion under § 3661 is subject to 
constitutional constraints.”); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 
371, 380-81 (2005) (a court should construe a statute to 
avoid a constitutional infirmity if possible); United States v. 
Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (“A defendant’s 
race or nationality may play no adverse role in the 
administration of justice, including sentencing.”) (internal 
citations omitted); see also United States v. Stewart, 590 
F.3d 93, 167 (2d Cir. 2009) (Walker, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“We do not categorically proscribe 
any factor concerning the [defendant’s] background, 
character, and conduct, with the exception of invidious 
factors.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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“generally inappropriate” for the Commission to 
consider in recommending a term of imprisonment or 
length of a term of imprisonment.217  Moreover, those 
factors may be associated with socio-economic status, 
a forbidden factor under section 994(e).218   As a result 
of the lack of certainty in this area, courts sometimes 
reach different conclusions about whether and to what 
extent such characteristics should affect the 
defendant’s sentence.219 
                                                 
217  See, e.g., United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 572 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (affirming a downward variance in part based 
upon defendant’s prior record as the operator of a large and 
successful plumbing company that employed more than 300 
people); United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (affirming a downward variance in part based 
upon defendant’s post-offense record of creating a 
successful house-painting business); United States v. Ayala-
Garcia, 2008 WL 2566858, *4 (E.D. Wisc. 2008) (imposing 
a sentence below the applicable guideline range in part 
based on the “defendant’s recent educational and vocational 
endeavors”) (unpublished); United States v. Crocker, 2007 
WL 2757130, *1 (D. Kan. 2007) (imposing a sentence 
below the guidelines in part based on the defendant’s 
“efforts to better herself through a college education”) 
(unpublished).  
 
218  See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 393 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (“We cannot easily disentangle the weight given 
to the proper factor of need for treatment from the weight 
given to the improper factor of socioeconomic status, with 
which the former proper factor was entwined.”); United 
States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 505 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that the district court made it clear that, but for the 
defendant’s earning capacity, it would have imposed a 
within guidelines sentence of imprisonment, the Fourth 
Circuit found that, “[r]educed to its essence, the district 
court’s approach means that rich tax-evaders will avoid 
prison, but poor tax-evaders will almost certainly go to jail,” 
that an approach based on socioeconomic status was 
impermissible pre-Booker, and that Booker and Gall did not 
“permit[] district courts to rest a sentencing decision 
exclusively on such constitutionally suspect grounds.”). 
 
219  According to some criminal defense attorneys, there is 
no tension between the statutory proscriptions in section 994 
and the section 3553(a) factors because section 994(e) can 
be interpreted as making certain offender characteristics 
inappropriate for consideration only for determining 
whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment, as opposed 
to probation, or to lengthen a sentence of imprisonment.  In 
their view, despite section 994(e), judges retain discretion 
under section 3553(a) to consider those same offender 
characteristics in deciding whether to shorten a sentence of 
imprisonment, or whether to impose a sentence of probation 
A defendant’s status as a young adult 
(although not a juvenile) at the time of the offense is 
an example of an offender characteristic that courts 
have viewed differently.  Some courts believe relative 
youth is a mitigating factor, while others do not.  The 
district judge who sentenced the defendant in Gall 
noted that “[r]ecent studies on the development of the 
human brain conclude that human brain development 
may not become complete until the age of twenty-
five” and “compared [the defendant’s] sale of ecstasy 
when he was a 21-year-old adult to the ‘impetuous and 
ill-considered’ actions of persons under the age of 
18.”220  The Supreme Court agreed that “it was not 
unreasonable for the District Judge to view Gall’s 
immaturity at the time of the offense as a mitigating 
factor,” and that such consideration “finds support in 
[the Court’s] cases.”221  Similarly, a district judge 
relied in part on age when sentencing a young adult 
defendant convicted of possessing child pornography 
because the defendant began viewing such images 
when he was himself a young teenager.222  The judge 
concluded that although the “unformed nature of the 
adolescent brain” did not “remove[] all culpability,” it 
did constitute a “critical distinction” from the typical 
defendant convicted of possessing child pornography, 
and it “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of a” downward 
variance from the guideline range.223 
Other courts, however, have taken the view 
that a defendant’s status as a young adult cannot 
support a substantial downward variance.  For 
example, the Eighth Circuit reversed a substantial 
downward variance in the case of a career offender 
                                                                                  
or other alternative to incarceration.  See, e.g., U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n Public Hearing on Federal Sentencing Options 
After Booker, Washington, DC (Feb. 16, 2012) (Statement 
of Lisa Wayne, President, National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, written statement at 7); U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n Public Hearing on Federal Sentencing Options 
After Booker, Washington, DC (Feb. 16, 2012) (Statement 
of Henry Bemporad, Federal Public Defender, Western 
District of Texas, written statement at 10).   
 
220  Gall, 552 U.S. at 57-58. 
 
221  Id. at 58. 
 
222  United States v. Stern, 590 F. Supp. 2d 945, 952-54 
(N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 
223  Id. 
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who was 22 years old at the time of the offense, in part 
because the district court explicitly stated that had the 
defendant been 35 or 40 years of age, the court would 
have imposed a sentence at or near the guideline range 
“because the court would have serious questions about 
whether a defendant at that age could be 
rehabilitated.”224  The Eighth Circuit held that, 
especially given the size of the downward variance, it 
was unreasonable because “[r]elative youth is a factor 
that may apply to many career offenders, and it is 
unlikely that district courts uniformly will adopt the 
view of the district court in this case.”225  In such a 
circumstance, the Eighth Circuit said, “the potential 
for excessive sentence disparities would be 
substantial.”226  In a subsequent case, one judge of the 
Eighth Circuit explained his disagreement with a 
district judge’s reliance on a defendant’s relative youth 
as a mitigating factor as follows: 
 
[The defendant’s] age does not 
distinguish him in any meaningful 
way from other defendants. In fact, 
34.1% of all males arrested in the 
United States in 2007 were between 
the ages of 20 and 29.  In 2007, even 
more narrowly, males between the 
ages of 25 and 29 made up the largest 
demographic group - an estimated 
17.24% - of all state and federal 
prisoners in the United States. … [The 
defendant’s] age has no significant or 
“appreciable probative value” in this 
sentencing and is irrelevant[.]227 
 
In the same case, another Eighth Circuit judge 
explained that “[r]easonable minds can differ” on the 
question of whether a defendant’s relative youth is a 
mitigating factor, and that therefore “[t]he offender’s 
punishment in these career offender cases – ranging 
from the statutory minimum term to a sentence at or 
                                                 
224  United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 669 (8th Cir. 
2006). 
 
225  Id. 
 
226  Id. 
 
227  United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 465-66 (8th 
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (Riley, J., concurring). 
 
near the statutory maximum – will depend 
substantially on the luck of the judicial draw.”228 
Similarly, in the context of considering the 
history and characteristics of the defendant as required 
by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), courts have considered how to 
account for a defendant’s positive employment history.  
As Justice Alito observed in his dissent in Gall, before 
the SRA:  
 
[I]f a defendant had a job, a 
supportive family, and friends, those 
factors were sometimes viewed as 
justifying a harsher sentence on the 
ground that the defendant had 
squandered the opportunity to lead a 
law-abiding life. Alternatively, those 
same factors were sometimes viewed 
as justifications for a more lenient 
sentence on the ground that a 
defendant with a job and a network of 
support would be less likely to return 
to crime.229 
 
Since Booker, judges have expressed disparate 
views on this issue, making sentencing outcomes less 
certain.  For example, the Third Circuit reviewed en 
banc a substantial downward variance in a tax fraud 
case in which one of the factors supporting the 
variance was the defendant’s prior record as the 
operator of a large and successful plumbing company 
that employed more than 300 people.230  The Third 
Circuit split over the substantive reasonableness of the 
sentence.  Affirming the variance, the majority 
concluded that the district court appropriately relied in 
part on the defendant’s prior employment when 
imposing the sentence.231  The dissent, while 
acknowledging that a prior record of employment may 
in some cases be a mitigating factor, emphasized that 
this consideration “fails to distinguish [the defendant] 
from other tax evaders … and therefore falls far short 
of widening the range of” substantively reasonable 
                                                 
228  Id. at 468 (citations omitted) (Colloton, J., concurring). 
 
229  552 U.S. at 70 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 
230  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 572. 
 
231  Id. 
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sentences.232  The dissent expressed the view that “[a]n 
admirable record of employment is a characteristic 
common to many white-collar criminals, and the 
prospect of business failure seems of little relevance as 
a mitigating circumstance when the business itself was 
the vehicle through which the defendant perpetrated 
the crime.”233  Several judges in the Ninth Circuit have 
made substantially the same observation: “We can 
hardly be surprised if a white collar criminal has a 
good employment history – otherwise, he or she would 
likely not be in a position to commit the crime.”234 
In public hearings before the Commission, 
several district court judges expressed concern over 
this uncertainty, suggesting that offender 
characteristics that do not support a guideline 
departure are what most often lead them to vary from 
the guidelines.235  Several district court judges and the 
federal public defender community asserted that the 
authority of district court judges to take account of 
offender characteristics results in a more fair and just 
sentencing outcome, allowing judges to mitigate 
otherwise harsh guidelines or unwarranted sentencing 
disparities.236   
                                                 
232  Id. at 583-84 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 
233  Id. at 584. 
 
234  See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 559 F.3d 918, 921 
(9th Cir. 2009) (Gould, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 
235  U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Regional Hearing on the 
25th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, Austin, TX (Nov. 19-20, 2009) (Testimony of 
the Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, District Judge, Western 
District of Oklahoma, transcript at 11); see also U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n Public Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary 
of the Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
Denver, CO (Oct. 20-21, 2009) (Testimony of the 
Honorable Joan Ericksen, District Judge, District of 
Minnesota, transcript at 269-270, 274); see also 2010 
JUDGES’ SURVEY at 19 (Question 4, Table 14) (76 percent of 
respondents indicated that they do not rely on a departure 
provision within the Guidelines Manual because the 
Guidelines Manual does not contain a departure provision 
that adequately reflects the reason for a sentence outside the 
guideline range; and 65 percent indicated that they do not 
rely on a departure provision because the departure policy 
statements in the manual are too restrictive). 
 
236  See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Regional Hearing on 
the 25th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing 
The Department of Justice has expressed 
concern that judges’ increased discretion after Booker, 
including the discretion to consider offender 
characteristics, has led to increasing unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.237  In addition, some probation 
officers have suggested that the guidelines be amended 
to better reflect the relevance of the defendant’s 
history and characteristics as described in section 
3553(a), either because those factors that the 
guidelines discourage courts from considering might 
                                                                                  
Reform Act of 1984, New York, NY (July 9-10, 2009) 
(Testimony of the Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose, Chief 
District Judge, Western District of Pennsylvania, transcript 
at 51-52); U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Hearing on Federal 
Sentencing Options After Booker, Washington, DC (Feb. 
16, 2012) (Statement of the Honorable Paul Barbadoro, 
District Judge, District of New Hampshire, written 
statement at 6) (“Downward departures and variances may 
not reveal a problem with the advisory guidelines system 
but may in fact reduce undue rigidity in individual cases.”); 
U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Hearing on Federal Sentencing 
Options After Booker, Washington, DC (Feb. 16, 2012) 
(Statement of Raymond Moore, Federal Public Defender, 
Districts of Colorado and Wyoming, written statement at 
20-21) [hereinafter Moore 2012 Public Hearing Statement] 
(“Some have suggested that consideration of mitigating 
offender characteristics creates ‘racial and ethnic disparity.’  
One cannot accept disparate impacts of aggravating factors 
because they are considered relevant (especially when they 
are often given excessive weight), but decry the supposed 
disparate impacts of offender characteristics that are clearly 
relevant, and that judges have used to mitigate excessively 
harsh punishment in deserving cases.”).  
 
237  U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Hearing on Federal 
Sentencing Options After Booker, Washington, DC (Feb. 
16, 2012)  (Statement of David Axelrod, Associate Deputy 
Attorney General, United States Department of Justice, 
written statement at 12) (“We believe these two lines of 
thought and doctrine – one that insists that the length of 
federal imprisonment terms be based primarily on the 
offense and criminal history, and one that suggests that 
offender characteristics and rehabilitation should join those 
factors as co-equal determinants – ought to be examined 
more closely and reconciled to the extent possible in order 
to create a more coherent, national system. We believe the 
post-Booker sentencing regime, which gives sentencing 
courts an unbounded menu of sentencing principles from 
which to devise the ultimate sentence, will continue to lead, 
if not reformed, to unwarranted disparities in sentencing 
outcomes.”). 
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be relevant to assessing the risk of recidivism,238 or 
simply because section 3553(a) suggests such factors 
are relevant while the Guidelines Manual categorizes 
them as not ordinarily relevant.239   
In 2010, the Commission amended certain 
offender characteristics in Chapter Five, Part H to 
remove age, mental and emotional condition, physical 
condition, and military service from the list of 
characteristics the Commission considered not 
ordinarily relevant.240  Those offender characteristics 
                                                 
238  See, e.g., U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Regional Hearing 
on the 25th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, Stanford, CA (May 27-28, 2009) 
(Testimony of Christopher Hansen, Chief Probation Officer, 
District of Nevada, transcript at 166). 
 
239  U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Regional Hearing on the 
25th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, New York, NY (July 9-10, 2009) (Testimony 
of William Henry, Chief U.S. Probation Officer for the 
District of Maryland, transcript at 173); U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n Public Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary 
of the Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
Phoenix, AZ (Jan. 20-21, 2010) (Testimony of Mario 
Moreno, Chief U.S. Probation Officer for the District of 
Arizona, transcript at 112-113).  See also U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n Public Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary 
of the Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
Denver, CO (Oct. 20-21, 2009) (Statement of Honorable 
Robert W. Pratt, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Southern 
District of Iowa, written statement at 3-4). 
 
240  Pursuant to the SRA’s directives to the Commission in 
section 994, the guidelines had until recently listed age, 
education and vocational skills, mental and emotional 
condition, physical condition, employment record, and 
several other offender characteristics as “not ordinarily 
relevant” in determining whether a departure is warranted.  
See USSG §§5H1.1, p.s. (Age), 5H1.2, p.s. (Education and 
Vocational Skills), 5H1.3, p.s. (Mental and Emotional 
Conditions), 5H1.4, p.s. (Physical Condition, Including 
Drug and Alcohol Dependence or Abuse; Gambling 
Addiction), 5H1.5, p.s. (Employment Record), and 5H1.11, 
p.s. (Military, Civic, Charitable, or Public Service; 
Employment-Related Contributions; Record of Prior Good 
Works).  Recently, the Commission amended these 
provisions to state that age, mental and emotional 
conditions, physical condition, and military service “may be 
relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted,” 
generally “if the characteristic, individually or in 
combination with other such characteristics, is present to an 
unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical 
cases covered by the guidelines.”  See USSG App. C, 
amend. 739 (effective Nov. 1, 2010). 
now “may be relevant in determining whether a 
departure is warranted” “if the characteristic 
individually or in combination with other offender 
characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and 
distinguish[] the case from the typical cases covered 
by the guidelines.”241  However, departures based on 
these offender characteristic provisions are still very 
rare.242 
 
POLICY DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE GUIDELINES 
 
The distinction between the consideration of 
guideline policy during the second step, and the 
consideration of the section 3553(a) factors during the 
third step has led courts to consider to what extent 
courts may disregard guideline policy in favor of their 
own policy judgments.  In Kimbrough v. United States, 
the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge may 
consider the disparity that existed before the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010 between the Guidelines’ 
treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenders, and 
therefore may reject the guidelines’ policy of 
sentencing crack cocaine offenders more harshly.243  
According to the Court, in creating the drug trafficking 
guidelines the Commission varied from what the Court 
perceived as its usual practice of employing an 
“empirical approach based on data about past 
sentencing practices,” instead adopting the “weight-
driven scheme” used in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986244 (“1986 Act”) and maintaining the 100-to-1 
quantity ratio throughout the drug table.245 
The Court rejected the government’s position 
that the 1986 Act implicitly required both the 
                                                 
241  See, e.g., USSG §5H1.1, p.s. (Age). 
 
242  A comparison of Table 25 in the 2010 Sourcebook with 
the same table in the 2011 Sourcebook shows a slight 
increase: 2010 – age (cited 97 times), mental and emotional 
condition (cited 97 times) and physical condition (cited 111 
times); 2011 – age (cited 138 times), mental and emotional 
condition (cited 153 times), and physical condition (cited 
163 times).  Given the limited data it would be difficult to 
draw conclusions on the amendment’s effectiveness at 
promoting uniform consideration of these characteristics. 
 
243  552 U.S. at 91.   
 
244  Pub. L. No. 99-570. 
 
245  Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 96-97. 
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Commission and sentencing courts to apply the 100-
to-1 ratio:  “The statute says nothing about the 
appropriate sentences within [the maximum and 
minimum sentences applicable to crack and powder 
cocaine], and we decline to read any implicit directive 
into that congressional silence.”246  The Court found 
that “drawing meaning from silence [was] particularly 
inappropriate” in this case, because Congress had 
shown that “it knows how to direct sentencing 
practices in express terms,” by, for example, requiring 
in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) that the Commission set the 
guideline sentences for serious recidivist offenders “at 
or near” the statutory maximum.247 
In addition, the Court was unpersuaded by the 
government’s argument that allowing district courts to 
vary based on the crack/powder disparity would lead 
to the very unwarranted disparities district courts are 
instructed to avoid under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6): 
“Under [§ 3553(a)(6)], district courts must take 
account of sentencing practices in other courts and the 
‘cliffs’ resulting from the statutory mandatory 
minimum sentences” and “[t]o reach an appropriate 
sentence, these disparities must be weighed against the 
other § 3553(a) factors and any unwarranted disparity 
created by the crack/powder ratio itself.”248 
Finally, while underscoring the “important 
institutional role” the Commission fills by “bas[ing] its 
determinations on empirical data and national 
experience, guided by a professional staff with 
appropriate expertise,” the Court found that the crack 
cocaine guidelines “do not exemplify” what the Court 
considered to be the Commission’s “characteristic 
institutional role.”249  The Court noted that the 
Commission itself had reported that the crack cocaine 
guidelines produce “disproportionately harsh 
sanctions.”250  The Court then concluded that “[g]iven 
all this, it would not be an abuse of discretion for a 
district court to conclude when sentencing a particular 
defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a 
                                                 
246  Id. at 103. 
 
247  Id. 
 
248  Id. at 108. 
 
249  Id. at 109. 
 
250  Id. at 109-110. 
 
sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve                 
§ 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case.”251   
In 2009, the Supreme Court reinforced this 
holding in Spears v. United States, ruling that “district 
courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from 
the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a policy 
disagreement with those Guidelines.”252  The Court 
made clear that the holding in Kimbrough allowing 
categorical disagreements with the guidelines 
“necessarily implies adoption of some other 
[crack/powder] ratio to govern the mine-run case.”253  
Accordingly, district courts “must also possess the 
power to apply a different ratio which, in [the court’s] 
judgment, corrects the disparity.”254   
Kimbrough engendered significant 
disagreement in the circuit courts about whether a 
district court may categorically reject several other 
sentencing guidelines, including the child pornography 
guideline at USSG §2G2.2, the fast track departure 
policy statement at USSG §5K3.1, and the career 
offender guideline at USSG §4B1.1.  The circuit 
courts holding that courts could reasonably reject 
guideline policy based this holding on two aspects of 
the Kimbrough opinion: first, Kimbrough’s conclusion 
that the crack cocaine guidelines were not based on an 
“empirical approach;”255 and second, its indication that 
                                                 
251  Id. at 110. 
 
252  555 U.S. 261, 265-66 (2009). 
 
253  Id. at 265. 
 
254  Id.  
 
255  See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 
(1st Cir. 2008) (“Like the crack/powder ratio, the fast-track 
departure scheme does not ‘exemplify the [Sentencing] 
Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional 
role.’ . . .  In other words, the Commission has ‘not take[n] 
account of empirical data and national experience’ in 
formulating them.”); United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 
184 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Commission did not use this 
empirical approach in formulating the Guidelines for child 
pornography.  Instead, at the direction of Congress, the 
Sentencing Commission has amended the Guidelines under 
§2G2.2 several times since their introduction in 1987, each 
time recommending harsher penalties.”).  For a discussion 
of the limited role of empirical evidence in promulgating 
guidelines, see “Directives: Sentence Length,” above at 16, 
and “Implementation of Directives: Sentence Length,” 
above at 19-21. 
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a district court’s categorical variance may be rooted in 
a finding that the crack/powder disparity yields a 
sentence “greater than necessary” to achieve                
§ 3553(a)’s purposes, rather than based on any one     
§ 3553(a) factor in isolation.256  By contrast, the circuit 
courts holding that a categorical rejection was not a 
reasonable exercise of a district court’s discretion 
based their conclusion on other aspects of the 
Kimbrough opinion: the Court’s determination that 
Congress neither expressly nor implicitly required that 
the Commission incorporate the 100-to-1 ratio into the 
guidelines, and its corresponding reference to 
congressional policy embodied in section 994(h), as 
distinct from guideline or Commission policy.257  
In a similar vein, several circuits have 
considered whether the child pornography guidelines 
deserve less weight at sentencing because Congress 
directly amended them.   In United States v. Dorvee, 
the Second Circuit concluded that USSG §2G2.2 is 
“fundamentally different” from most other guidelines 
because it was not based on “an empirical approach 
based on data about past practices” but promulgated 
“at the direction of Congress[.]”258  The circuit court 
                                                 
256  See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 327 
(6th Cir. 2009) (“A district court may lawfully conclude [] 
that the policies underlying the career-offender provisions – 
including their implicit incorporation of the 100:1 ratio – 
yield a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to serve the 
objectives of sentencing.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
257  See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 
559, 562 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[] Kimbrough, which concerned a 
district court’s ability to sentence in disagreement with 
Guideline policy, does not control this case, which concerns 
a district court’s ability to sentence in disagreement with 
Congressional policy . . . .  [B]ecause any disparity that 
results from fast-track programs is intended by Congress, it 
is not ‘unwarranted’ within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6).”); 
United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 
2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1135 
(Jan. 19, 2010) (“[] Kimbrough does not gut our analysis in 
Williams [that variances based on a disagreement with the 
career offender guideline are improper].  To the contrary, 
the Supreme Court expressly made a distinction between the 
Guidelines’ disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine 
offenses -- where Congress did not direct the Sentencing 
Commission to create this disparity -- and the Guideline’s 
punishment of career offenders -- which was explicitly 
directed by Congress.”). 
 
258  616 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2010).   
 
went further by encouraging district courts “to take 
seriously the broad discretion they possess in 
fashioning sentences under §2G2.2 . . . bearing in 
mind that they are dealing with an eccentric Guideline 
of highly unusual provenance which, unless carefully 
applied, can easily generate unreasonable results.”259  
The Third and Ninth Circuits agreed, concluding that a 
district court may give less weight to §2G2.2 because, 
as the Third Circuit stated, it “was not developed 
pursuant to the Commission’s institutional role and 
based on empirical data and national experience, but 
instead was developed largely pursuant to 
congressional directives.”260  
The First Circuit, while acknowledging the 
district court’s authority to vary because of a policy 
disagreement with the child pornography guidelines, 
recognized that this discretion also includes the 
authority to agree with the congressional policies 
inherent in a certain guideline:  
 
Even though a guideline is affected by 
congressional adjustment, a 
sentencing court may rely on it.  We 
see no reason why it would be 
somehow invalid for a district court, 
in its broad sentencing discretion, to 
conclude that its reason for rejecting a 
                                                 
259  Id. at 188. 
  
260  United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 608 (3d Cir. 
2010); United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 960 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he history of the child pornography 
Guidelines reveals that, like the crack-cocaine Guidelines at 
issue in Kimbrough, the child pornography Guidelines were 
not developed in a manner ‘exemplify[ing] the [Sentencing] 
Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional 
role,’ . . . so district judges must enjoy the same liberty to 
depart from them based on reasonable policy disagreement 
as they do from the crack-cocaine Guidelines discussed in 
Kimbrough.”); see also United States v. Huffstatler, 571 
F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2009) (a district court “perhaps” has 
the freedom to sentence below the child pornography 
guidelines, but it is “certainly not required to do so; 
“perhaps for good reason, the government did not take issue 
with Huffstatler’s premise that the child-exploitation 
guidelines lack an empirical basis.  As the Sentencing 
Commission itself stated, ‘[m]uch like policymaking in the 
area of drug trafficking, Congress has used a mix of 
mandatory minimum penalty increases and directives to the 
Commission to change sentencing policy for sex 
offenses.’”). 
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Kimbrough variance is that it values 
congressional input.  If these results 
seem inconsistent, it is only because a 
sentencing court’s discretion is so 
broad.  After Kimbrough, the law 
allows one judge to find that 
congressional input makes a sentence 
less empirical, and so less appropriate, 
while another judge may reasonably 
find such input makes the sentence 
more reflective of democratic 
judgments of culpability, and so more 
reasonable.261  
 
The Sixth Circuit called the criticism of guidelines 
based on congressional directives “misguided” and 
explained that in our system of government, defining 
crimes and fixing penalties are legislative functions.  
While Congress has delegated limited authority to the 
Commission, “it is normally a constitutional virtue, 
rather than vice, that Congress exercises its power 
directly, rather than hand it off to an unelected 
commission.”262  The circuit court emphasized that it 
                                                 
261  United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 93 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(“[A] district court is free to agree with the guidelines (or, at 
least, some particular guideline). Part of this freedom must 
be a freedom to agree with the guidelines because the 
sentencing court believes that the guidelines express some 
societal wisdom beyond what an entirely unrestricted 
sentencing judge might possess. Thus, part of the sentencing 
court’s broad discretion must be the discretion to conclude 
that guidelines are convincing for various reasons, including 
that they reflect popular will.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 
262  United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 
2012) (“Congress can marginalize the Commission all it 
wants: Congress created it.”); see also United States v. 
Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1201 n.15 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The 
[child pornography] Guidelines involved in Pugh’s case . . . 
do not exhibit the deficiencies the Supreme Court identified 
in Kimbrough.”); but see United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 
1160, 1212 n.32 (11th Cir. 2010)  (“In Pugh, we rejected the 
notion that Kimbrough-style policy disagreement could 
justify the district court's decision to impose a probation-
only sentence in a child pornography case where the 
minimum guidelines sentence was 97 months.  . . . We do 
not rule out the possibility that a sentencing court could ever 
make a reasoned case for disagreeing with the policy 
judgments behind the child pornography guidelines.  We 
hold simply that in this case (involving production of child 
pornography), as in Pugh (involving possession of child 
was not constraining district court discretion to 
disagree with the child pornography guidelines on 
policy grounds, but rather holding that “the fact of 
Congress’ role in amending a guideline is not itself a 
valid reason to disagree with the guideline.”263  
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit found that the argument 
that the Commission had departed from its usual role 
in amending §2G2.2 “simply misse[d] the point”: “It is 
true that the Commission did not act in its usual 
institutional role with respect to the relevant 
amendments to §2G2.2.  But that is because Congress 
was the relevant actor with respect to those 
amendments; and that puts §2G2.2 on stronger ground 
than the crack-cocaine guidelines were on in 
Kimbrough.”264   
The import of congressional directives to the 
Commission took on a different significance in the 
context of the EDP and career offender guidelines.  
With respect to EDP departures, the existence of fast 
track programs in some, but not all districts, generated 
significant circuit conflict about whether a district 
court may vary on the basis of this disparity.  The 
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits disapproved of 
variances on this basis, explaining that “Kimbrough, 
which concerned a district court’s ability to sentence 
in disagreement with Guideline policy, does not 
control this case, which concerns a district court’s 
ability to sentence in disagreement with Congressional 
policy.”265  Furthermore, “because any disparity that 
                                                                                  
pornography), the district court did not come close to doing 
so.”). 
 
263  Bistline, 665 F.3d at 762; see also United States v. Plate, 
361 F. App’x 318, 332 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
sentence is not substantively unreasonable solely on the 
basis that §2G2.2 was based on statutory directives; 
“Kimbrough did not hold it impermissible for a guideline to 
be formulated based on statutory directives, but that when it 
is so formulated, a court may choose to give it less 
weight.”).  
 
264  Bistline, 665 F.3d. at 763.   
 
265  United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 563 (5th 
Cir. 2008) (“Kimbrough addressed only a district court’s 
discretion to vary from the Guidelines based on a 
disagreement with Guideline, not Congressional, policy.”); 
see also United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 
1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Gonzalez-
Zoleto, 556 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he judge’s 
downward departure reflected not a disagreement with the 
Guidelines, but with congressional policy authorizing 
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results from fast-track programs is intended by 
Congress, it is not ‘unwarranted’ within the meaning 
of § 3553(a)(6).”266  Other circuits adopted the 
opposite view, concluding that the Commission did 
not “take[] account of empirical data and national 
experience in formulating” the fast track departure 
scheme,267 and therefore, “guidelines and policy 
statements embodying these judgments deserve less 
deference than the sentencing guidelines normally 
attract.”268   The Department of Justice has recently 
changed its policy to require EDP programs in all 
districts for illegal entry offenses. 269  However, criteria 
for qualifying for the departure and the amount of the 
reduction from the guideline minimum (within the 4-
level-reduction limit in USSG §5K3.1), remain within 
the discretion of the United States Attorney for each 
district.  Therefore, regional differences in the 
programs may continue. 
The division among the circuits with respect to 
the career offender guideline continues unresolved.  In 
the immediate aftermath of Kimbrough, the Seventh 
and Eleventh Circuits held that district courts lack the 
discretion to vary on the basis of a policy disagreement 
with the career offender guideline because, in the 
words of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Welton, “[u]nlike the crack/powder disparity, the 
career offender Guideline range is the product of a 
                                                                                  
downward departures for fast-track defendants.  While 
Kimbrough permits a district court to consider its policy 
disagreements with the Guidelines, it does not authorize a 
district judge to take into account his disagreements with 
congressional policy.”). 
 
266  Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d at 562. 
  
267  United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 
2008) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States 
v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(indicating that the Commission did not use an empirical 
approach but “[r]ather, it quickly adopted the congressional 
language.”). 
 
268  Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 227. 
  
269  On January 31, 2012, the Deputy Attorney General 
issued a memorandum in requiring all districts to create fast 
track programs for felony illegal reentry offenses.  See 
Memorandum of James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, 
Department Policy on Early Disposition or “Fast-Track” 
Programs (Jan. 31, 2012) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf.   
 
Congressional mandate” and “the statutory origin of 
the disparity embedded in §4B1.1 removes that 
disparity from the sentencing discretion provided by 
Kimbrough.”270  The Eleventh Circuit in United States 
v. Vazquez pointed to the Supreme Court’s specific 
citation to section 994(h) in Kimbrough: “[] 
Kimbrough does not gut our analysis in Williams [that 
variances based on a disagreement with the career 
offender guideline are improper].  To the contrary, the 
Supreme Court expressly made a distinction between 
the Guidelines’ disparate treatment of crack and 
powder cocaine offenses -- where Congress did not 
direct the Sentencing Commission to create this 
disparity -- and the Guideline’s punishment of career 
offenders -- which was explicitly directed by 
Congress.”271 
The reasoning of these courts “seems to be 
falling out of favor.” 272  The government confessed 
error in both Welton and Vazquez – the government 
asked the Seventh Circuit to overrule Welton, which it 
did in United States v. Corner,273 and in Vazquez, the 
Solicitor General argued that: 
  
the reference to Section 994(h) was 
not intended to suggest that Congress 
had also bound sentencing courts to 
follow the career offender Guidelines.  
Such a conclusion would have to rest 
on a faulty premise: that congressional 
directives to the Sentencing 
Commission are equally binding on 
the courts.274  
 
In addition, in a case before the Third Circuit, 
the government “concede[d] that a sentencing court 
may vary downward from the Guidelines range 
                                                 
270  583 F.3d 494, 496-97 (7th Cir. 2009), overruled by 
United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 
271  United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th 
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010). 
 
272  United States v. Merced, 603 F.2d 203, 218 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 
273  United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
 
274  United States v. Vazquez, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 
(M.D. Fl. 2011) (emphasis in original). 
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generated by the career offender provision based 
solely on a policy disagreement with the scope of that 
provision.”275  This concession brought the 
government’s position in line with the decisions of the 
First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and, following Corner, 
Seventh Circuits.276 
These circuits have held, in the words of the 
Sixth Circuit, that a district court “may lawfully 
conclude[] that the policies underlying the career-
offender provisions . . . yield a sentence ‘greater than 
necessary’ to serve the objectives of sentencing.”277   
                                                 
275  Merced, 603 F.2d at 218.  Based on the government’s 
concession, the Third Circuit assumed that it was 
permissible to vary from §4B1.1 based on a policy 
disagreement, but held that the district court had provided 
inadequate explanation of the reasons for its variance in this 
case.  Id. at 219.   
 
276  See United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 
2008); United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651 (2d Cir. 
2008); United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Gray, 577 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 
277  United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 
2009); see also United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 663 
(2d Cir. 2008)  (“Section 994(h), [] by its terms, is a 
direction to the Sentencing Commission, not to the courts, 
and it finds no express analog in Title 18 or Title 21.  While 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) expressly establishes the minimum and 
maximum prison terms that the court is allowed to impose 
for violations of § 841(a), there is no statutory provision 
instructing the court to sentence a career offender at or near 
the statutory maximum.”); United States v. Boardman, 528 
F.3d 86, 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (“we do not see why 
disagreement with the Commission’s policy judgment [] 
would be any less permissible a reason to deviate than 
disagreement with the guideline policy judgment at issue in 
Kimbrough.”); United States v. Gray, 577 F.3d 947, 950 
(8th Cir. 2009) (“On the more general question of a district 
court’s authority to vary from the guidelines, the Supreme 
Court in Kimbrough quoted the government’s concession 
that a district court may vary based on policy 
considerations, including disagreements with the guidelines, 
[] and the district court [in the instant case] gave no 
indication that it failed to understand its authority to vary 
from the career-offender guideline on that basis.”); United 
States v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (“As 
the Supreme Court through Booker, Kimbrough, and Spears 
has instructed, and as other circuits that have confronted the 
crack/powder variance in the sentence of a career offender 
have accepted and clarified in their circuit law, sentencing 
judges can reject any Sentencing Guideline, provided that 
the sentence imposed is reasonable.”) (emphasis in original). 
The Seventh Circuit explained its changed position 
from Welton to Corner as follows:  
 
Further reflection has led us to 
conclude that the Justices’ reference to 
§ 944(h) in Kimbrough does not 
equate §4B1.1 with either § 994(h) or 
the statutory maximum sentence that 
the career-offender guideline must be 
“at or near.”  The Court made two 
related points in Kimbrough: first, the 
crack/powder ratio in the Guidelines 
was the choice of the Commission 
rather than Congress; second, district 
judges are entitled to disagree with the 
Commission’s policy choices, as long 
as judges follow all statutes.  The 
reference to § 994(h) in Kimbrough 
concerned the first of these points 
rather than the second; and it is the 
second, reiterated in Spears, that 
controls the career-offender issue.278 
 
The Seventh Circuit concluded: “Because §4B1.1 is 
just a Guideline, judges are as free to disagree with it 
as they are with §2D1.1(c) (which sets the 
crack/powder ratio).  No judge is required to sentence 
at variance with a Guideline, but every judge is at 
liberty to do so.”279 
Although not specifically addressing 
congressional directives to the Commission, Pepper v. 
United States also addressed the authority of district 
courts to disregard those guideline policy statements 
with which they disagree, and may affect future circuit 
court decisions about sentencing courts’ authority to 
reject other guideline policies.280  In addition, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, the Court declined 
the invitation to give greater weight to the guidelines 
and policy statements than to any other § 3553(a) 
factor.281  
                                                 
278  Corner, 598 F.3d at 415 (“Sentencing judges must 
implement all statutes, whether or not the judges agree with 
them – but all § 994(h) requires is that the Sentencing 
Commission set the presumptive sentencing range for 
certain serial criminals at or near the statutory maximum.”). 
 
279  Id. at 416 (emphasis in original). 
 
280 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). 
 
281  Id. at 1249. 
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Specifically, the question in Pepper was 
whether a district court may, on resentencing a 
defendant after a successful appeal, look to evidence 
of the defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation to 
support a downward variance from the guideline 
range.282  The Court found it “clear” that such 
evidence “may, in appropriate cases, support a 
downward variance from the advisory Guidelines 
range.”283  The Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 
made no distinction between an initial sentencing and 
any subsequent resentencing on remand; instead, the 
Court said a categorical ban on the consideration of 
post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence would 
contravene this provision.  Moreover, the Court 
observed that post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence 
“may also critically inform a sentencing judge’s 
overarching duty under section 3553(a) to ‘impose a 
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to 
comply with the sentencing purposes set forth in 
section 3553(a)(2).”284  In short, the Court concluded 
that a prohibition on the consideration of such post-
sentencing rehabilitation evidence “conflicts with 
longstanding principles of federal sentencing law and 
contravenes Congress’ directives in §§ 3661 and 
3553(a).”285  Accordingly, the Court held “as with the 
provisions in Booker, the proper remedy here is to 
invalidate § 3742(g)(2),” a provision of the SRA that 
limited resentencing to grounds expressly relied upon 
in the prior sentencing.286   
The Court also expressly disagreed with the 
Commission’s reasoning as stated in the commentary 
to §5K2.19,287 which provided that “[p]ost-sentencing 
rehabilitative efforts, even if exceptional, undertaken 
by a defendant after imposition of a term of 
imprisonment for the instant offense are not an 
appropriate basis for a downward departure when 
                                                 
282  Id. at 1235. 
 
283  Id. at 1241. 
 
284  Id. at 1242. 
 
285  Id. at 1243. 
 
286  Id. at 1245. 
 
287  Id. at 1248.  The Commission deleted §5K2.19 effective 
November 1, 2012.  USSG App. C, amend. 768 (Nov. 1, 
2012). 
 
resentencing the defendant for that offense.”288  In 
rejecting the policy statement, the court noted that the 
policy found no support in section 3661’s broad 
requirement that “no limitation” be placed “on the 
information concerning the background, character, and 
conduct” of the offender before the court. 
The Court “recognized that the Commission 
post-Booker continues to ‘fil[l] an important 
institutional role’ because ‘[i]t has the capacity courts 
lack to base its determinations on empirical data and 
national experience, guided by a professional staff 
with appropriate expertise’” and the guidelines 
themselves are due “respectful consideration” at 
sentencing.289   Nevertheless, the Court emphasized 
that “a district court may in appropriate cases impose a 
non-Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with 
the Commission’s views” and stated, “[t]hat is 
particularly true where, as here, the Commission’s 
views rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales 
not reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress 
enacted.”290  Finally, the Court declined the invitation 
to elevate the guidelines’ policy statements (18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(5)) and the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)) above all 
other section 3553(a) factors.291  
To the extent that courts may disagree with 
guideline and congressional policy in favor of their 
own policy views, individual judges, sentencing 
practitioners, and academics are divided about whether 
district court judges should be allowed to take policy 
disagreements into account at sentencing.  Some 
believe sentences based on policy disagreements 
should be reviewed with greater scrutiny on appeal, 
while others believe such heightened scrutiny would 
present constitutional problems by tending to make the 
guidelines more mandatory. 292  
                                                 
288  USSG §5K2.19, p.s. (Nov. 2011). 
 
289  Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1247. 
 
290  Id. (citing Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109-110). 
 
291  Id. at 1249. 
 
292  Compare, e.g., U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Hearing on 
Federal Sentencing Options After Booker, Washington, DC 
(Feb. 16, 2012) (Testimony of the Honorable Gerard Lynch, 
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, transcript at 104-05) (“[T]he result that 
judges are free, individually, to disagree with the policy of 
the Guidelines is what strikes at the heart of the Guidelines 
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In sum, disagreements in circuits and among 
practitioners regarding when courts may disregard 
Commission policy – and even congressional policy – 
and the permissible grounds for doing so have not 
been resolved.  Further, the courts are divided on two 
important questions: how much weight should be 
given to guidelines resulting from congressional 
directives to the Commission; and the appropriate 
interaction between the proscriptions and limitations 
on consideration of offender characteristics in section 
994 of Title 28 and the courts’ consideration of 
offender characteristics in section 3553(a).   
 
POST-BOOKER APPELLATE REVIEW 
 
Presumption of Reasonableness   
 
In Rita v. United States,293 the Supreme Court 
responded to a division among the circuits that had 
arisen since Booker: the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits 
adopted the rule that a sentence within the applicable 
guideline range is “presumed reasonable” on appeal,294 
                                                                                  
system. . . . I think [policy disagreements are] the biggest 
problem with the current system, and I would like to see 
stronger appellate review in those cases. . . . I think it is a 
good idea that policy disagreements, however defined, 
should be subject to de novo review in the courts of appeals, 
and ultimately in the Supreme Court, so that we do not have 
a system where some judges think that child pornography is 
not to be sentenced as severely, and others take a completely 
different approach.”) and U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public 
Hearing on Federal Sentencing Options After Booker, 
Washington, DC (Feb. 16, 2012) (Statement of Matthew 
Miner, Attorney, written statement at 8)  (“I also support the 
Commission’s proposal for heightened appellate scrutiny for 
sentencing decisions that are based upon policy 
disagreements with the Guidelines.”), with U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n Public Hearing on Federal Sentencing Options 
After Booker, Washington, DC (Feb. 16, 2012) (Testimony 
of Henry Bemporad, Federal Public Defender, Western 
District of Texas, transcript at 118) (“if judges are not free 
to disagree with the Guidelines on the basis of policy. . . if 
judges on the courts of appeals are substituting their 
judgments on this factor, it is going to lead to 
unconstitutional sentences.”). 
 
293  551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 
294  United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th 
but the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits held to the contrary.295  In adopting a 
presumption of reasonableness, the Seventh and Tenth 
circuits had emphasized the need for nationwide 
uniformity.296   The First and Third Circuits had 
declined to adopt a presumption of reasonableness due 
to the concern that a presumption would tend in the 
direction of making the guidelines mandatory.297  The 
Ninth Circuit had rejected a presumption of 
reasonableness because it found that a non-binding 
presumption would have little practical effect.298  
Ultimately, the Court affirmed Rita’s within range 
sentence, and held that courts of appeals may, but need 
not, apply a presumption of reasonableness when 
reviewing within range sentences.299  
In allowing the courts of appeals to adopt a 
presumption of reasonableness, the Court emphasized 
the close relationship between the guidelines and the 
section 3553(a) factors.300  First, the Court discussed 
                                                                                  
Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 
(7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 
1053-54 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dorcely, 454 
F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 
295  United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 
19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 
324, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds as 
recognized in United States v. Wells, 279 F. App’x 100 (3d 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993-94 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 
1180, 1185 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 
296  Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 607-608; Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054.  
For the various circuits’ reasoning on this issue, see Part B 
of this report, available online. 
 
297  Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518; Cooper, 437 F.3d at 
331. 
 
298  Carty, 520 F.3d at 993-94. 
 
299  Rita, 551 U.S. at 347-48.  In Nelson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court reiterated that the presumption of 
reasonableness is an appellate presumption only:  “[T]he 
sentencing court must first calculate the Guidelines range, 
and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the 
individual defendant in light of the statutory sentencing 
factors, explaining any variance from the former with 
reference to the latter.”  555 U.S. 350, 351 (2009). 
 
300  Rita, 551 U.S. at 348. 
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the statutory provisions governing the promulgation of 
the guidelines and how those provisions mirror the 
factors that § 3553(a) requires sentencing courts to 
consider, noting that “the sentencing statutes envision 
both the sentencing judge and the Commission as 
carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the 
one, at retail, the other at wholesale.”301   
 
According to the Court: 
 
[T]he presumption reflects the nature 
of the Guidelines-writing task that 
Congress set for the Commission and 
the manner in which the Commission 
carried out that task.  In instructing 
both the sentencing judge and the 
Commission what to do, Congress 
referred to the basic sentencing 
objectives that the statute sets forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . . . . The 
provision also tells the sentencing 
judge to “impose a sentence sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary, to 
comply with” the basic aims of 
sentencing as set out above. 
Congressional statutes then tell the 
Commission to write Guidelines that 
will carry out these same section 
3553(a) objectives.302 
 
Second, the Court discussed the process the 
Commission used to initially promulgate and 
subsequently amend the guidelines, concluding that 
the guidelines “seek to embody the § 3553(a) 
considerations, both in principle and in practice,” and 
that they “reflect a rough approximation of sentences 
that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.”303  
Accordingly, the Court held that a rebuttable 
presumption of reasonableness at the appellate level 
“simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that 
when the judge’s discretionary decision accords with 
the Commission’s view of the appropriate application 
of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable 
                                                 
301  Id.  
 
302  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
303  Id. at 350.   
 
that the sentence is reasonable.”304  Nonetheless, even 
after Rita, in some circuits a sentence within a 
properly determined guideline range is presumed 
reasonable on appeal, while in others it is not. 
 
Reasonableness Review  
 
In Gall v. United States,305 the Supreme Court 
made clear that reasonableness review is a two-step 
process in which the courts of appeals first consider 
procedural reasonableness by determining whether the 
sentencing court correctly determined the guideline 
range, properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, and 
sufficiently explained the sentence imposed; and then 
consider the substantive reasonableness of the 
sentence.306  The first step is “to ensure that the district 
court committed no significant procedural error, such 
as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, 
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, 
or failing to adequately explain the chosen 
sentence.”307  “Assuming that the district court’s 
sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the 
appellate court,” as a second step, should then consider 
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence 
imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,”308 
taking into account “the totality of the 
circumstances.”309  Moreover, the Court emphasized, 
“[t]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably 
have concluded that a different sentence was 
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the 
district court.”310 
The Supreme Court considered whether the 
standard of review differs for sentences within the 
                                                 
304  Id. at 350-51.  
 
305  552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 
306  Id. at 51.  But see Rita, 551 U.S. at 370 (“I would hold 
that reasonableness review cannot contain a substantive 
component at all.” (Scalia, J., dissenting.)). 
 
307  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  
 
308  Id. 
 
309  Id. 
 
310  Id. 
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guideline range and those outside the guideline range.  
The Court held that an abuse of discretion standard 
applies equally to all sentences “whether inside, just 
outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines 
range.”311  Where the sentence varies from the 
guideline range, the appellate court “may consider the 
extent of the deviation but must give due deference to 
the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, 
on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”312   
The Court also addressed whether the standard 
of review is heightened depending on how far outside 
the guideline range the sentence falls.  The Court 
stated that it is “clear that a district judge must give 
serious consideration to the extent of any departure 
from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion 
that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh 
sentence is appropriate in a particular case with 
sufficient justifications.”313  However, the Court 
rejected any “appellate rule that requires 
‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence 
outside the Guidelines range” or “the use of a rigid 
mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a 
departure as the standard for determining the strength 
of the justifications required for a specific 
sentence.”314  Such rules or formulas, the Court noted, 
“come too close to creating an impermissible 
presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside 
the Guidelines range.”315  Moreover, such rules and 
formulas would be “inconsistent with the rule that the 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to 
appellate review of all sentencing decisions — 
whether inside or outside the Guidelines range.”316   
Nonetheless, if a court chooses a sentence 
outside the guideline range, the court “must consider 
the extent of the deviation and ensure that the 
justification is sufficiently compelling to support the 
degree of the variance”317 and must provide an 
                                                 
311  Id. at 41.   
 
312  Id. at 51. 
 
313  Id. at 46.   
 
314  Id. 
 
315  Id. at 47. 
 
316  Id. at 49. 
 
317  Id. at 50. 
 
explanation sufficient “to allow for meaningful 
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair 
sentencing.”318  Furthermore when a judge varies in a 
“mine-run case” based “solely on the judge’s view that 
the Guidelines range ‘fails properly to reflect               
§ 3553(a) considerations,’” closer review may be in 
order.319  
 
Reasonableness Review after Rita and Gall  
 
The courts of appeals have uniformly 
recognized that the appellate court’s role is to 
determine whether the sentence is procedurally sound 
and falls within the broader range of reasonable 
sentences, not whether the sentence was the correct 
sentence.320  However, review of the circuits’ 
sentencing cases reveals variations among the circuits’ 
stated approaches to this two-step review, as well as 
differences between the circuits’ stated approaches and 
their actual practices. 
These differences range from the types of 
reasonableness a court will consider on appeal, to the 
factors sentencing courts are permitted to consider, to 
the manner in which an appellate court will determine 
whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable.  
Some circuits focus more on procedural 
reasonableness than substantive reasonableness.  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has held that “appellate 
courts have a sua sponte duty to undertake a review 
for procedural error even where . . . no such error is 
expressly asserted by the [parties].”321  At least one 
                                                 
318  Id. 
 
319  Id. at 109-110 (citations omitted). 
 
320  See, e.g., United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1015 
(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the “broad range of sentences 
that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances”); 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(en banc) (“if the district court’s sentence is procedurally 
sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided).”  Additional caselaw on this topic can be found 
in Part B of this report, available online. 
 
321  United States v. Evans-Martinez, 611 F.3d 635, 638 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 
1115 (9th Cir. 2010), opinion superseded by 679 F.3d 1069 
(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). 
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circuit does not read Gall to require such review 
absent an argument by the parties.322  Similarly, at 
least one circuit considers Gall’s instructions to 
preclude a review for substantive reasonableness when 
procedural errors are found,323 while another circuit 
elects to rule on substantive reasonableness even 
where procedural errors are established.324  Moreover, 
there are cases in several circuits that blur the line 
between procedural and substantive reasonableness; in 
at least two circuits, grave procedural errors may 
render a sentence substantively unreasonable.325 
 
Procedural Reasonableness Review 
The courts of appeals have not taken a 
uniform approach to the depth of explanation 
                                                 
322  United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 
2009) (examining only the substantive reasonableness of the 
sentence where the appellant did not challenge the 
procedural reasonableness of the sentence).   
 
323  United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1280 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“the new reasonableness standard of review 
established in Booker comes into play only if there was no 
material error in the district court’s calculation of the 
appropriate Guidelines range”); c.f. United States v. 
Vickers, 528 F.3d 1116, 1120 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Absent 
reversible procedural error, we then review the 
reasonableness of the court’s sentence for abuse of 
discretion.”). 
 
324  United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 182-83 (2d Cir. 
2010) (“nothing in our existing sentencing law prevents us 
from reaching both the procedural and substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence in the course of an appeal 
where we find both types of error. . . It is especially 
appropriate to reach the matter of substantive 
unreasonableness now because we have found and identify 
here certain serious flaws . . . which are squarely presented 
on this appeal and which must be dealt with by the district 
court at resentencing.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
325  United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 
2009) (district court’s analysis was so “procedurally flawed” 
as to result in a substantively unreasonable sentence); 
United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 553 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(same); United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 256-57 (3d Cir. 
2007) (same); United States v. Friedman 554 F.3d 1301, 
1312 (10th Cir. 2009) (“the very limited nature of the record 
and the paucity of reasoning on the part of the district court 
most certainly bear on our review of the substantive 
reasonableness”).  
 
necessary for a sentence to be deemed procedurally 
sound.  Many circuits clearly state that a sentencing 
court need not explain why it is not imposing a certain 
sentence proposed by either the government or the 
defendant.326  However, some appellate courts have 
faulted sentencing courts for failing to make such 
explanations.  For example, in United States v. Hall, 
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a within 
range sentence where, among other things, “the district 
court did not explain why, in view of the factors in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), a sentence of 188 months was 
necessary, much less why the lower sentence that Hall 
requested would be insufficient.”327  
In contrast, in some circuits an adequate 
explanation may render procedural error harmless.  If 
the court uses the wrong starting point, for example by 
miscalculating the guidelines, the sentence will 
withstand appeal in most cases as long as the court 
recognizes the potential calculation error and 
announces that it would impose the same sentence 
under section 3553(a) regardless of the erroneous 
computation.328  Even the Ninth Circuit, which appears 
                                                 
326  See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 804 
(6th Cir. 2010) (“It is well-settled that a district judge need 
not give the reasons for rejecting any and all arguments by 
the parties for alternative sentences, nor must she give the 
specific reason for a within guidelines sentence.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); United States v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 
45, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (a sentencing court is not required “to 
provide a lengthy and detailed statement of its reasons for 
refusing to deviate” from the guideline range). 
 
327  610 F.3d 727, 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  See also United 
States v. Akhigbe, 642 F.3d 1078, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“Reviewing the sentencing proceedings as a whole . . . we 
conclude that the court plainly erred in failing to provide an 
adequate explanation for the unsought above-Guidelines 
sentence imposed”). 
 
328  See, e.g., United States v. Barner, 572 F. 3d 1239, 1248 
(11th Cir. 2009) (“Where a district judge clearly states that 
he would impose the same sentence, even if he erred in 
calculating the guidelines, then any error in the calculation 
is harmless.”);  United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. O’Georgia, 569 F.3d 
281, 296 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where a Guidelines departure 
provision has been erroneously applied, the resulting 
sentence may still be procedurally reasonable if the district 
court has adequately explained it by reference to the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. In such a case, the sentence would 
be unreasonable as a departure but reasonable as a variance 
from the advisory Guidelines range.”); United States v. 
46
BOOKER REPORT 2012: PART A    
 
to have adopted a general rule of reversing sentences 
imposed after an improper calculation of the guideline 
range,329 has failed to adopt an explicit per se reversal 
rule.330 
Likewise, courts of appeals take different 
approaches to the appropriate section 3553(a) factors 
to be considered at sentencing.  For example, in one 
case the First Circuit rejected as unreasonable an 
upward variance from a range of zero to six months to 
a sentence of 48 months because the defendant had 
been deported twice before and was subject to an 
unexecuted bench warrant for a prior arrest.331  In 
contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that an upward 
departure from a range of 24 to 30 months to a 
sentence of 72 months was reasonable based upon the 
sentencing court’s reliance on the defendant’s criminal 
history and post-deportation re-entry arrests as 
                                                                                  
Henson, 550 F.3d 739, 742 (8th Cir. 2008) (guideline 
calculation error is harmless if court recognizes specific 
potential for error and expressly states same sentence would 
be imposed in absence of error).  But c.f. United States v. 
Bah, 439 F.3d 423, 432 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he district court 
cannot preemptively announce an alternative sentence under 
the § 3553(a) factors without first having determined the 
correct advisory guidelines range”). 
 
329  United States v. Pham, 545 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“If upon review we conclude that the district court 
committed a ‘significant procedural error,’ such as a 
‘material error in the Guidelines calculation that serves as 
the starting point for the district court's sentencing decision, 
we will remand for resentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(f).’ If no such material error in applying the 
Guidelines is found, however, we may go on to evaluate the 
sentence for its substantive reasonableness under an abuse 
of discretion standard.”) (citations omitted). 
 
330  United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1279 n.3 (“We 
leave open the question whether, and under what 
circumstances, district courts may find it unnecessary to 
calculate the applicable Guidelines range.”). 
 
331  United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 
2006).  See also United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 354 
(6th Cir. 2007) (holding that an above-guideline sentence 
for a repeat child sex offender is substantively unreasonable 
where the sentencing court relied on recidivism, which is “a 
problem common to all repeat sex offenders” and the 
guideline “was meant to account for the problem of 
recidivism”).   
 
evidence that the defendant had “no respect” for the 
laws of the United States.332   
 
Substantive Reasonableness Review 
 
Although a direct assessment of how 
uniformly courts conduct substantive reasonableness 
review is difficult, a review of cases suggests appellate 
courts have reached different outcomes for seemingly 
similarly situated defendants.  A review of child 
pornography and fraud cases illustrates that courts of 
appeals may reach different outcomes in similar cases, 
based in part on which sentencing factors the circuit 
court chooses to emphasize in that particular case.   
In the area of child pornography the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Autery333 found a sentence 
of probation provided just punishment and adequate 
deterrence based on the defendant’s personal 
characteristics, while the Eleventh Circuit in United 
States v. Pugh334 found that a sentence of probation did 
not provide adequate general deterrence or protect the 
public.  In both cases, the defendants had no criminal 
history and no known history of sexual misconduct.  In 
Autery the district court emphasized that the defendant 
“did not ‘fit the profile of a pedophile,’”335 and had the 
support of his family as well as “redeeming personal 
characteristics,” including “no history of substance 
abuse, no ‘interpersonal instability,’ no ‘sociopathic or 
criminalistic attitudes.”336  In upholding the 
probationary sentence as substantively reasonable, the 
Ninth Circuit emphasized the district court’s 
assessment that the defendant was not a pedophile and 
that his “redeeming personal characteristics” were 
sufficient to support the district court’s conclusion that 
the defendant’s case was not a mine-run child 
pornography possession case, and did not lead to 
unwarranted sentencing disparities.337  In contrast, in 
reversing Pugh’s probationary sentence as 
                                                 
332  United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 807 
(5th Cir. 2008);  
 
333  555 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 
334  515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 
335  555 F.3d at 867. 
 
336  Id. at 868. 
 
337  Id. at 876. 
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substantively unreasonable, the Eleventh Circuit 
emphasized sentencing factors other than the 
defendant’s personal characteristics, including general 
deterrence, the seriousness of the offense, the need to 
protect the public, and the need to avoid sentencing 
disparity.338   
Even within range sentences in child 
pornography cases may be subject to different 
outcomes on substantive reasonableness review.  In 
United States v. Dorvee, the Second Circuit held that a 
within range sentence was substantively unreasonable, 
and that “unless applied with great care, [application 
of the child pornography guideline] can lead to 
unreasonable sentences that are inconsistent with what 
section 3553(a) requires.”339  In contrast, the Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged the Dorvee court’s view of the 
child pornography guidelines generally, but declined 
to adopt it.340  In particular, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that “[w]hether one agrees or disagrees with 
the concerns expressed by the Second Circuit, it is 
ultimately for Congress and the Commission to 
consider these concerns.”341 
In fraud cases, different approaches to 
substantive review have led to discord among judges 
on the Ninth Circuit over the appropriateness of non-
                                                 
338  515 F.3d at 1194-1203.  
 
339  616 F.3d at 183-84. 
 
340  United States v. Mantanes, 632 F.3d 372, 376-77 (7th 
Cir. 2011). 
 
341  Id. at 377.  In a subsequent case, the Second Circuit 
declined to find a sentence imposed under the illegal reentry 
guideline unreasonable, and in so doing commented on its 
holding in Dorvee: “the absence of empirical support is not 
the relevant flaw we identified in Dorvee.  We criticized the 
child pornography Guideline in Dorvee because Congress 
ignored the Commission and directly amended the 
Guideline, which had the effect of ‘eviscerat[ing] the 
fundamental statutory requirement in section 3553(a) that 
district courts consider the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.’ 
There is no such flaw in the reentry Guideline. Congress did 
not bypass the usual procedure for amending the Guidelines 
with respect to illegal reentry cases.  To the contrary, the 16-
level enhancement in §2L1.2 was based on the 
Commission’s own determin[ation] that these increased 
offense levels are appropriate to reflect the serious nature of 
these offenses.”  United States v. Perez-Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 
43 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 
 
imprisonment sentences for white collar criminals.  In 
United States v. Whitehead, the defendant was 
convicted of selling unauthorized “access cards” 
which allowed purchasers to pirate copyrighted 
material from DirecTV, resulting in more than a 
million dollar loss to the company.342  In dissenting 
from an opinion upholding a sentence of probation, 
which was a reduction from a guideline range of 41 to 
51 months, Judge Bybee argued that the district court’s 
decision was “not an exercise of discretion so much as 
an abdication of responsibility,”343 and expressed deep 
concern over the impact of the majority’s decision on 
sentencing practice in the Ninth Circuit:  
 
Whitehead’s non-sentence surely 
becomes an important starting point 
for defendants in this circuit willing to 
claim close family ties and post-
conviction remorse to avoid prison.  
As a circuit, we have an obligation to 
ensure roughly equal sentences both 
among our judicial districts and within 
each judicial district.  Deferring 
equally to district court sentences is 
not the same as securing equal 
sentences in district court.344 
 
 In United States v. Prosperi,345 the First 
Circuit affirmed a sentence of probation, a downward 
variance from a range of 87 to 108 months, in a case in 
which “[t]he government charged that over the course 
of nine years [the defendants’ company] knowingly 
provided concrete that failed to meet project 
specifications and concealed that failure by creating 
false documentation purporting to show that the 
concrete provided complied with the relevant 
                                                 
342  532 F.3d 991, 992 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
343  Id. at 994 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 
344  Id. at 999-1000 (Bybee, J., dissenting).  See also United 
States v. Edwards, 622 F.3d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Gould, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur court’s practice of 
uncritically affirming unreasonably lenient sentences for 
white-collar criminals renders the Sentencing Guidelines a 
nullity, makes us an outlier among the circuit courts, and 
impairs our ability to effectively review sentences for 
substantive reasonableness.”). 
 
345  686 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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specifications.”346  The concrete was used in Boston’s 
Central Artery/Tunnel project (the “Big Dig”) over a 
16-year period.  The project “was one of the largest 
public works projects in United States history at the 
time of its completion.”347  While recognizing that any 
loss calculation in the case would be imprecise given 
legitimate questions about whether the government 
sustained any loss at all,348 the court adopted the 
government’s $5.2 million loss figure, but determined 
that the loss amount should not drive the sentence: 
 
[l]oss is certainly important, but the 
crimes at issue do not fit the usual 
white collar crime profile. There was 
no intent on defendants’ part to enrich 
themselves personally.  Nor is there 
any evidence that defendants intended 
to do harm to the [Big Dig] project or 
to the taxpaying public in any specific 
sense.349 
 
In upholding the sentence, the First Circuit noted, 
among other things, that the district court had fulfilled 
its duty to consider the purposes of sentencing, 
including deterrence.  The court of appeals found 
“plausible” the district court’s explanation of the 
sentence, including the lack of evidence that the 
substandard concrete created a safety issue, the court’s 
belief that the defendants were not seeking to enrich 
themselves, and the individual circumstances of the 
defendants.350 
Other circuits have rejected sentences in fraud 
cases as substantively unreasonable because the court 
found the sentences too lenient.351  For example, in 
United States v. Engle, the Fourth Circuit vacated a 
sentence of probation, a downward variance from a 
guideline range of 24 to 30 months.  Engle had evaded 
taxes for 16 years and had a total tax liability 
                                                 
346  Id. at 34. 
 
347  Id. 
 
348  Id. at 43.  
 
349  Id. at 38. 
 
350  Id. at 50. 
 
351  See, e.g., United States v. Givens, 443 F.3d 642, 645 
(8th Cir. 2006). 
  
exceeding $2 million.352  While the Fourth Circuit 
recognized that after Booker a district court could 
disagree with the guidelines or its policy statements, it 
explained that the district court had not even 
acknowledged the policy statements and had given a 
significantly lower sentence in a case that some could 
believe warranted an above range sentence on the 
basis of the defendant’s lengthy tax evasion and his 
failure to pay anything toward his debt after receiving 
a lenient sentence.353  More specifically, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the district court’s near-total focus on 
the defendant’s ability to repay his debt was 
substantively unreasonable,354 noting that Booker and 
Gall did not “permit[] district courts to rest a 
sentencing decision exclusively on such 
constitutionally suspect grounds.”355  
In United States v. Martin, a case involving 
securities and mail fraud in which the defendant’s 
guideline range was 108 to 135 months, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that a sentence of probation was 
“shockingly short and wholly fail[ed] to serve the 
purposes of sentencing as set forth by Congress in       
§ 3553(a).”356  Similarly, in United States v. Cutler, a 
case involving “various charges relating to extensive 
bank frauds and tax frauds,” the Second Circuit 
rejected two downward departures, one from a range 
of 78 to 97 months down to a sentence of one year and 
one day of imprisonment for one defendant, and the 
other from a range of 108 to 135 months down to 
probation for another defendant, based on their 
extraordinary family circumstances, need to pay 
restitution, health, age, and “public humiliation” 
associated with the charges.357 
                                                 
352  592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 
353  Id. at 502-03. 
 
354  Id. at 504. 
 
355  Id. at 505. 
 
356  455 F.3d 1227, 1239 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 
357  520 F.3d 136, 158-175 (2d Cir. 2008), questioned in 
United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (while 
not questioning the ultimate result in Cutler, the court noted 
that it will “set aside a district court’s substantive 
determination only in exceptional cases where the trial 
court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of 
permissible decisions.’”) (emphasis in original). 
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In addition to the different outcomes resulting 
from substantive reasonableness review, questions 
have arisen regarding how to calculate the size of a 
departure or a variance for purposes of appellate 
review.  In United States v. Castillo,358 the Seventh 
Circuit upheld an above-range sentence of 60 months 
from a guideline range of 37 to 46 months in a false 
identification case under 18 U.S.C. § 1028.  In so 
doing the court clarified “an ambiguity concerning the 
scope of appellate review of an above-guidelines 
sentence.”  After noting that circuit precedent requires 
that “the farther the judge’s sentence departs from the 
guidelines . . . the more compelling the justification 
based on factors in section 3553(a) that the judge must 
offer to enable the court of appeals to assess the 
reasonableness of the sentence imposed,” the court 
went on to identify an ambiguity in the word 
“farther”.359   
“It can be conceived of in either relative or 
absolute terms,” according to the court, and a variance 
that is 30 percent longer than the top of the guideline 
range seems large, but “in absolute terms . . . it is a 
smallish 14 months.”360  The court determined that 
“the relative is generally more important than the 
absolute, as is implicit in a number of our previous 
decisions,” and gave greater weight to the percentage 
deviation, than to the number of months it 
represented.361  In Castillo’s case, the court found the 
30 percent upward variance reasonable, because the 
guidelines encourage an upward departure if the 
offense involved substantially more than 100 false 
documents, and Castillo’s offense involved 2,800 
documents, “28 times the number of fraudulent 
documents that triggers the highest guideline 
sentence.”362 
Other factors may limit the ability of the 
appellate process to “iron out sentencing differences,” 
as the Court anticipated in Booker.363  First, fewer than 
ten percent of all offenders appeal some aspect of their 
                                                 
358  695 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 
359  Id. at 673 (citations omitted). 
 
360  Id. 
 
361  Id. 
 
362  Id. at 675. 
 
363  543 U.S. at 263. 
 
sentence, and the proportion of cases that are appealed 
has diminished over time.364  This may be due in part 
to the prevalence of appeal waivers in plea 
agreements.365  Second, of the appeals in the 
Commission’s database,366 defendants initiate the vast 
majority.  In most of these cases the court of appeals 
affirms the sentence.  The number of appellate orders 
and opinions arising from appeals initiated by the 
government pales in comparison to the number of 
appeals initiated by defendants, but the government 
prevails in a higher percentage of its appeals.  The 
Commission’s analysis of court orders and opinions 
issued in fiscal year 2011 showed that courts of 
appeals ruled on nearly 6,000 constitutional issues, 
reasonableness issues, and issues related to the section 
3553(a) factors (as distinct from guideline 
determination issues) raised by the defendant, and 
approximately 30 such issues raised by the 
government.367  
                                                 
364  See Figure, “Number of Defendants Sentenced and 
Appeals Decided Fiscal Years 1993-2011,” Part B, available 
online. 
 
365  Many factors likely contribute to the overall rate of 
appeal, including the prevalence of waivers of the right to 
appeal in plea agreements.  See Nancy J. King and Michael 
E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing 
Policy, 53 DUKE L. J. 209, 219-225 (2005) (“Based on 
interviews and an analysis of data coded from 971 randomly 
selected cases sentenced under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, the study’s findings include (1) in nearly two-
thirds of the cases settled by plea agreement, the defendants 
waived their rights to review”). 
 
366  The appeals database includes orders and opinions, both 
published and unpublished, in direct appeals of federal 
criminal cases in which the defendant has been convicted 
and sentenced. 
 
367  A more in-depth discussion of appeals data is in Part B, 
available online. 
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Analysis of Federal Sentencing Data  
 
 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The Commission analyzed sentencing data for 
offenses in the aggregate and individually for five 
offense types and one commonly applied guideline: 
drug trafficking offenses368 under §§2D1.1 or  2D1.2 
(all drugs combined, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, 
heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine); firearms 
offenses369 under §2K2.1; immigration offenses370  
                                                 
368  Drug trafficking offenses include distribution, 
possession with intent to distribute, or manufacture of 
controlled substances, or conspiracy or attempt to do the 
same, importation and exportations of controlled substances, 
or conspiracy or attempt to do the same.  These offenses are 
sentenced under USSG §2D1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, 
Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession 
with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or 
Conspiracy).  Drug trafficking offenses also include 
distribution of controlled substances to persons under 21 
years of age, distribution, possession with intent to 
distribute, or manufacture controlled substances in or near 
protected locations, and employment or use of persons 
under the age of 18 in drug operations, and distribution of 
controlled substances to pregnant individuals.  These 
offenses are sentenced under USSG §2D1.2 (Drug Offenses 
Occurring Near Protected Locations or Involving Underage 
or Pregnant Individuals; Attempt or Conspiracy). 
 
369  Firearms offenses include unlawful 
possession/transportation of firearms or ammunition; 
unlawful acquisition of a firearm from a licensed dealer, 
receiving or possessing a stolen firearm or ammunition, 
making false statements regarding firearms recordkeeping, 
and possessing or receiving an unregistered firearm.  These 
offenses are sentenced under USSG §2K2.1 (Unlawful 
Receipt, Possession or Transportation of Firearms or 
Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms or 
Ammunition). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
under §§2L1.1 or 2L1.2 (alien smuggling and illegal 
entry); fraud offenses371 under §2F1.1 or §2B1.1; child 
pornography offenses372 under §§2G2.1, 2G2.2, and 
                                                                                  
370  Immigration offenses include smuggling, transporting or 
harboring an unlawful alien, and unlawfully entering or 
remaining in the United States.  These offenses are 
sentenced under USSG §2L1.1 (Smuggling, Transporting, 
or Harboring an Unlawful Alien) and USSG §2L1.2 
(Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States).  
The Commission has previously reported that beginning in 
fiscal year 2009 immigration cases became the most 
common serious federal crime.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 
2009, at 1-2 (December 2010) (noting immigration cases 
comprised 32.2 percent of the federal caseload while drugs 
comprised 30.3 percent).  However, that analysis was based 
on the defendant’s statute of conviction, not on the guideline 
applied at sentencing.  
 
371  Fraud offenses include theft, embezzlement, fraud, 
forgery, some counterfeiting offenses, some insider trading 
offenses, simple property damage and destruction, and a 
wide variety of federal statutes and assimilative crimes 
sentenced under USSG §2B1.1 (Larceny, Embezzlement, 
and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen 
Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and 
Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit 
Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of 
the United States) with a primary offense type of fraud 
sentenced under a Guidelines Manual effective November 
1, 2001 or later, or the former USSG §2F1.1 (Fraud and 
Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit 
Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of 
the United States) (deleted by consolidation with §2B1.1 
effective November 1, 2001 (see USSG App. C, amend. 
617)). 
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2G2.4 (production and non-production); and the career 
offender guideline, §4B1.1.  These analyses are 
discussed in detail in Part C of this report, available 
online.   
The data in this report necessarily differs in 
certain respects from the data published annually in 
the Commission’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics.  In the Sourcebook, offenses are generally 
classified by the offense of conviction, whereas in this 
analysis, offenses are classified by the guideline 
applied at sentencing.  These two methods of defining 
cases are both useful for research analysis; the choice 
of which method to use depends on the type of 
analysis to be undertaken.  For this report, the 
Commission classified offenses by the guideline 
applied at sentencing because it enables several 
analyses.  The guidelines take into account real offense 
conduct, such as the presence of a weapon, or the 
amount stolen in a robbery, that are not accounted for 
by mere reference to the statute of conviction.373  If, 
for example, an offender convicted of a drug 
trafficking offense engaged in conduct in which a 
victim was killed, that offender might be sentenced 
pursuant to the guideline applicable to homicide rather 
than drug trafficking.374  Such an offender’s sentence 
would not reflect the operation of the drug trafficking 
guideline, and therefore, including that sentence in the 
analysis of drug trafficking sentences would not 
contribute to an accurate analysis of the drug 
trafficking guideline.  In summary, because the 
                                                                                  
372  Child pornography offenses include the production, sale, 
distribution, transportation, shipment, receipt, or possession 
of materials involving the sexual exploitation of minors 
sentenced under USSG §2G2.1 (Sexually Exploiting a 
Minor by Production of Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed 
Material; Custodian Permitting Minor to Engage in Sexually 
Explicit Conduct; Advertisement for Minors to Engage in 
Production), USSG §2G2.2 (Trafficking in Material 
Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving, 
Transporting, Shipping, Soliciting, or Advertising Material 
Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing 
Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with 
Intent to Traffic; Possessing Material Involving the Sexual 
Exploitation of a Minor), or USSG §2G2.4 (Possession of 
Materials Depicting a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit 
Conduct) (deleted by consolidation with §2G2.2 effective 
November 1, 2004 (see USSG App. C, amend. 664)). 
 
373  See USSG Ch.1, Pt.A, intro. comment. (Nov. 2012). 
 
374  USSG §2D1.1(d) (cross references) (Nov. 2012). 
 
offender’s conduct ultimately determines the 
applicable sentencing range, classifying offenders by 
guideline rather than by statute of conviction facilitates 
a more precise analysis in which offenders engaged in 
similar criminal conduct are grouped together. 
Complete guideline information is required for 
most of the analyses in this report, and therefore cases 
with missing data were excluded from the analyses.  
As a result, statistics in this report differ from those 
reported in the Sourcebook.  For example, in fiscal 
year 2011, the Commission received sentencing 
information on 86,201 cases.375  However, the 
Commission received sufficient documentation for the 
analyses in this report in 76,216 individual cases for 
fiscal year 2011, the last full fiscal year available.  The 
Commission excluded 9,985 cases because those cases 
lacked the complete documentation needed for the 
analyses performed in this report.  In 8,164 of those 
cases, the majority of which were illegal entry offenses 
from border districts, the court waived the presentence 
investigation report.  As a result, those cases lacked 
certain guideline application and demographic 
information.  The Commission excluded other cases in 
which the statement of reasons form and the 
presentence investigation report contained conflicting 
information concerning guideline application, and 
therefore, the Commission could not ascertain how the 
Chapter Two guideline was applied. 
In the additional parts of this report available 
online, each guideline-specific section begins with a 
brief discussion about the guideline and the statutes 
referenced to it, followed by detailed fiscal year 2011 
data regarding the caseload and its distribution across 
the circuits and districts.  The single year data is 
followed by analyses of trends over time with respect 
to demographic characteristics and criminal history of 
the offenders, the types of sentence imposed, the 
sentence relative to the range (e.g., sentence length for 
within range, government sponsored below range, and 
non-government sponsored below range sentences), 
the rates of within and below range sentences, and the 
                                                 
375  Title 28, United States Code, section 994(w) requires 
that the chief judge of every district ensure that within 30 
days of entry of judgment in every felony and Class A 
misdemeanor case, the sentencing court submit to the 
Commission: (1) the judgment and commitment order; (2) 
the statement of reasons for the sentence imposed; (3) the 
plea agreement, if any; (4) the indictment or other charging 
information; and (5) the presentence report (unless waived 
by the court).   
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variation among the districts in the rates of below 
range sentences. 
In most instances, four periods are examined: 
the Koon period376 (June 13, 1996 through April 30, 
2003), the PROTECT Act period377 (May 1, 2003 
through June 24, 2004), the Booker period378 (January 
12, 2005 through December 10, 2007), and the Gall 
period379 (December 11, 2007 through September 30, 
2011).  The Commission selected these periods based 
on Supreme Court decisions and legislation that 
influenced federal sentencing in fundamental ways.  
Specifically, in United States v. Koon,380 the Supreme 
Court defined the level of deference due district 
courts’ decisions to sentence outside the guideline 
range and determined that such decisions should be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  In passing the 
PROTECT Act381 nearly seven years later, Congress 
restricted district courts’ discretion to impose 
sentences outside the guideline range, and required 
that courts of appeals review such decisions without 
deference to the decision of the district court.  In 
                                                 
376  The Koon period includes 333,564 offenders sentenced 
from June 13, 1996 through and including April 30, 2003 
for which the Commission has received complete 
information.  
 
377  The PROTECT Act period includes 67,554 offenders 
sentenced from May 1, 2003 through and including June 24, 
2004 for which the Commission has received complete 
information.  Offenders sentenced after Blakely but before 
Booker are not included in this period.  In Blakely v. 
Washington, decided on June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a sentence imposed under Washington’s 
sentencing guidelines system.  See Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296 (2004).  Following the Blakely decision, 
district and circuit courts voiced varying opinions on the 
implications of the decision for federal sentencing and no 
longer uniformly applied the sentencing guidelines. 
 
378  The Booker period includes 187,632 offenders sentenced 
from January 12, 2005 through and including December 10, 
2007 for which the Commission has received complete 
information.   
 
379  The Gall period includes 274,623 offenders sentenced 
from December 11, 2007 through and including September 
30, 2011 for which the Commission has received complete 
information.    
 
380  518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
 
381  Pub. L. No. 108-21 (Apr. 30, 2003). 
 
United States v. Booker,382 the Supreme Court struck 
the statutory provisions that made the guidelines 
mandatory, and in United States v. Gall,383 the court 
reiterated that the guidelines were no longer 
mandatory and further defined the appellate standard 
of review.  
A direct comparison across all four periods 
cannot always be made.  Shortly before the enactment 
of the PROTECT Act in April 2003 the Commission 
changed the way it reports data on departures.  Before 
the PROTECT Act, the Commission reported only two 
categories of below range sentences: “substantial 
assistance” and “other downward departures.”384  In its 
2003 report on departures under the sentencing 
guidelines, the Commission found that approximately 
40 percent of the “other downward departures” 
attributed to courts in fiscal year 2001 actually cited 
some benefit to the government as the reason for the 
departure in the sentencing documents.385  Such 
benefits included “waiver of indictment” and “early 
plea,” among others.386  The practice known as “fast 
track” had been used informally in some districts 
along the southwest border prior to the PROTECT Act 
but had been reported as an “other downward 
departure.”  Prior to the PROTECT Act, the existence 
of only two departure categories resulted in an 
overstatement of the proportion of downward 
departures attributable solely to the courts and an 
understatement of the proportion of downward 
departures attributable to government sponsorship.   
The Commission subsequently refined its 
collection of below range sentence data to properly 
attribute the below range sentence either to the court or 
to the government.  In addition, in the PROTECT Act, 
Congress authorized Early Disposition Programs 
(EDP) which authorize below range sentences for 
offenders in high-volume districts who agree to plead 
guilty and meet other criteria as determined by the 
United States Attorney.  Such sentences now are 
reported as government sponsored below range 
                                                 
382  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 
383  552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 
384   See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK, at 
51. 
 
385   U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEPARTURES REPORT at 59. 
 
386  Id. at 59 n.130. 
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sentences pursuant to USSG §5K3.1 (Early 
Disposition Programs (Policy Statement)).  
Consequently, the Koon period data is not as refined as 
the data from subsequent periods and as a result, in 
some instances, cannot be compared to data from the 
other periods.  
 
Box plots 
 
Offense specific data is presented, for the most 
part, in ways familiar to most readers.  For example, 
information regarding the demographic characteristics 
of offenders, the sentence length, and sentence relative 
to the range is presented in table format.  Information 
such as the rates of below range sentences is presented 
in bar graphs.  However, information on the rates of 
government sponsored and non-government sponsored 
below range sentences, and the variation across 
districts in these rates, is presented in alternative ways, 
including using a box plot like the example plot above. 
A full explanation of how to read the box plot 
is provided in Part C of this report, available online.  
Each box plot depicts the spread in rates among the 
districts that engaged in the sentencing practice.  The 
rate for each district is the percentage of all sentences 
imposed in a given district that are below range 
sentences (either government sponsored or non-
government sponsored below range sentences). The 
spread is the variation in those rates among the 
districts that engaged in the sentencing practice.  All 
districts in which the practice occurred (for example, 
all districts in which a non-government sponsored 
below range sentence was imposed for a fraud offense) 
are plotted along the vertical axis.  If a district did not 
have any cases exhibiting the particular sentencing 
practice, then that district is not depicted on the box 
plot.  
The main value of the box plot is its depiction 
of the size and position of the box over time.  These 
plots answer the question: excluding those districts 
that did not impose any such sentence (i.e., non-
government sponsored below range sentences) and 
focusing only on those districts that did, what is the 
spread in rates over time?  The top and bottom of the 
whiskers (vertical lines) show the highest (top) and 
lowest (bottom) rates of non-government sponsored 
below range rates.  The boxes depict the rates and 
variation within the middle 50 percent of districts that 
imposed such sentences.  Changes in the height of the 
box’s position along the vertical axis over the four 
periods depict at a glance whether the rates are 
increasing or decreasing among the middle 50 percent 
of districts that engaged in the practice, and the size of 
the box depicts the spread in rates among those 
districts that engaged in the practice.  A higher box 
signifies that the sentencing practice occurred more 
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often among the middle 50 percent of districts that 
engaged in the practice, a lower box signifies that the  
sentencing practice occurred less often.  A smaller box 
means there is less spread (greater uniformity) among 
the middle 50 percent of districts that engaged in the 
practice, and a larger box means there is a greater 
spread (less uniformity).  The districts depicted on the 
box plot, as well as which districts make up the 
particular portions of the box plot, may change across 
time periods. 
The “whiskers,” the vertical lines above and 
below the box, represent those districts that engaged in 
the sentencing practice more or less often than those 
districts depicted within the box.  The district that had 
the highest rate marks the endpoint of the top whisker, 
and the district that had the lowest rate (but still 
engaged in the practice at least once) marks the 
endpoint of the bottom whisker.  The “Max” and 
“Min” values listed in the table below the figure report 
the numerical rates for those districts at the top and 
bottom endpoints of the whisker.  The districts in the 
whiskers are not necessarily evenly distributed along 
the axis and may cluster at any point along the axis. 
An appendix to this report, available online, lists all 94 
districts for each offense type and for each type of 
sentence, in order of their rates, highest to lowest. 
 
Bubble plots 
 
In addition to offense-specific data analyses, 
the Commission analyzed intra-district sentencing 
data.  This analysis is presented in Part D of this report 
in the form of bubble plots for each of the 12 circuits 
and 94 districts.  The methodology behind the plots is 
explained fully in Part D, available online.  The bubble 
plots depict the rates of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences for each judge within a district.  
The bubble plot contains one circle (or “bubble”) for 
each judge who sentenced a felony or Class A 
misdemeanor offender during the relevant period.  The 
position of the bubbles along the vertical axis indicates 
the judge’s rate of imposing non-government 
sponsored below range sentences.  The spread in the 
distribution of all the bubbles on the plot illustrates the 
spread in rates of non-government sponsored below 
range sentences.   
The bubble for each judge is sized according 
to the judge’s overall caseload relative to the overall 
caseload of other judges within the district.  The 
smallest overall caseloads may be represented by a 
dot, while the largest overall caseloads will have the 
largest bubbles.  Often judges with the highest and 
lowest rates of non-government sponsored below 
range sentences had small overall caseloads relative to 
the other sentencing judges in the district.   
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Scatter plots 
 
Following each bubble plot is a “scatter plot” 
depicting, for each judge in the district, the average 
extent of the reduction below the guideline minimum 
for that judge’s non-government sponsored below 
range sentences.  Each triangle represents a judge who 
sentenced at least one offender in that district for a 
Class A misdemeanor or felony offense.  The triangles 
in the scatter plot are of uniform size; unlike the 
bubble plots, they are not sized according to the 
judge’s caseload.  These scatter plots answer the 
question: when a judge imposes a non-government 
sponsored below range sentence, how far below the 
guideline minimum is the sentence on average?  The 
answer is expressed in terms of the percentage 
reduction below the guideline minimum:  the triangle 
is placed along the vertical axis according to the 
average extent of reduction for that judge.  It should be 
noted that some of the non-government sponsored 
below range sentences in the bubble plot were 
excluded from the corresponding scatter plot either 
because of missing sentence information, or because 
the offender’s guideline minimum was either life or 
zero.387  
                                                 
387  Alternatively, a court may report that the defendant 
received a below range sentence but not provide the actual 
sentence imposed.  In such a case, the extent of the 
departure below the range cannot be calculated. 
 
Sentencing Appeals 
 
This report also presents data on sentencing 
appeals, which the Commission has systematically 
collected from all 12 circuit courts since 1992.  Each 
fiscal year, the Commission collects from all 12 circuit 
courts of appeals final dispositive decisions of direct 
criminal appeals in which the defendant has been 
convicted and sentenced.388  Where possible, the 
appellate case is linked to the original sentencing 
datafile on that offender in the Commission’s 
monitoring database so that the Commission can 
identify data about the defendant that may not be part 
of the appellate decision.  
Historically, the Commission used the data 
collected from appellate opinions to track the 
frequency with which guideline interpretation issues 
were appealed.  After Booker, the Commission 
expanded its data collection to capture additional 
information on non-guidelines issues in sentencing 
appeals, such as arguments about whether the court 
properly considered offender characteristics under    
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), or whether the sentence was 
substantively and procedurally reasonable.  
                                                 
388  The Commission’s methodology for collecting and 
coding appeals cases is described in detail in Part C of this 
report, available online. 
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Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
 The final data analysis presented is a 
multivariate regression analysis addressing whether 
differences in sentencing outcomes are correlated with 
offenders’ demographic characteristics.  The 
Commission most recently published this analysis in 
its 2010 report titled Demographic Differences in 
Federal Sentencing Practices: An Update of the 
Booker Report’s Multivariate Regression Analysis.389  
The Commission later updated its analysis with data 
through fiscal year 2010 for the testimony of 
Commission Chair Patti Saris before the 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representatives, in October 2011.390  For this report, 
the Commission has included data through fiscal year 
2011. 
Multivariate regression analysis usually begins 
with a decision to examine an observed phenomenon 
or outcome.  For this analysis, the observed 
phenomenon was the difference in sentence length 
between offenders, specifically the fact that, among 
other differences, Black male offenders receive longer 
sentences than White male offenders.  In this 
multivariate analysis, the Commission identified a 
number of factors that affect sentence length, such as 
the type of offense, the applicable guideline minimum, 
and whether the defendant remained subject to a 
mandatory minimum penalty at sentencing.  Once the 
relevant factors were identified, the multivariate 
analysis controlled for those factors, meaning that 
offenders who were alike in relevant ways were 
compared to each other.  This type of analysis seeks to 
answer the question: if two offenders are similar in 
certain ways, what other factors might be associated 
with those two offenders receiving different 
sentences?   
Multivariate regression analysis often does not 
control for all relevant factors because sufficient data 
is not always readily available.  Judges make 
sentencing decisions based on many legally relevant 
considerations that are not accounted for in the 
Commission’s analysis.  Judges may consider other 
                                                 
389  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, MULTIVARIATE REPORT, supra 
note 10. 
 
390  2011 Chair Statement to Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Security, supra note 36.  
 
potentially relevant factors available to them at 
sentencing.  For example, the presentence report may 
describe whether the offender’s history included 
violent criminal conduct or a long employment 
history; however, the Commission does not routinely 
extract that information from the sentencing 
documents it receives.  Such factors, therefore, are not 
included in the Commission’s datafile, and therefore 
are not controlled for in this analysis.  In addition, 
some commentators have stated that disparities in 
prosecutorial decisionmaking contribute to 
demographic differences in sentencing.391  The 
presumptive sentence as used in this analysis controls 
in a limited way for some prosecutorial decisions (for 
example the charging of mandatory minimum statutes 
or the government’s motion for a below range 
sentence).  However, data to determine whether other 
aspects of prosecutorial decision making (for example, 
the decision not to prosecute an offense federally at 
all) contribute to demographic differences is not 
readily available and therefore the complete impact of 
prosecutorial decision making could not be controlled 
for in the multivariate analysis.  For these reasons, the 
Commission’s analysis should be interpreted with 
caution and is not intended to suggest any racial or 
gender bias on the part of judges in making sentencing 
decisions. 
The Commission performed additional 
multivariate regression analyses to determine whether 
demographic differences in sentence length were 
present in any of three specific offense types for which 
                                                 
391  For further discussion of demographic differences in 
prosecutorial decision making, see VERA Institute of 
Justice, Do Race and Ethnicity Matter in Prosecution?: A 
Review of Empirical Studies (June 2012), available at 
http://www.vera.org/download?file=3532/race-and-
ethnicity-in-prosecution-first-edition.pdf (reviewing 34 
studies analyzing the role of race and ethnicity in 
prosecutorial decision making).  At least one researcher has 
attempted to measure through a multivariate analysis the 
contribution, if any, of prosecutorial decision-making to 
sentencing outcomes.  See Sonja B. Starr, Estimating 
Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases (U. Mich. L. 
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-018, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144002; M. Marit 
Rehavi & Sonja Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal 
Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences (U. Mich. L. & 
Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 12-002, 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1985377. 
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there was a sufficiently diverse population to conduct 
the analysis: drug trafficking, firearms, and fraud.  
Other analyses in the report examined whether there 
were differences in sentence length depending on the 
position of the sentence relative to the range (i.e., 
within range, government sponsored below range, or 
non-government sponsored below range), and whether 
there were demographic differences in the likelihood 
of receiving a non-government sponsored below range 
sentences.  The final multivariate analysis determined 
whether sentence length changed for certain 
demographic groups over the four periods, and if so, 
whether sentences for these groups were longer or 
shorter compared to past periods. 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
A review of the table below indicates that 
beginning in the PROTECT Act period and continuing 
through the Gall period, the proportion of sentences 
within the guideline range generally has decreased, 
while the rates of both government sponsored and non-
government sponsored below range sentences 
generally have increased.  The extent of the reductions 
below the guideline minimum, however, has remained 
relatively stable.  The table also shows that average 
sentences have decreased somewhat in the Gall period 
compared to the Booker period, which reflects a 
similar reduction in the average guideline minimum.  
These data points and others are discussed at length in 
the analysis that follows. 
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The number of federal offenders has 
substantially increased, and most federal 
offenders have continued to receive substantial 
sentences of imprisonment. 
 
The number of federal offenders and the 
percentage sentenced to imprisonment without any 
alternative to incarceration, such as home detention or 
community confinement, has increased over the 
periods studied in this report.  In fiscal year 1996, 
there were 37,091 federal offenders, compared to 
76,216 in fiscal year 2011.  In fiscal year 2011, 87.8 
percent of federal offenders were sentenced to serve a 
term of imprisonment without any alternative to 
incarceration, an increase from 76.9 percent in fiscal 
year 1996.392  As a result of these trends, the number 
of inmates housed by the federal Bureau of Prisons has 
more than doubled, from just below 100,000 in 1996, 
to more than 200,000 in 2011.393 
For offenses in the aggregate, the average 
sentence was 49 months in the Koon period, 53 
months in the PROTECT Act period, 54 months in the 
Booker period, and 49 months in the Gall period.  
Average sentences have increased or decreased over 
time depending on the offense type. 
Immigration and drug trafficking offenses 
have comprised the majority of all federal offenses 
over the four periods.  Immigration offenses have 
grown substantially as a percentage of the federal case 
load.  Average sentences for illegal entry offenses 
were 32 months in the Koon period, 29 months in the 
PROTECT Act period, 26 months in the Booker 
period, and 20 months in the Gall period.  Average 
sentences have decreased in part because of 
amendments to the guidelines, and in part because of 
increasing rates of departures for offenders sentenced 
through an Early Disposition Program (EDP).  EDP 
departure rates were 7.1 percent in the PROTECT Act 
                                                 
392  The increase in incarceration rates over time was 
attributable in part to increasing numbers of immigration 
offenders, most of whom were not eligible to receive 
alternatives to incarceration because of their undocumented 
status. 
 
393  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM 
REPORT at 76, supra note 17; U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public 
Hearing on Federal Sentencing Options after Booker, 
Washington, DC (Feb. 16, 2012) (Testimony of Charles E. 
Samuels, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, transcript at 
30-32, written statement at 2).  
period, 26.2 percent in the Booker period, and 26.8 
percent in the Gall period.   
In drug trafficking offenses average sentences 
peaked during the Booker period (83 months) and 
decreased to 75 months during the Gall period, three 
months longer than average sentences during the Koon 
period (72 months).  Average sentences for firearm 
offenses have been the most consistent of any offense 
type, increasing by one month during each period, 
from 56 months in the Koon period, to 57 months in 
the PROTECT Act period, to 58 months in the Booker 
period, and to 59 months in the Gall period.  
For two offense types, average sentences have 
increased markedly over time.  In child pornography 
non-production offenses (including receipt, trafficking, 
and possession offenses) average sentences have 
increased significantly over the periods due to 
statutory changes, congressional directives to the 
Commission to increase guideline penalties, and 
Commission-initiated amendments.  Average 
sentences for child pornography non-production 
offenses were 34 months in the Koon period, 47 
months in the PROTECT Act period, 82 months in the 
Booker period, and 93 months in the Gall period.  
Average sentences for fraud offenders have also 
increased, partly due to increases in offense 
seriousness (e.g., loss amounts) over time and partly 
due to guideline amendments increasing penalties.  
Average sentences for fraud offenses were 13 months 
in the Koon period, 16 months in the PROTECT Act 
period, 19 months in the Booker period, and 25 months 
in the Gall period. 
For career offenders, average sentences have 
decreased, even though the average guideline 
minimum has increased slightly. Average sentences 
for career offenders were 180 months in the Koon 
period, 187 months in the PROTECT Act period, 184 
months in the Booker period, and 172 months in the 
Gall period.  The decrease in sentence length for 
career offenders was attributable in part to the 
increasing rates of both government and non-
government sponsored below range sentences in career 
offender cases.  During the Koon period, 53.4 percent 
of career offenders were sentenced within the 
guideline range, and in the Gall period only 36.1 
percent of career offenders were sentenced within the 
guideline range.  
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The guidelines have remained the essential 
starting point for all federal sentences and have 
continued to influence sentences significantly.  
 
The Supreme Court has held that courts must 
begin the sentencing process by properly determining 
the applicable guideline range.394  Accordingly, the 
guidelines have continued to significantly influence 
sentences for most offenses.  During the 
Gall period 80.7 percent of sentences 
were either within range or below range 
pursuant to a government motion.395  As 
seen in the line chart to the right, 
average sentences have continued to 
parallel average guideline minimums 
for offenses in the aggregate.  That is, 
when the average minimum of the 
applicable guideline range has increased 
(due to guideline amendments, 
increases in offense seriousness, or 
increases in the criminal history of the 
offenders) the average sentence also has 
tended to increase, as evidenced by the 
close tracking between the blue and red 
lines.  Where the two lines were closer 
together, the average sentence was closer to the 
average guideline minimum; where the two lines were 
farther apart, the reverse was true.  
The fact that there was distance between the 
two lines does not necessarily indicate that the 
guidelines lacked influence over sentences.  Some 
sentences were lower than the guideline minimum due 
to substantial assistance or EDP below range 
sentences, which are guidelines-based and pursuant to 
specific statutory authority.  Substantial assistance 
departures have occurred frequently in drug trafficking 
offenses (24.4% of drug trafficking offenses in the 
Gall period) and typically have led to the greatest 
reductions among government sponsored below range 
sentences (54 months, or 48.4% below the guideline 
minimum in the Gall period), therefore the average 
sentence has been noticeably lower than the average 
guideline minimum for those offenses.  EDP 
departures have accounted for many below range 
sentences in immigration offenses (26.8% of illegal 
entry offenses in the Gall period), therefore average 
                                                 
394  See Rita 551 U.S. at 351. 
 
395  See supra, p. 58, Table “Selected Sentencing 
Characteristics – All Offenses.”   
sentences were lower than average guideline 
minimums.  However, EDP departures generally have 
resulted in much smaller sentence reductions than 
substantial assistance departures (10 months, or 30.0% 
below the guideline minimum for illegal entry offenses 
in the Gall period) and for this reason the distance 
between the two lines has been smaller in immigration 
offenses than in drug trafficking offenses.   
 
The degree to which the lines for the average 
guideline minimum and the average sentence have 
been parallel has reflected the degree of influence of 
the guidelines.  Where the lines have diverged, as in 
the cases of fraud and child pornography (discussed 
below), the lack of parallelism suggests that the 
influence of the guidelines has diminished.  Where the 
lines have been consistently parallel, as in drug 
trafficking, immigration, and firearms offenses 
(discussed below), the influence of the guidelines has 
remained relatively stable, even though the difference 
between the average sentence and the average 
guideline minimum may have been sizeable. 
The graph on the next page depicts an 
alternative way to view the parallelism between the 
guideline minimum and the sentence imposed.  The 
single line illustrates the percentage difference 
between the average guideline minimum and the 
average sentence.  A line below zero indicates that the 
average sentence was lower than the average guideline 
minimum.  
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As the figure shows, the 
percentage difference has varied from a 
low of 10.2 percent below the guideline 
minimum in fiscal year 2004 to a high of 
17.9 percent below the guideline 
minimum in fiscal year 2011.  There has 
been a general widening of the 
difference since fiscal year 2005, from 
13.1 percent in fiscal year 2005 to 17.9 
percent in fiscal year 2011.  However, 
the line is relatively flat, indicating 
relative stability over time in the 
relationship between the average 
guideline minimum and the average 
sentence for offenses in the aggregate. 
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The influence of the guidelines, as measured by 
the relationship between the average guideline 
minimum and the average sentence, has 
generally remained stable in drug trafficking, 
firearms, and immigration offenses.  
 
For drug trafficking, firearms, and 
immigration offenses (alien smuggling and illegal 
entry) the average guideline minimum and the average 
sentence have maintained a fairly consistent parallel 
relationship during all four periods, although there has 
been a slight divergence between the PROTECT Act 
and Gall periods.396 
                                                 
396  See “Percent Difference Between Average Guideline 
Minimum and Sentence Imposed, Fiscal Years 1996-2011” 
for each offense type, nationally and by circuit, in Part C 
online.  For a more detailed discussion of the relevant 
legislative and guidelines changes for these offenses, see 
Part C, available online.    
 
The influence of the guidelines has remained 
stable for drug trafficking offenses generally.397  The 
average guideline minimum for drug trafficking 
offenses increased from 89 months in the Koon period 
to 96 months in the PROTECT Act period and 101 
months in the Booker period, but then decreased to 95 
months in the Gall period.  The same trend occurred 
with average sentence length, which increased from 72 
months in the Koon period to 81 months in the 
PROTECT Act period and 83 months in the Booker 
period, but decreased to 75 months in the Gall period.
                                                 
397  The drug trafficking guidelines incorporate statutory 
mandatory minimum penalties where applicable.  For a 
more detailed discussion of this topic, see Part C, available 
online. 
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As seen in the line charts on the preceding 
page, the average sentence was notably further below 
the average guideline minimum in drug trafficking 
offenses than in firearms and immigration offenses.  
This was due, in part, to higher rates of government 
sponsored below range sentences based on substantial 
assistance for drug trafficking offenses than for other 
offenses.  In drug trafficking offenses, rates of 
substantial assistance below range sentences were 29.3 
percent during the Koon period, 27.0 percent during 
the PROTECT Act period, 26.1 percent during the 
Booker period, and 24.4 percent during the Gall 
period.   
In contrast, in firearms offenses, 
substantial assistance below range rates 
were 11.7 percent during the Koon 
period, 11.4 percent during the 
PROTECT Act period, 9.4 percent 
during the Booker period, and 8.8 
percent during the Gall period.  In alien 
smuggling offenses, rates of substantial 
assistance below range sentences were 
less than ten percent during all periods.  
In illegal entry offenses, rates of 
substantial assistance below range 
sentences have never exceeded two 
percent.   
In addition to the rate of below 
range sentences, the extent of the 
reduction below the guideline minimum 
for drug trafficking offenses has 
contributed to the distance between the 
red and blue lines.  Substantial 
assistance below range sentences have 
been nearly 50 percent below the 
average guideline minimum (49.3% in 
the Koon period, 46.8% in the 
PROTECT Act period, 46.5% in the 
Booker period, and 48.4% in the Gall 
period), which has amounted to 
reductions of between 52 and 54 
months, substantially larger than 
reductions for other types of below 
range sentences. 
The Commission also examined 
individual drug types, and analyses for 
each are in Part C, available online.  In crack cocaine 
trafficking offenses, sentences have diverged from the 
average guideline minimum during the past few years.  
However, reduced penalties for crack cocaine 
offenders, resulting from the Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010 and the guideline amendments in response to 
it,398 may have slowed the divergence.  In fiscal year 
2010, the average sentence for crack cocaine 
trafficking offenders was 23.8 percent below the 
average guideline minimum.  This was the largest 
percent difference between the average guideline 
minimum and the average sentence dating back to 
fiscal year 1996.  In contrast, the average sentence 
during 2011 was 22.3 percent below the average 
guideline minimum.  The change is small, and it may 
be too soon to determine whether reduced penalties for 
crack cocaine trafficking offenses might bring average 
sentences closer to the guideline minimum.  
 
 
                                                 
398  See USSG App. C, amend. 748 (effective Nov. 1, 2010) 
and 750 (effective Nov. 1, 2011). 
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The influence of the guidelines, as measured by 
the relationship between the average guideline 
minimum and the average sentence, has 
diminished in fraud and child pornography 
offenses. 
 
In contrast to drug trafficking, firearms, and 
immigration offenses, for fraud and child pornography 
non-production offenses (which include receipt, 
trafficking, and possession offenses) the average 
guideline minimum and the average sentence have not 
consistently paralleled one another over time, and the 
divergence between the two has increased since fiscal 
year 2004 in the case of fraud offenses, and since 
fiscal year 2005 in the case of child pornography non-
production offenses.  Average guideline minimums for 
these two offense types have increased over time as a 
result of statutory changes, including congressional 
directives to the Commission, guideline amendments, 
and the seriousness of the offenses. 
 
  With respect to fraud offenses, the average 
guideline minimum has more than doubled from 14 
months during the Koon period to 30 months during 
the Gall period.  The average sentence also has nearly 
doubled from 13 months during the Koon period to 25 
months during the Gall period, but during the past few 
years the average guideline minimum has increased at 
a faster rate than the average sentence.  For example, 
between fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the average 
sentence remained flat, while the average guideline 
minimum increased.  
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With respect to child pornography non-
production offenses, the recent divergence between the 
average guideline minimum and the average sentence 
has been even more pronounced.  The average 
guideline minimum for child pornography non-
production offenses has increased steadily over time in 
large part due to statutory changes implemented 
between 1997 and the enactment of the PROTECT Act 
of 2003, and the guideline amendments in response to 
it.  The average guideline minimum has more than 
tripled from 36 months in the Koon period to 115 
months in the Gall period.  For many years the average 
sentence continued to track closely these sharp 
increases in the average guideline minimum.  As the 
average guideline minimum has continued to increase 
through the Booker and Gall periods, however, the 
average sentence increasingly has diverged from the 
guideline minimum.  Whereas the average sentence 
was 34 months during the Koon period (two months 
less than  
the average guideline minimum), the average sentence 
was 93 months during the Gall period (22 months less 
than the average guideline minimum).  A graphical 
depiction of the average guideline minimum compared 
to the average sentence reveals that, as the average 
guideline minimum for child pornography non-
production offenses has increased during the Booker 
and Gall periods, the average sentence has remained 
relatively flat by comparison.  
In sum, during all four periods, the influence of 
the guidelines has remained relatively stable in drug 
trafficking, firearms, and immigration offenses, while 
in fraud and child pornography non-production 
offenses, the average sentence increasingly has 
diverged from the average guideline minimum during 
the Booker and Gall periods.   
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For most offense types, the rate of within range 
sentences has decreased while the rate of below 
range sentences (both government sponsored 
and non-government sponsored) has increased 
over time. 
 
For most offenses studied, rates of within 
range sentences have decreased while rates of below 
range sentences, particularly non-government 
sponsored below range sentences, have increased.399  
While average sentences have tended to parallel the 
average guideline minimum, courts have imposed 
more non-government sponsored below range 
sentences, resulting in a widening gap between the 
average guideline minimum and the average sentence.  
A review of quarterly data for offenses in the 
aggregate illustrates this trend.  The notable decrease 
in non-government sponsored below range sentences 
between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 was due primarily 
to the change in the way the Commission reported data 
on departures shortly before enactment of the 
PROTECT Act.400  EDP departures in immigration 
offenses have increased, and immigration offenses 
have increased as a proportion of the federal case load.  
For example, in fiscal year 2003 there were 10,722 
immigration offenses.  That number increased to 
11,113 in fiscal year 2004, and more than doubled to 
23,810 in fiscal year 2011. 
                                                 
399  See Figures, “Quarterly Data for Within-Range and Out-
of-Range Sentences” in Part C, available online. 
 
400  See supra at 53-54 (discussing changes in Commission 
collection methodology).   
 
Even in drug trafficking, firearms, and 
immigration offenses, where the line graphs of the 
average guideline minimum and average sentence 
have shown a relatively stable relationship,401 the rates 
of non-government sponsored below range sentences 
increased during the Gall period, while rates of within 
range sentences decreased.  The line graphs on the 
following pages depict quarterly data on within range 
and out of range sentences for drug trafficking (in the 
aggregate and by each major drug type), firearms, and 
immigration offenses. 
In drug trafficking offenses, rates of within 
range sentences decreased throughout the Booker and 
Gall periods from a high during the PROTECT Act 
period.  Rates of within range sentences in drug 
trafficking offenses were 55.8 percent during the Koon 
period, 63.3 percent during the PROTECT Act period, 
53.7 percent during the Booker period, and 47.8 
percent during the Gall period.  Rates of both 
government sponsored and non-government sponsored 
below range sentences have generally increased during 
those periods.  Rates of substantial assistance below 
range sentences decreased from 29.3 percent during 
the Koon period, to 27.0 percent during the PROTECT 
Act period, 26.1 percent during the Booker period, and 
24.4 percent during the Gall period.  Rates of EDP 
below range sentences, on the other hand, have 
increased over the three periods during which they 
were available, from 1.0 percent in the PROTECT Act 
period, to 4.9 percent in the Booker 
period, to 5.3 percent in the Gall period.  
Even though EDP departures have been 
available in only a small number of 
districts until recently (Southern 
California, Arizona, and New Mexico 
had the highest rates) EDP departures 
have contributed to an overall increase in 
the rate of government sponsored below 
range sentences.  The rates of other 
government sponsored below range 
sentences were 3.7 percent in the 
PROTECT Act period, 3.0 percent in the 
Booker period, and 4.1 percent in the 
Gall period. 
Non-government sponsored 
below range rates for drug trafficking offenses 
increased during the Booker and Gall periods.  Those 
rates were 14.2 percent during the Koon period, 4.7 
                                                 
401  See e.g., supra at 62, “Average Guideline Minimum and 
Sentence Imposed – Drug Trafficking Offenses.” 
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percent during the PROTECT Act 
period, 11.7 percent during the Booker 
period, and 17.6 percent during the Gall 
period.  Rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences were 
lowest during the PROTECT Act 
period, whereas government sponsored 
below range sentences increased during 
that period, reflecting, in part, the 
change in the manner in which the 
Commission collected and attributed 
below range sentences.402 
Even though rates of both 
government sponsored and non-
government sponsored below range 
sentences have increased for drug 
trafficking offenses, the extent of the 
reduction below the guideline minimum has not 
changed markedly over time.  The average extent of 
reduction for government sponsored below range 
sentences varied from an average reduction of 51 
months (49.2% below the average guideline minimum) 
during the Koon period, to an average reduction of 46 
months (45.2% below the average guideline minimum) 
during the Gall period.   Reductions in non-
government sponsored below range sentences ranged 
from an average reduction of 22 months (40.4% below 
the average guideline minimum) during the Koon 
period, to an average reduction of 28 months (34.3% 
below the average guideline minimum) during the Gall 
period.   
  
                                                 
402  See supra at 53-54 (discussing changes in Commission 
collection methodology). 
 
Examination of the same 
figures by drug type illustrates 
differences in rates of within range, 
government sponsored below range, 
and non-government sponsored below 
range sentences, depending on the type 
of drug involved in the offense.  Of all 
drug types, the pattern for powder 
cocaine trafficking offenses was most 
similar to the pattern for all drugs 
combined.  Marijuana was the only 
drug type in which the within range rate 
remained relatively stable during the 
Booker and Gall periods. 
 
 
70
BOOKER REPORT 2012: PART A    
 
In crack cocaine trafficking 
offenses, as with all drugs, rates of 
within range sentences have decreased 
markedly after the PROTECT Act 
period.  Between 2008 and 2010 there 
was an additional decrease in within 
range rates, and a corresponding 
increase in rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences.  
Within range rates increased and non-
government sponsored below range 
rates decreased between fiscal years 
2010 and 2011, perhaps in response to 
statutory changes and guideline 
amendments reducing penalties for 
crack cocaine trafficking offenders. 
In heroin trafficking offenses, 
within range rates have decreased 
markedly since Booker and have 
generally declined through fiscal year 
2011.  In heroin trafficking offenses, 
rates of both government sponsored and 
non-government sponsored sentences 
have increased.  During fiscal year 2010 
the rate of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences exceeded the rate 
of government sponsored below range 
sentences. 
Of the five major drug types, 
marijuana trafficking offenses had the 
lowest average guideline minimums.  
For each of the four periods, the average 
guideline minimum for marijuana 
trafficking offenses never exceeded 50 
months, compared to average guideline 
minimums of not less than 93 months 
for powder cocaine trafficking, not less 
than 138 months for crack cocaine 
trafficking, not less than 74 months for 
heroin trafficking, and not less than 112 
months for methamphetamine 
trafficking.  Marijuana trafficking 
offenses also had the lowest rates of 
non-government sponsored below range 
sentences of all the drug types, and the 
smallest decline in rates of within range 
sentences.  The rate of government 
sponsored below range sentences 
increased markedly between fiscal years  
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2002 and 2003, while the rate of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences decreased.  This 
marked change occurred at least in part because of the 
change in the way the Commission reported its 
departure data in the first quarter of fiscal year 2003 to 
better account for downward departures attributable to 
the government, including Early Disposition Program 
departures (commonly referred to as “fast-track” 
departures).403  Three districts appeared to have EDP 
programs in marijuana trafficking offenses: Southern 
California, Arizona and New Mexico had the highest 
rates during the PROTECT Act, Booker, and Gall 
periods.  In Southern California, for example, 69.6 
percent of marijuana trafficking offenders received 
EDP departures during the Gall period.   
 
 
Methamphetamine was the only 
drug type for which rates of 
government sponsored below range 
sentences have exceeded rates of within 
range sentences.  This first occurred in 
fiscal year 2009.  The rate of 
government sponsored below range 
rates has been relatively stable, whereas 
the rate of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences has increased 
more markedly, causing most of the 
reduction in within range rates. 
                                                 
403  See supra, discussion at 53-54. 
 In firearms offenses, the rate of within range 
sentences has remained high relative to other offenses, 
but it has decreased over time.  Within range rates 
were 75.1 percent during the Koon period, 79.7 
percent during the PROTECT Act period, 70.6 percent 
during the Booker period, and 62.9 percent during the 
Gall period.  In contrast, non-government sponsored 
below range rates were 11.9 percent during the Koon 
period, 6.5 percent during the PROTECT Act period, 
14.6 percent during the Booker period, and 21.1 
percent during the Gall period. 
As with drug trafficking offenses, firearms 
offenses have shown consistency in the extent of the 
reduction below the guideline minimum.  During the 
Koon period, the average extent of the reduction in 
government sponsored below range sentences was 26 
months (51.0% below the average 
guideline minimum), and in the Gall 
period the average extent of reduction 
was 28 months (45.2% below the 
average guideline minimum).  Firearms 
offenses have also shown consistency in 
the extent of the reduction below the 
guideline minimum for non-government 
sponsored below range sentences.  The 
average non-government sponsored 
below range reduction was 18 months 
(42.2% below the average guideline 
minimum) during the Koon period and 
17 months (39.4% below the average 
guideline minimum) during the Gall 
period. 
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In illegal entry offenses, the rate 
of within range sentences has decreased 
most notably during the PROTECT Act 
period, and to a lesser degree during the 
Gall period.  However, the rates of 
government sponsored below range 
sentences have substantially increased 
because of EDP departures, accounting 
for the large change during the 
PROTECT Act period.  The marked 
increase in the rate of government 
sponsored below range sentences in 
illegal entry offenses between fiscal 
years 2002 and 2003, and the 
corresponding decrease in non-
government sponsored below range 
sentences, were attributable to the 
increased use of EDP programs, as well as to the 
change in the way the Commission reported its 
departure data beginning in the first quarter of fiscal 
year 2003 to account for this. 404    
As with drug trafficking and firearms offenses, 
illegal entry offenses have shown consistency in the 
extent of the reduction below the guideline minimum.  
During the Koon period, the average extent of the 
reduction in government sponsored below range 
sentences was 13 months (28.7% below the average 
guideline minimum), and in the Gall period the 
average extent of the reduction was 10 months (30.4% 
below the average guideline minimum).  Illegal entry 
offenses also show consistency in the extent of the 
reduction below the guideline minimum for non-
                                                 
404  See supra at 53-54 (discussing changes in Commission 
collection methodology). 
government sponsored below range sentences.  The 
average non-government sponsored below range 
reduction was 16 months (33.2% below the average 
guideline minimum) during the Koon period and 12 
months (35.7% below the average guideline minimum) 
during the Gall period. 
Sentencing in child pornography non-
production offenses has been markedly different from 
any other offense type.  In recent years, the rates of 
non-government sponsored below range sentences 
have exceeded within range rates.  During the Gall 
period, 41.1 percent of sentences were within the 
range, and 44.0 percent of sentences were non-
government sponsored below range sentences. 
 As Congress has enacted higher penalties for 
child pornography non-production 
offenses, the average extent of the 
reduction for both government 
sponsored and non-government 
sponsored below range sentences has 
increased substantially in terms of 
months (but not as a percentage 
reduction below the guideline 
minimum).  The average extent of the 
reduction for government sponsored 
below range sentences was 16 months 
(57.2% below the average guideline 
minimum) during the Koon period, but 
increased to 47 months (42.2% below 
the average guideline minimum) during 
the Gall period.  For non-government 
sponsored below range sentences in 
child pornography non-production offenses, the 
average reduction was 15 months (55.7% below the 
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average guideline minimum) during the Koon period, 
but was 44 months (40.4% below the average 
guideline minimum) during the Gall period. 
The within range rate for career offenders has 
decreased substantially since Booker.  More than one-
third (36.7%) of career offenders received government 
sponsored below range sentences during the Gall 
period, and more than one-quarter (26.4%) received
 non-government sponsored below range sentences.  
The extent of the reduction for career offenders was 
also substantial.  Government sponsored below range 
sentences led to average reductions of 96 months 
(43.1% below the guideline minimum), and non-
government sponsored below range sentences led to 
average reductions of 69 months (32.4% below the 
guideline minimum) in the Gall period. 
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The influence of the guidelines, as measured by 
the relationship between the average guideline 
minimum and the average sentence, has varied 
by circuit. 
 
 
 
 
For offense types in the 
aggregate, the average sentence largely 
has paralleled the average guideline 
minimum in the majority of circuits, but 
the degree of divergence between the 
two has varied from circuit to circuit.405  
The line graphs illustrate the different 
trends.  For example, in the Fourth 
Circuit, average sentences have 
generally paralleled average guideline 
minimums.   
                                                 
405 The sentencing scale for all circuit level analyses is 
consistent within each offense type, although it varies from 
offense type to offense type.  For instance, the top of the 
scale for the chart that depicts all offenses is 120 months in 
order to accommodate the circuit with the highest average 
guideline minimum or average sentence.  The top of the 
scale for fraud, however, is 50 months because average 
sentences are lower in fraud offenses.  Using the same scale 
for the same offense type facilitates comparisons between 
the circuits. 
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However, in the Third Circuit a 
greater divergence between average 
guideline minimums and average 
sentences appeared between fiscal years 
2008 and 2009, when a sharp increase in 
the average guideline minimum was met 
with only a modest increase in average 
sentence length.406 
 
                                                 
406  Charts depicting the percentage difference between the 
average guideline minimum and the average sentence 
imposed for each circuit by offense type are provided in Part 
C, available online. 
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Greater differences appeared 
among the circuits when sentencing data 
was analyzed by offense type.  For 
example, in fraud offenses, the percent 
difference between the average 
guideline minimum and the average 
sentence has varied.  In the Fourth 
Circuit, average guideline minimums 
and average sentences for fraud offenses 
have continued to increase and decrease 
in tandem, with the exception of a small 
divergence beginning in fiscal year 
2009.  
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In contrast, in the Second 
Circuit, changes in averages sentences 
have not paralleled changes in average 
guideline minimums over time.  
Average guideline minimums have 
increased at a much greater rate than 
average sentences since fiscal year 
2005.  Moreover, in fiscal year 2011, 
the average guideline minimum 
decreased slightly, while the average 
sentence increased slightly. 
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In child pornography non-
production offenses in the Tenth 
Circuit, the relationship between the 
average guideline minimum and the 
average sentence may be diminishing 
as average sentences have remained 
below the average guideline minimum 
since fiscal year 2006.  Nonetheless, in 
the Tenth Circuit, average sentences 
have continued to track average 
guideline minimums.  
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In all of the other circuits, 
average sentences have not increased to 
the same extent as average guideline 
minimums during the Booker period and 
continuing through the Gall period.  In 
the Second Circuit, average sentences 
have demonstrated little relationship 
with average guideline minimums since 
fiscal year 2006. 
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Even in firearms offenses, 
where the relationship between the 
average guideline minimum and 
average sentence has been relatively 
stable nationally, the degree of 
parallelism has varied by circuit.  For 
example in the Fifth Circuit, average 
sentences have continued to track 
changes in average guideline 
minimums.  
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In contrast, in the Third 
Circuit average sentences have 
diverged from average guideline 
minimums since fiscal year 2009. 
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In illegal entry offenses, the 
average guideline minimum and 
average sentence have been parallel in 
most circuits over time.  Even so, 
differences can be seen in the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits, which have large 
immigration caseloads.  In the Fifth 
Circuit, average sentences have nearly 
equaled average guideline minimums 
during each fiscal year.   
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In contrast, in the Ninth Circuit, 
average sentences have been much 
lower than average guideline 
minimums.  This was likely attributable 
to the fact that more districts with high 
immigration caseloads had EDP 
programs in the Ninth Circuit than in 
the Fifth Circuit.  
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In offenses sentenced under 
the career offender guideline, the 
relationship between the average 
guideline minimum and average 
sentence has fluctuated over time.  In 
the Fourth Circuit, the relationship 
has been relatively stable.  
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In the First Circuit, however, 
average sentences have not tracked 
average guideline minimums since 
fiscal year 2004.  
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The influence of the guidelines, as measured by 
within range rates, has varied by circuit. 
 
 
 
 
Although for most offense 
types the rates of within range 
sentences have decreased, the degree of 
decrease and the prevalence of non-
government and government sponsored 
below range sentences have varied by 
circuit.  For example, in the First 
Circuit, within range rates for drug 
trafficking offenses have consistently 
exceeded rates of both government and 
non-government sponsored below range 
sentences. 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, in the Second 
Circuit, in fiscal year 2009 the within 
range rate for drug trafficking offenses 
was lower than both the government 
sponsored below range rate and non-
government sponsored below range rate, 
primarily due to an increase in non-
government sponsored below range 
sentences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Likewise, in fraud and child 
pornography offenses, within range rates 
have also decreased in a non-uniform 
fashion across circuits.  For fraud 
offenses in the First Circuit, the majority 
of sentences have been within range, 
whereas in the Second Circuit in fiscal 
year 2011, within range rates were less 
than 40 percent, and for the first time 
non-government sponsored below range 
rates exceeded within range rates.   
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The Second Circuit was the only 
circuit in which non-government 
sponsored below range rates have 
exceeded within range rates in fraud 
offenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In child pornography non-
production offenses (including receipt, 
trafficking and possession offenses) the 
Fifth Circuit was the only circuit in 
which the within range rate has 
exceeded the non-government sponsored 
below range rate throughout the entire 
Gall period.  As reflected in the line 
graph, however, if the current trend 
continues, within range rates will be 
lower than non-government sponsored 
below range rates in the near future. 
 
 
 
In all other circuits, non-
government sponsored below range rates 
exceeded within range rates by the end 
of the Gall period.  In the Ninth Circuit, 
non-government sponsored below range 
rates exceeded within range rates in 
fiscal year 2009.  
 In sum, differences among the 
circuits in the stability of the 
relationship between average sentences 
and average guideline minimums, and 
differences in within range sentencing 
rates, have demonstrated growing 
sentencing disparities. 
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The rates of non-government sponsored below 
range sentences have increased in most districts 
and the variation in such rates across districts 
for most offenses was greatest in the Gall period, 
indicating that sentencing outcomes increasingly 
depend upon the district in which the defendant 
is sentenced.  
 
For most offense types, the spread in the rates 
of non-government sponsored below range sentences 
among districts was greatest during the Gall period, 
indicating growing disparity in district practices.  The 
box plot of non-government sponsored below range 
rates for all offenses exhibits this pattern.  The Koon 
period is not directly comparable to the other periods 
because during that period the Commission attributed 
some below range sentences to the court as “other 
downward departures,” whereas the sentencing 
documents indicated some benefit to the government.  
The Commission would now attribute such a sentence 
to the government according to the coding and 
reporting practices implemented just before enactment 
of the PROTECT Act.407   
This trend of increasing spread in rates of non-
government sponsored below range sentences was also 
apparent with respect to specific offense types.  The 
                                                 
407  See supra at 53-54 (discussing changes in Commission 
collection methodology). 
following box plots depict the spread among districts 
in rates of non-government sponsored below range 
sentences for drug trafficking and firearms offenses.  
The rising position of the box along the vertical axis in 
the plots reflects that non-government below range 
rates have increased over time for drug trafficking and 
firearms offenses.  Further, the increasing size of the 
box shows that the spread in the rates has also 
increased over time, and was largest during the Gall 
period. 
In drug trafficking offenses, courts imposed 
non-government sponsored below range sentences in 
81 districts during the PROTECT Act period, and in 
all 94 districts during both the Booker and Gall 
periods.  The spread was smallest, and the rates of 
non-government sponsored below range sentences 
were lowest, during the PROTECT Act period.  
During the PROTECT Act period, for example, among 
the districts with the lowest rates within the box was 
Middle Pennsylvania, which had a non-government 
sponsored below range rate of 1.8 percent.  Among the 
districts with the highest rates within the box was 
Minnesota, with a rate of 5.3 percent.  Both districts 
sentenced just over 220 drug trafficking offenders 
during this period, and the difference in the rates was 
3.5 percentage points.  The spread was greatest, and 
the rates of non-government sponsored below range 
rates were highest, during the Gall period.  Southern 
Mississippi, for example, sentenced 320 drug 
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trafficking offenders during the Gall period and had a 
rate of 11.6 percent non-government sponsored below 
range sentences, whereas Western Michigan sentenced 
519 drug offenders during that same period and had a 
rate of 22.2 percent non-government sponsored below 
range sentences, a 10.6 percentage point difference.   
Large increases in the rates of non-
government sponsored below range sentences within 
individual districts have contributed to the increasing 
spread in non-government sponsored below range 
rates in drug trafficking offenses.  For example, in 
Southern Ohio, rates of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences were 6.1 percent during the 
PROTECT Act period, 14.1 percent during the Booker 
period, and 23.0 percent during the Gall period.  In 
Middle Pennsylvania, the non-government sponsored 
below range rates were 1.8 percent during the 
PROTECT Act period, 10.4 percent during the Booker 
period, and 20.3 percent during the Gall period.  In 
Eastern Tennessee, a district with relatively low rates 
of non-government sponsored below range sentences 
in drug trafficking offenses, rates increased from 2.2 
percent during the PROTECT Act period, to 6.8 
percent during the Booker period, and 12.4 percent 
during the Gall period.   
In firearms offenses courts imposed non-
government sponsored below range sentences in 82 
districts during the PROTECT Act period, and in 93 
districts during the Booker and Gall periods.  Both the 
spread and the rates among the middle 50 percent of 
districts were greatest during the Gall period.  During 
the PROTECT Act period, for example, among the 
districts with the lowest rates within the box was 
Western Virginia, which had a non-government 
sponsored below range rate of 3.6 percent.  Among the 
districts with the highest rates within the box was 
Wyoming, with a rate of 9.4 percent.  Western 
Virginia sentenced 84 firearms offenders during the 
PROTECT Act period, Wyoming sentenced 64, and 
the spread between the two districts was 5.8 
percentage points.  During the Gall period, Northern 
Oklahoma, for example, sentenced 162 firearms 
offenders and had a rate of 16.0 percent non-
government sponsored below range sentences, 
whereas Wyoming sentenced 156 firearms offenders 
during that same period and had a rate of 26.9 percent 
non-government sponsored below range sentences, 
nearly 11 percentage points higher than the rate in 
Northern Oklahoma.   
Substantial increases in the rates of non-
government sponsored below range sentences within 
individual districts have contributed to an increased 
spread in rates in firearms offenses.  For example, in 
Eastern Michigan, rates of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences were 8.0 percent during the 
PROTECT Act period, 18.2 percent during the Booker 
period, and 26.9 percent during the Gall period.  In 
Western Virginia, the rates were 3.6 percent during the 
PROTECT Act period, 12.3 percent during the Booker 
period, and 24.5 percent during the Gall period.  In 
Eastern Pennsylvania, the rates were 4.0 percent 
during the PROTECT Act period, 19.2 percent during 
the Booker period, and 28.3 percent during the Gall 
period.  In contrast, in South Carolina, a district with 
relatively low rates of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences in firearms offenses, rates 
increased from 1.3 percent during the PROTECT Act 
period, to 10.9 percent during the Booker period, and 
16.6 percent during the Gall period.  South Carolina 
sentenced 534 firearms offenders during the Booker 
period and 699 firearms offenders in the Gall period.   
The same trend was evident in fraud 
offenses408 where the number of districts with non-
government sponsored below range sentences 
increased from 69 districts in the PROTECT Act 
period, to 92 districts in the Booker period, to 93 
districts in the Gall period.  During the Gall period, 
                                                 
408  Box plots for fraud offenses are in Part C, available 
online. 
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the middle 50 percent of districts had higher non-
government sponsored below range rates and more 
variation than in previous periods.  In Northern 
Georgia, for example, rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences more than tripled 
from the PROTECT Act period to the Gall period.  In 
the PROTECT Act period, the rate was 8.3 percent, in 
the Booker period it was 17.1 percent, and in the Gall 
period, it was 27.5 percent.  Likewise, rates of non-
government sponsored below range sentences in fraud 
offenses in the district of Utah increased 
tremendously, from 4.0 percent during the PROTECT 
Act period, to 18.5 percent in the Booker period, to 
27.7 percent in the Gall period.   
In illegal entry offenses,409 the spread in the 
rates of non-government sponsored below range 
sentences also was greatest in the Gall period.  
Further, the increase in the number of districts 
reporting non-government sponsored below range 
sentences was more marked:  54 districts in the 
PROTECT Act period, 79 districts in the Booker 
period, and 92 districts during the Gall period.  Similar 
increases in the number of districts reporting non-
government sponsored below range sentences occurred 
in career offender cases:  there were 52 districts in the 
PROTECT Act period, 86 districts in the Booker 
period, and 89 districts in the Gall period.  
In child pornography non-production offenses 
(including trafficking, receipt, and possession 
offenses)410  a relatively small number of districts 
(N=39) reported non-government sponsored below 
range sentences during the PROTECT Act period, 
when Congress enacted broad restrictions on below 
range sentences in these types of cases.  In contrast, 
during the Gall period, 91 districts reported non-
government sponsored below range sentences.411   
                                                 
409  Box plots for illegal entry offenses are in Part C, 
available online. 
 
410  Box plots for child pornography non-production 
offenses are in Part C, available online. 
 
411  During the PROTECT Act period, judges in 39 districts 
imposed non-government sponsored below range sentences, 
whereas judges in many more districts did so during the 
other periods.  (Koon period N=88; Booker period N=83; 
Gall period N=91).  This may reflect the fact that Congress 
specifically prohibited departures in child sexual 
exploitation cases in the PROTECT Act period.  The 
PROTECT Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) to permit the 
sentencing court to impose a sentence below the applicable 
Of all of the offense types studied, child 
pornography non-production offenses had the highest 
rates of non-government sponsored below range 
sentences among the middle 50 percent of districts. 
Furthermore, of the offense types studied, child 
pornography non-production offenses had the greatest 
spread among the middle 50 percent of districts, at 
24.3 percentage points in the Gall period.412  This 
compared to spreads of 19.8 percentage points in 
illegal entry offenses, 12.6 percentage points in fraud 
offenses, and 12.4 percentage points in firearms 
offenses and drug trafficking offenses.  
 
For offenses in the aggregate, the average extent 
of the reduction for non-government sponsored 
below range sentences has been approximately 
40 percent below the guideline minimum during 
all periods (amounting to average reductions of 
17 to 21 months); however, the extent of the 
reduction has varied by offense type.  
 
For offenses in the aggregate, the extent of 
non-government sponsored below range reductions has 
remained relatively constant over time, hovering near 
a 40 percent reduction below the guideline minimum 
during all four periods:  41.8 percent (17 months 
below the guideline minimum) during the Koon 
period; 40.0 percent (17 months below the guideline 
minimum) during the PROTECT Act period; 39.1 
percent (20 months below the guideline minimum) 
during the Booker period; and 40.7 percent (21 months 
below the guideline minimum) during the Gall period.   
When analyzed by offense type, the extent of 
the reduction has varied over time and by offense type.  
                                                                                  
sentencing guideline range only if the court finds that there 
exists a mitigating circumstance of a kind or to a degree that 
has been affirmatively and specifically identified as a 
permissible ground of downward departure in the sentencing 
guidelines or policy statements, taking account of any 
amendments to such sentencing guidelines or policy 
statements by Congress.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) (Child 
crimes and sex offenses) (2003).  In addition, the 
PROTECT Act directly amended several policy statements 
to specifically prohibit their application to child sexual 
exploitation cases.  Furthermore, the PROTECT Act period 
was the shortest of the four periods, and had the smallest 
number of cases. 
 
412  The spread is the difference between the bottom of the 
box (Q1=31.3%) and the top of the box (Q3=55.6%). 
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In child pornography non-production offenses, for 
example, the average reduction in months increased 
from 15 months (55.7% below the guideline 
minimum) in the Koon period to 18 months (50.4% 
below the guideline minimum) in the PROTECT Act 
period, 28 months (38.8% below the guideline 
minimum) during the Booker period, and 44 months 
(40.4% below the guideline minimum) during the Gall 
period.  In contrast, reductions in illegal entry offenses 
held steady at 12 months during the PROTECT Act, 
Booker, and Gall periods.  The 12-month reduction 
has translated into a reduction of 28.1 to 35.7 percent 
below the guideline minimum depending on the 
period.   
As a percentage below the guideline 
minimum, fraud offenses have had the largest 
reductions of all offense types, more than 50 percent 
below the guideline minimum during three out of four 
periods:  56.1 percent (nine months below the 
guideline minimum) during the Koon period, 53.4 
percent (10 months below the guideline minimum) 
during the PROTECT Act period, 52.6 percent (11 
months below the guideline minimum) during the 
Booker period, and 49.3 percent (13 months below the 
guideline minimum) during the Gall period.  In 
firearms offenses, the extent of the reduction has 
varied little, between 38.0 percent (16 months below 
the guideline minimum) in the Booker period and 42.2 
percent (18 months below the guideline minimum in 
the Koon period.  In months, career offenders have 
received the largest reductions below the guideline 
minimum across the periods, varying between 63 
months (32.0% below the guideline minimum) in the 
PROTECT Act period and 72 months (37.3% below 
the guideline minimum) in the Koon period.   
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Government sponsored below range sentences 
have contributed to increasing variation in 
sentencing. 
 
The decrease in within range sentence rates for 
offenses in the aggregate was attributable to increases 
in the rates of both non-government sponsored and 
government sponsored below range sentences.  
Specifically, rates of government sponsored below 
range sentences for all offenses were 19.8 percent in 
the Koon period, 23.4 percent in the PROTECT Act 
period, 26.1 percent in the Booker period, and 26.8 
percent in the Gall period.  By comparison, rates of 
non-government sponsored below range sentences 
were 15.4 percent in the Koon period, 5.7 percent in 
the PROTECT Act period, 12.6 percent in the Booker 
period, and 17.4 percent in the Gall period.413  The 
analysis categorized the rates of government 
sponsored below range sentences as one of three types:  
substantial assistance (pursuant to USSG §5K1.1); 
EDP (pursuant to §5K3.1); or other.   
Substantial assistance below range sentences 
are specifically authorized in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).  
This section provides limited authority to impose a 
sentence below the statutory minimum in a case in 
which the defendant provides substantial assistance to 
the government in the investigation and prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense.  
Further, section 994(n) of title 28, United States Code, 
requires the Commission to “assure that the guidelines 
reflect the general appropriateness” of imposing a 
reduced sentence on a defendant who has provided 
substantial assistance.  The Commission implemented 
this directive in USSG §5K1.1 (Substantial 
Assistance). 
EDP departures were authorized by Congress 
in the PROTECT Act of 2003,414 but had been 
operating before then in a number of districts and had 
                                                 
413  The sharp decrease in non-government sponsored below 
range rates between the Koon and PROTECT Act periods 
reflects in part the change in the way the Commission 
collected departure data.  See supra at 53-54 (discussing 
changes in Commission collection methodology). 
 
414  See section 401(m)(2)(B) of the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. 
No. 108-21 (directing the Commission to formulate a 
guideline providing up to a 4-level reduction pursuant to an 
early disposition program authorized by the Attorney 
General of the United States). 
 
generally been reported by the Commission as “other 
downward departures.”  Therefore, EDP rates are 
reported only for the PROTECT Act, Booker, and Gall 
periods.  The vast majority of EDP departures occur in 
illegal entry offenses, because “fast-track programs 
originated in southwestern border districts with an 
exceptional volume of immigration cases.”415  
However, the Department of Justice recently expanded 
eligibility for EDP departures, stating that “[t]he 
existence of these programs in some, but not all, 
districts has generated a concern that defendants are 
being treated differently depending on where in the 
United States they are charged and sentenced,”416 and 
noting that “USAOs in non-fast track districts 
routinely face motions for variances based on fast-
track programs in other districts.”417  The revised 
policy establishes “baseline eligibility requirements for 
any defendant who qualifies for fast-track treatment, 
regardless of where that defendant is prosecuted,” 
meaning that all districts that prosecute illegal reentry 
offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 are now required to 
implement early disposition programs for offenders 
who meet the criteria.418  Nonetheless, the criteria for 
qualifying for the EDP departure, and the amount of 
the reduction (within the 4-level-reduction limit in 
USSG §5K3.1) remain within the discretion of the 
United States Attorney for each district; therefore, 
regional differences in the programs may continue. 
Unlike substantial assistance and EDP, other 
government sponsored below range sentences are not 
                                                 
415  Memorandum of James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney 
General, Department Policy on Early Disposition or “Fast-
Track” Programs (Jan. 31, 2012) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf. 
[hereinafter Cole Memorandum] See also Memorandum of 
David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, Authorization 
of Certain Early Disposition Programs, at 1 (May 29, 2009) 
[hereinafter Ogden Memorandum].   
 
416  Cole Memorandum at 2.  
 
417  Id.  See also Ogden Memorandum (authorizing certain 
early disposition program and listing the classes of cases to 
which they apply). 
 
418  Cole Memorandum, supra note 415 (“Districts 
prosecuting felony illegal reentry cases (8 U.S.C. § 1326)—
the largest category of cases authorized for fast-track 
treatment—shall implement an early disposition program in 
accordance with the following requirements and the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion by the United States Attorney”). 
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specifically authorized by statute and have not been 
incorporated into the Guidelines Manual through any 
specific guideline or policy statement.  In this respect, 
other government sponsored below range sentences 
are more similar to non-government sponsored below 
range sentences.  Department of Justice policy on 
charging and sentencing notes that “[i]n the typical 
case, the appropriate balance among [the statutory 
purposes of sentencing] will continue to be reflected 
by the applicable guidelines range,” and advises 
prosecutors to “generally continue to advocate for a 
sentence within that range,” because “[t]he advisory 
guidelines remain important in furthering the goal of 
national uniformity throughout the federal system.” 419  
However, the policy goes on to note that “consistent 
with the Principles of Federal Prosecution and given 
the advisory nature of the guidelines, advocacy at 
sentencing—like charging decisions and plea 
agreements—must also follow from an individualized 
assessment of the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case.” 420  By its terms, the memorandum 
permits government sponsored below range sentences 
that are based on neither substantial assistance nor 
EDP programs. 
The rates of substantial assistance sentences 
have decreased over time for offenses in the aggregate, 
from 19.1 percent in the Koon period, to 16.6 percent 
during the PROTECT Act period, to 15.2 percent 
during the Booker period, to 12.9 percent during the 
Gall period, and this trend was observed for most 
offense types.  The extent of the reduction below the 
guideline minimum, however, has been generally 
consistent, ranging from 49.9 percent below the 
guideline minimum in the Booker period to 52.4 
percent below the guideline minimum in the Koon 
period.  This has been fairly comparable to the extent 
of the reductions below the guideline minimum in 
non-government sponsored below range sentences, 
which ranged from 39.1 percent below the guideline 
minimum in the Booker period to 41.8 percent below 
the guideline minimum in the Koon period. 
  In terms of months, however, the reductions 
in substantial assistance sentences have been nearly 
twice as long as reductions in non-government 
                                                 
419  Memorandum of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, 
Department Policy on Charging and Sentencing, at 2 (May 
19, 2010). 
 
420  Id. at 2-3. 
 
sponsored below range sentences.  The extent of the 
reduction in substantial assistance sentences ranged 
from 41 months during the Koon and PROTECT Act 
periods to 44 months and 45 months during the Booker 
and Gall periods, respectively.  By comparison, the 
extent of the reduction in non-government sponsored 
below range sentences was 17 months in the Koon and 
PROTECT Act periods, and 20 and 21 months in the 
Booker and Gall periods, respectively.  This difference 
in the extent of the reduction as measured in months 
reflects the fact that substantial assistance departures 
have generally applied to offenders with higher 
guideline minimums than offenders who received non-
government sponsored below range sentences.   
In contrast to substantial assistance rates, the 
rates of EDP departures have increased over time.  The 
rates of EDP departures for illegal entry offenses, 
which constituted nearly one-third of fiscal year 2011 
offenses in this analysis421 (31.3% of all federal 
offenses), increased from 7.1 percent in the PROTECT 
Act period, to 26.2 percent in the Booker period, to 
26.8 percent in the Gall period.  Now that EDP 
departures are available in all districts prosecuting 
illegal entry offenses, these rates will likely increase.  
Further, some districts make EDP available in drug 
trafficking offenses.  For example, in Southern 
California, 69.6 percent of 1,991 marijuana traffickers 
received EDP departures during the Gall period.  
Marijuana trafficking offenders in New Mexico and 
Arizona received EDP departures at rates of 43.6 
percent (out of 1,472 offenders) and 37.7 percent (out 
of 3,707 offenders), respectively.  It is unclear whether 
the new Department of Justice policy regarding EDP 
departure policies in illegal entry offenses will affect 
the rates of EDP departures for other offense types. 
                                                 
421  Immigration offenses include smuggling, transporting or 
harboring an unlawful alien, and unlawfully entering or 
remaining in the United States.  These offenses are 
sentenced under USSG §2L1.1 (Smuggling, Transporting, 
or Harboring an Unlawful Alien) and USSG §2L1.2 
(Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States).  
The Commission has previously reported that beginning in 
fiscal year 2009 immigration cases became the most 
common serious federal crime.  See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 
2009, at 1-2 (December 2010) (noting immigration cases 
comprised 32.2 % of the federal caseload while drugs 
comprised 30.3%).  That analysis was based on the 
defendant’s statute of conviction, not on the guideline 
applied at sentencing.  
 
94
BOOKER REPORT 2012: PART A    
 
The extent of the reduction in terms of months 
and percentage below the guideline minimum in EDP 
sentences was relatively small compared to substantial 
assistance and non-government sponsored reductions.  
Average reductions for EDP departures in illegal entry 
offenses were ten months (25.3% below the guideline 
minimum) in the PROTECT Act period, nine months 
(26.1% below the guideline minimum) in the Booker 
period, and ten months (30.0% below the guideline 
minimum) in the Gall period.422 
The rates of other government sponsored 
below range sentences were substantially lower than 
the rates of substantial assistance and EDP 
departures.423  Other government sponsored below 
range sentences for all offenses were first collected 
and reported by the Commission during the PROTECT 
Act period, when the rate was 5.1 percent.  The rate 
decreased to 3.3 percent during the Booker period, 
then increased to 4.2 percent in the Gall period.  These 
rates have varied depending on the type of offense. 
Although rates of other government sponsored 
below range sentences have remained relatively low, 
they have occurred in more districts over time and may 
contribute to increased variation in sentencing in the 
future.  During the PROTECT Act period, for offenses 
in the aggregate, such sentences were imposed in 73 
districts, compared to 93 districts in the Booker period, 
and all 94 districts in the Gall period.  This increase 
has occurred for a number of offense types.  For 
example, in drug trafficking offenses, other 
government sponsored below range sentences were 
imposed in 51 districts in the PROTECT Act period, 
compared to 81 districts in the Booker period, and 87 
districts in the Gall period.  Similarly, in firearms 
offenses, other government sponsored below range 
sentences occurred in 28 districts in the PROTECT 
Act period, compared to 72 districts in the Booker 
period, and 81 districts in the Gall period.  In fraud 
                                                 
422  See Table, “Selected Sentencing Characteristics – Illegal 
Entry Offenses,” in Part C, available online. 
 
423  Box plots depicting the spread in average rates of 
substantial assistance and EDP departures, and other 
government sponsored below range sentences are in Part C, 
available online.  The spread in the rates of substantial 
assistance sentences for all offenses in the aggregate has 
remained relatively stable across the periods, with the 
smallest spread in the Koon period.  The spread in the rates 
of EDP departures has increased over time, likely reflecting 
the fact that this departure is a congressionally authorized 
departure intended for use in limited circumstances.  
offenses, the number of districts with other 
government sponsored below range sentences 
increased from 31 districts in the PROTECT Act 
period, to 70 districts in the Booker period, to 82 
districts in the Gall period.  The same trend existed for 
child pornography non-production offenses and for 
fraud offenses.  The number of districts with other 
government sponsored below range sentences in child 
pornography non-production offenses increased from 
six in the PROTECT Act period, to 45 in the Booker 
period, to 70 districts in the Gall period.  The number 
of districts with other government sponsored below 
range sentences in fraud offenses increased from 31 in 
the PROTECT Act period, to 70 in the Booker period, 
to 82 districts in the Gall period.  
The rate of other government sponsored below 
range sentences has varied depending on the offense 
type.  Gall period rates were very similar for several 
offenses types: 4.1 percent for drug trafficking 
offenses, 4.3 percent for firearms offenses, and 3.9 
percent for fraud offenses.  For other offenses, rates of 
other government sponsored below range sentences 
were higher.  The highest rates were in child 
pornography offenses: 11.7 percent for production 
offenses and 10.4 percent for non-production offenses.  
In career offender cases, the other government 
sponsored below range rate was 9.3 percent.  As seen 
in the table on the next page, when other government 
sponsored below range sentences were imposed, the 
extent of the reduction was similar to the extent of the 
reduction for non-government sponsored below range 
sentences. 
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Differences in prosecutorial practices, such as 
charging and plea agreement practices, have 
contributed to unwarranted disparity in 
sentencing.   
 
A defendant’s sentence is a product not only 
of decisions made by the court at sentencing, but also 
of decisions made earlier in the process.  Prosecutorial 
decision making, including, for example, the choice of 
which crime to charge and the negotiation of various 
aspects of plea agreements, impacts the applicable 
statutory and guideline penalties, and therefore the 
ultimate sentence.  Some of these decisions are 
reflected in Commission data, but the Commission 
does not have information on others and therefore 
cannot analyze their impact.  One area of prosecutorial 
decision making that the Commission has studied is 
the decision to charge crimes that carry mandatory 
minimum penalties.  
In its 2011 report to Congress on mandatory 
minimum penalties, the Commission studied drug 
offenses and mandatory minimum penalties.424  In 
drug trafficking offenses, the applicable statutory 
mandatory minimum penalty increases when a drug 
offender is convicted of a second or subsequent felony 
drug offense and the prosecutor files a notice of 
enhancement prior to plea or trial.  Using sample 
groups from fiscal years 2006, 2008, and 2009, the 
Commission found significant variation in the manner 
in which prosecutors applied the enhancement 
provision.  For example, in six districts, more than 75 
percent of eligible defendants received the increased 
statutory mandatory minimum penalty as an 
enhancement.  In contrast, in eight districts, none of 
the eligible drug offenders received the enhanced 
penalty.  Interviews of prosecutors confirmed this 
regional disparity with respect to filing the notice of 
enhanced penalties in drug trafficking offenses.  In 
interviews conducted in 13 districts, prosecutors 
reported wide variations in the practices surrounding 
the filing of notices seeking enhanced statutory 
mandatory minimum penalties in drug trafficking 
offenses.425  The Commission’s interviews also 
                                                 
424  2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 17, at 
252-261. 
 
425  Id. at 111-113.  In nine districts, prosecutors related that 
they did not file the notice automatically in every applicable 
case.  In each of those districts, the prosecutors advised that 
they delayed filing the notice while engaging in plea 
revealed divergent practices relating to the filing of 
multiple charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), involving 
the use of a firearm during a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking felony,426 as well as inconsistencies in 
charging and plea agreement practices relating to child 
pornography and whether to charge receipt of child 
pornography, which carries a five-year statutory 
mandatory minimum, or possession, which does not.427 
                                                                                  
negotiations.  In two districts, prosecutors advised that they 
filed the notice triggering the enhanced penalties in every 
applicable case and did not withdraw the notice under any 
circumstances.  In another district, prosecutors suggested 
that office policy required section 851 notices to be filed in 
every applicable case, absent supervisory approval to 
withhold the filing of the notice.  These prosecutors noted, 
however, that the timing of the filing was left to discretion 
of the individual prosecutor handling the case.  These 
prosecutors also related that they might withdraw the 
section 851 notice if the offender agreed to provide 
substantial assistance.  Finally, in one district, the 
prosecutors advised that they rarely filed the notices.  The 
prosecutors in this district described the enhanced penalties 
as a “hammer for the worst offenders,” but otherwise too 
harsh for low-level drug offenders. 
 
426  Id. at 113-114.  This offense carries a consecutive 
penalty of at least five years; second and subsequent 
violations are subject to a 25-year consecutive penalty.  In 
most districts, the prosecutors generally charged multiple 
section 924(c) violations in violent offenses.  By contrast, in 
two districts prosecutors advised that they rarely charge 
multiple violations.  Further, the charge bargaining practices 
for multiple section 924(c) counts were inconsistent.  
Prosecutors in some districts would dismiss all but one 
section 924(c) count in exchange for a guilty plea.  Others 
require a plea to at least two section 924(c) counts.  In 
another, prosecutors require offenders that they consider 
especially violent to plead to at least three counts.  Not only 
did the practices differ among districts, but the respondents 
interviewed also noted that the practice sometimes varied 
within districts, either by division or by individual 
prosecutor. 
 
427  Id. at 114.  A common inconsistency in prosecutorial 
charging decisions in child pornography offenses related to 
whether to charge possession, which carries no mandatory 
minimum penalty, or receipt, which carries a five-year 
mandatory minimum penalty.  Interviews revealed that in a 
few districts, offenders who offered to plead guilty to a child 
pornography possession charge early in the case would have 
their receipt charges either dismissed or never filed.  In at 
least one other district, if an offender successfully passed a 
polygraph examination establishing that no additional steps 
had been taken beyond viewing child pornography (i.e., the 
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Variation in the rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences among judges 
within the same district has increased in most 
districts since Booker, indicating that sentencing 
outcomes increasingly depend upon the judge to 
whom the case is assigned. 
 
The Commission examined the sentencing 
practices of individual judges within each district to 
determine the extent of variation among judges within 
the same district.  This analysis was aimed at 
exploring differences in the rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences within each district.  
The Commission analyzed these rates by district 
because judges within the same district generally are 
more likely than judges across districts to preside over 
similar cases to the extent the district’s cases are 
randomly distributed among the judges.  Furthermore, 
United States Attorneys’ prosecutorial practices within 
one district are more likely to be similar than across 
various districts.  The Commission recognizes, 
however, that caseload composition may differ 
substantially across divisions within the same 
district.428  For this reason and others, including all the 
districts’ judges in one analysis may not account for all 
relevant differences within a district and may limit the 
Commission’s analysis.  Nonetheless, for the purpose 
of analyzing differences among sentencing judges’ 
practices, examining each district separately reduces, 
though does not eliminate, differences that may be 
attributable to caseload composition and prosecutorial 
practices, and reveals substantial differences in 
sentencing practices.  
                                                                                  
offender  had not touched a child), that offender would be 
permitted to plead to possession of child pornography.  In 
yet another, prosecutors typically agreed to enter into a 
binding plea agreement allowing the offender to plead guilty 
to a possession charge and requiring a specific sentence if 
the forensic examination of the offender’s computer would 
be considerably delayed if the case were to go to trial. 
 
428  For example, Western North Carolina has one division 
(Charlotte) with a larger urban population, another district 
(Asheville) with substantial federal property, and yet 
another district (Bryson City), with a substantial American 
Indian population.  Different types of cases arise in each of 
these divisions, and one judge may be assigned more cases 
from a certain division than other judges due to caseload 
management issues.   
 
The Commission reviewed data from all 94 
districts, which are available online in Part D of this 
report, to determine whether any patterns emerged.429  
In this review, the Commission examined the entire 
spread of judges’ non-government sponsored below 
range rates.  All judges (magistrate or district) who 
sentenced at least one offender convicted of a felony 
or a Class A misdemeanor offense were included in 
the plots.  However, in determining whether the spread 
in the rates had expanded or contracted over time, it 
was important to distinguish whether the judge 
represented by the bubble sentenced a few or many 
offenders.  A judge with the highest or lowest rate of 
non-government sponsored below range sentences 
may have sentenced one offender because he or she 
was a visiting or senior-status judge.  Therefore, when 
the judge’s bubble was a small pinpoint, indicating 
that the judge sentenced one or a very small number of 
offenders relative to the other judges in the district, the 
Commission did not consider that judge in its 
assessment of whether the spread of rates generally 
increased or decreased during that period in order to 
avoid overstating the spread during any period. 
In the majority of districts (n=64) the spread in 
the rates of non-government sponsored below range 
sentences was smallest during the PROTECT Act 
period and greatest during the Gall period.  In other 
words, in two-thirds of districts, judges’ rates of non-
government sponsored below range sentences were 
most uniform during the PROTECT Act period, and 
were the most varied during the Gall period.  The 
spread of the rates in a much smaller number of 
districts (n=16) either did not change, or did not 
contract during the PROTECT Act period as compared 
to the Koon period.430  In 14 districts any difference in 
the spread between the Koon and PROTECT Act 
periods was too subtle to discern.431  In those 14 
                                                 
429  Bubble plots for each of the 12 circuits and each of the 
94 districts are in Part D, available online. 
 
430  The 16 districts in which the spread either did not 
change or expanded between the Koon and PROTECT Act 
periods were, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maryland, Eastern Virginia, Northern Mississippi, Eastern 
Kentucky, Southern Ohio, Eastern Wisconsin, Southern 
Iowa, Eastern Missouri, Nebraska, Guam, Northern Mariana 
Islands, Utah, and Northern Georgia. 
 
431  The 14 districts in which changes between the Koon and 
PROTECT Act periods were too subtle to discern were 
Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Eastern New York, Western 
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districts, there may have been some contraction in the 
rates among most judges, but one or more outlier 
judges with comparably sized caseloads made it 
difficult to classify the change as either an expansion 
or a contraction in the spread. 
 
 
 
South Carolina and Northern 
Texas provide clear examples of the 
pattern in the majority of districts:  the 
plots show contraction in the spread 
from the Koon period to the PROTECT 
Act period, when judges’ discretion was 
circumscribed, then an expansion in the 
spread from the PROTECT Act period 
to the Booker period, when judges had 
greater discretion.  The expansion 
continued from the Booker period to the 
Gall period.   
 
                                                                                  
New York, New Jersey, Eastern Pennsylvania, Western 
Pennsylvania, Virgin Islands, Middle North Carolina, 
Western North Carolina, Western Virginia, Northern Ohio, 
North Dakota, and Nevada. 
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As seen in these scatter plots, the 
average extent of the reduction below the 
guideline minimum varied broadly 
during each period, and did not appear to 
have been affected by legislation or 
Supreme Court decisions. 
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In most districts, judges with 
similarly sized caseloads imposed non-
government sponsored below range 
sentences at very different rates.  The 
following plot of Southern Florida shows 
that the non-government sponsored below 
range rates among judges with similar-
size caseloads varied from under ten 
percent to just below 40 percent in the 
Gall period.  The judges with the highest 
and lowest rates of non-government 
sponsored below range sentences had 
small caseloads relative to the other 
sentencing judges in the district. 
 
 
 
 
As the scatter plot reflects, the 
extent of the reduction in Southern 
Florida, as in most districts, varied 
during all four periods and did not 
appear to be affected by Supreme Court 
decisions or legislation.   
A reduction of 100 percent 
likely reflects a sentence of probation 
reduced from a guideline minimum 
recommending incarceration. 
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In the district of Rhode Island, 
two of the judges with high rates of non-
government sponsored below range 
sentences had the two largest caseloads 
in the district during the Gall period.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, in Southern Illinois 
judges imposed non-government 
sponsored below range sentences at 
generally lower rates.  Five out of six 
Southern Illinois judges had rates of 
approximately 25 percent and under.   
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Western New York is an 
example of a district in which the 
spread in the rates was similar during 
all four periods.  The bubble plot 
shows a slight increase in the height of 
the bubbles during the Gall period, 
indicating an increase in the rate of 
non-government sponsored below 
range sentences and a small increase in 
the spread.  The size of the bubbles 
also shows that during the Gall period, 
the two judges with the highest rates of 
non-government sponsored below 
range sentences had sizeable caseloads. 
 
 
 
 
 
On average, judges in Western 
New York granted reductions of more 
than 40 percent below the guideline 
minimum during the PROTECT Act, 
Booker, and Gall periods.  However, 
there was a relatively large amount of 
variation among judges. 
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In some districts, the spread in 
the rates of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences was smallest 
during the Gall period.  In the District of 
Nebraska, for example, the spread 
contracted considerably during the Gall 
period compared to the Booker period 
because a number of judges with 
relatively large caseloads increased their 
non-government sponsored below range 
rates.   
 
 
 
 
In other districts (for example 
several districts along the Southwest 
border) the spread in the rates of non-
government sponsored below range 
sentences contracted during the Gall 
period, likely reflecting the impact of 
government sponsored EDP departures.  
The District of Arizona plot illustrates 
this pattern.  As in other districts, the 
extent of the reduction from the 
guideline minimum in the District of 
Arizona has remained relatively constant 
over time. 
 
In sum, whether the spread in the 
rates of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences has expanded, 
contracted, or remained consistent over 
time has varied by district; however, in 
two-thirds of districts the spread in the 
rates of non-government sponsored 
below range sentences was smallest 
during the PROTECT Act period and 
greatest during the Gall period.  This 
increased intra-district variation in non-
government sponsored below range rates 
indicates that sentencing outcomes 
increasingly depend upon the judge to 
whom the case is assigned, within and 
across districts, and signals diminishing 
certainty and uniformity in federal 
sentencing.   
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Appellate review has not promoted uniformity in 
sentencing to the extent the Supreme Court 
anticipated in Booker. 
 
In Booker, the Supreme Court excised the 
portion of the sentencing statutes setting forth a de 
novo standard of review of sentences on appeal.  The 
Court effectively restored the pre-PROTECT Act 
standard of review, which provided for review of 
sentences for reasonableness.  The Court 
acknowledged that appellate review of sentences for 
reasonableness would not “provide the uniformity that 
Congress originally sought to secure,” but nonetheless 
anticipated that appellate review “would tend to iron 
out sentencing differences.”432  Appellate review, 
however, has not promoted uniformity in sentencing to 
the extent anticipated in Booker, and the Commission 
has identified several reasons for this result.  
First, and most significantly, offenders with 
similar offense conduct and similar criminal history 
increasingly have received different sentences, and 
reasonableness review on appeal has not ironed out 
these substantive differences.  A review of case law 
reveals that, in the wake of Booker, sentencing judges 
apply the section 3553(a) factors differently.  Some 
judges give substantial weight to the characteristics of 
the offender, including those that, consistent with 
section 994 of Title 28, the Commission has deemed 
ordinarily not relevant at sentencing.433  Some judges 
view certain characteristics as grounds for decreasing 
the sentence, while others do not.434  Other judges 
consider such factors, but accord greater weight to the 
Commission’s guidelines and policy statements.435  
                                                 
432  Booker, 543 U.S. at 263. 
 
433  See, e.g., United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 
2009) (reviewing the district court’s decision to take into 
account the defendant’s employment history in reducing his 
sentence for tax fraud). 
  
434  See, e.g., United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 465-
66 (8th Cir. 2009) (Riley, J., concurring), 467-96 (Colloton, 
J., concurring). 
  
435  Compare United States v. Jackson, 300 F. App’x 428 
(7th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court decision to sentence 
defendant within advisory guideline range after rejecting his 
request to vary from career offender guideline, where the 
district court concluded that the defendant was “young and 
impulsive and very dangerous” and “very much deserve[d]” 
the characterization of career offender), with United States 
Still other judges categorically reject certain guidelines 
and policy statements.436 
The fact that judges hold different views with 
respect to the importance of various sentencing factors 
raises a host of reasonableness issues at the appellate 
stage; indeed according to Commission data, 
reasonableness issues constituted a significant 
proportion of all sentencing issues raised on appeal in 
fiscal year 2011.437  Consistent with recent Supreme 
Court case law, appellate courts have afforded district 
court decisions great deference and have rarely 
reversed sentences on substantive reasonableness 
                                                                                  
v. Maloney, 446 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 2006) (reversing district 
court decision to sentence the defendant, which the court 
had concluded was a career offender and an armed career 
criminal, below the  guideline range based on the 
defendant’s youthful age of 22 years and the court’s view 
that “a longer sentence would undermine his chances at 
rehabilitation”).  See also Feemster, 572 F.3d at 468  
(Colloton, J., concurring) (“The [sentencing] judge in this 
case thought Feemster’s ‘troubled youth’ was largely 
mitigating, and elected to impose the statutory minimum 
sentence.  Other reasonable federal judges will believe that 
the Sentencing Commission was correct to declare a policy 
that age, including youth, is ordinarily not relevant to 
sentencing, USSG §5H1.1, and that a relatively youthful 
drug trafficking offender with a serious criminal history 
should be sentenced at or near the statutory maximum in 
accordance with the career offender guideline. The 
offender’s punishment in these career offender cases . . . 
will depend substantially on the luck of the judicial draw.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 
436  See, e.g., United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592 (3d Cir. 
2010) (affirming district court’s categorical disagreement 
with USSG §2G2.2); United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411 
(7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a district court may vary 
based on disagreement with the career offender guideline: 
“Because §4B1.1 is just a Guideline, judges are as free to 
disagree with it as they are with §2D1.1(c) (which sets the 
crack/powder ratio).  No judge is required to sentence at 
variance with a Guideline, but every judge is at liberty to do 
so.”). 
 
437  Out of 13,085 discrete sentencing issues raised by 
defendants, 4,547 were related to reasonableness, and 1,405 
were related to the section 3553(a) factors.  Out of a total of 
92 discrete sentencing issues raised by the government and 
decided by the circuit courts in fiscal year 2011, 18 related 
to reasonableness issues, and 11 related to the section 
3553(a) factors.  See Part B, available online, for a full 
explanation of how the Commission collects appeals data.   
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grounds.  Furthermore, a case review of certain 
offense types suggests that the substantive outcome of 
the appeals that address reasonableness has differed 
depending on the circuit.  In child pornography and 
fraud appeals, panels of judges in different circuits 
have reached different outcomes regarding the 
reasonableness of similar sentences.438  
Differences in appellate review procedures 
among the circuits further limit the appellate courts’ 
ability to iron out sentencing differences.  Some 
circuits have applied a presumption of reasonableness 
to review of within range sentences, and others have 
not.439  Some circuits have required district courts to 
address guideline departure arguments, while other 
                                                 
438  In child pornography non-production offenses, compare 
United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming as substantively reasonable below range sentence 
of five years of probation for possession of child 
pornography, where the guidelines range was 41-51 months 
of imprisonment), with United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 
1179 (11th Cir. 2008) (reversing as substantively 
unreasonable below range sentence of five years of 
probation for possession of child pornography, where the 
guidelines range was 97-120 months of imprisonment).  For 
fraud offenses, compare United States v. Edwards, 595 F.3d 
1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming as substantively reasonable 
below range sentence of five years of probation, where the 
guidelines range was 27-33 months of imprisonment for the 
defendant’s crimes of bankruptcy fraud and making a false 
statement to a bank), with United States v. Givens, 443 F.3d 
642 (8th Cir. 2006) (reversing below range sentence of 
supervised release including 12 months of house arrest for  
bank fraud defendant facing 24-30 months of 
imprisonment). 
 
439  Compare United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (applying presumption of reasonableness); 
United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(same); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 
2006) (same); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606 
(7th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 
716 (8th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 
1050 (10th Cir. 2006), with United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 
440 F.3d 514 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining to apply 
presumption of reasonableness); United States v. Fernandez, 
443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 
F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds as 
recognized in United States v. Wells, 279 F. App’x 100 (3d 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
 
circuits have not.  One circuit has declared departures 
“obsolete,” while the other circuits have continued to 
view proper federal sentencing practice as a three-step 
process. 
Finally, the role appellate review can play in 
promoting nationwide uniformity in sentencing is 
limited because only a small percentage of sentences 
are appealed.  As seen in the figure on the next page, 
while the number of offenders sentenced has 
increased, the number of sentencing appeals decided 
each year has remained relatively flat, and has been 
less than 10 percent since Booker.440  Even more 
significantly, the number of government-initiated 
appeals has declined since Booker.441   
                                                 
440  See also Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal 
Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, supra note 
365 (“Based on interviews and an analysis of data coded 
from 971 randomly selected cases sentenced under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines, the study’s findings 
include (1) in nearly two-thirds of the cases settled by plea 
agreement, the defendants waived their rights to review[]”).] 
 
441  At the Commission’s regional public hearings, several 
prosecutors testified that the government has curtailed its 
appeal of low sentences because of the deferential standard 
of review.  U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public Regional Hearing 
on the 25th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, Denver, CO (Oct. 20-21, 2009) 
(Testimony of the Honorable B. Todd Jones, United States 
Attorney, District of Minnesota, transcript at 155-56); U.S. 
Sent’g Comm’n Public Regional Hearing on the 25th 
Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, Denver, CO (Oct. 20-21, 2009) (Testimony of the 
Honorable David M. Gaouette, United States Attorney, 
District of Colorado, transcript at 166); U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 
Public Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary of the 
Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Chicago, IL 
(Sept. 9-10, 2009) (Testimony of the Honorable Patrick J. 
Fitzgerald, United States Attorney, Northern District of 
Illinois, transcript at 247); U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public 
Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary of the Passage of 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, New York, NY (July. 9-
10, 2009) (Testimony of the Honorable Dana Boente, 
United States Attorney, District of Eastern District of 
Virginia, transcript at 315-16); U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Public 
Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary of the Passage of 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, New York, NY (July 9-
10, 2009) (Testimony of the Honorable Benton J. Campbell, 
United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, 
transcript at 317-18).  Prosecutors voiced concerns about the 
ability of the reasonableness standard of review to prevent 
disparities in sentencing.  See, e.g., U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 
Public Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary of the 
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In each year, defendant-initiated 
appeals far outnumber both government-
initiated appeals and cases in which 
cross appeals were filed.  The bars 
depicting government-initiated appeals 
and cross appeals are barely visible on 
the first bar chart, which has been scaled 
to accurately depict defendant-initiated 
appeals.  The second bar chart shows 
government-initiated and cross appeals 
only on a different scale to make the 
government-initiated and cross appeals 
visible.  
In sum, at least four factors 
significantly limit the role of appellate 
review post-Booker in promoting 
national uniformity in sentencing:  the 
different views held by judges with 
respect to the importance of various 
factors, including offender 
characteristics and the guidelines, under 
section 3553(a); the deferential standard 
of review; the lack of uniform 
procedures among the circuits; and the 
relatively low number of sentencing 
appeals. 
 
                                                                                  
Passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Austin, TX 
(Nov. 19-20, 2009) (Statement of the Honorable Joyce W. 
Vance, United States Attorney, Northern District of 
Alabama, written statement at 2-3). 
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Demographic factors (such as race, 
gender, and citizenship) were 
associated with sentence length at 
higher rates in the Gall period than 
in previous periods. 
 
The Commission’s multivariate 
regression analyses, updated with data 
through fiscal year 2011 for this report, 
showed that sentence length has been 
associated with some demographic 
factors.442  For example, sentence length 
for Black male offenders exceeded 
sentence length for White male offenders 
by 19.5 percent in the Gall period.  In 
contrast, the difference was 15.2 percent 
in the Booker period, and 5.5 percent 
during the PROTECT Act period.  For 
Hispanic male offenders and Other 
Race443 male offenders sentenced during 
the Gall period, there was no statistically 
significant difference in sentence length 
compared to White male offenders. 
Female offenders of all races 
received shorter sentences than White 
male offenders during all four periods 
studied.  Sentences for White female 
offenders were 31.1 percent shorter than 
for White male offenders during the Gall 
period.  Sentences for Black female 
offenders were 33.1 percent shorter than 
sentences for White male offenders 
during the Gall period.  For Hispanic 
females the difference was 18.2 percent, and for Other 
Race females, the difference was 34.6 percent. 
Additional analysis also showed demographic 
differences in the likelihood of receiving a non-
government sponsored below range sentence.  During 
the PROTECT Act, Booker, and Gall periods, Black 
male offenders were at least 20 percent less likely to 
                                                 
442  See supra at 57 for a discussion of the limitations of 
multivariate regression analysis and examples of factors for 
which no data is readily available in the Commission’s 
datasets.   
 
443  “Other Race” includes American Indians and Alaskan 
Natives, Asians and Pacific Islanders, Multi-racial, Non-US 
American Indians (e.g., Canadian Indians), and other non-
specified races. 
 
receive a non-government sponsored below range 
sentence than White male offenders.  However, when 
Black male offenders did receive a non-government 
sponsored below range sentence during the Gall 
period, there was no statistically significant difference 
in sentence length.444  Hispanic male offenders were 
also less likely to receive a non-government sponsored 
below range sentence in all periods, and were 31.6 
percent less likely to do so in the Gall period.445  
                                                 
444  During the Booker period, the sentences of Black male 
offenders receiving non-government sponsored below range 
sentences were 12.3% longer than those of White male 
offenders receiving non-government sponsored below range 
sentences.  There was no statistically significant difference 
during any other period.  The graph depicting this analysis 
is in Part E, available online. 
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Demographic differences also 
were observed in sentence length for 
specific offense types (only fraud, 
firearms, and drug trafficking offenses 
had sufficient case numbers in each of 
the various demographic groups studied 
to conduct the analysis), but the 
differences did not follow a uniform 
pattern.  In fraud offenses, for example, 
there was no statistically significant 
difference in sentence length for Black 
male and White male offenders during 
the Gall period.  Differences in sentence 
lengths between White, Black, and 
Hispanic female fraud offenders and 
White male fraud offenders were 
significant in some, but not all of the 
periods studied. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
445  During the Gall period, the sentences of Hispanic male 
offenders receiving non-government sponsored below range 
sentences were 9.3% longer than those of White male 
offenders receiving non-government sponsored below range 
sentences.  There was no statistically significant difference 
during any other period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, in firearms 
offenses, sentences for Black male 
offenders were 10.2 percent longer 
than sentences for White male 
offenders.   
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Statistically significant differences 
in sentence length for Black male and 
White male drug trafficking offenders 
were present during the Koon and Booker 
periods, but the greatest difference 
occurred during the Gall period.  White 
female, Black female, and Hispanic 
female drug trafficking offenders received 
shorter sentences than White male drug 
trafficking offenders during all four 
periods.   
The Commission’s analysis of 
changes in sentence length for each race 
and gender pairing across periods revealed 
some demographic differences.  For 
example, White male and female 
offenders, Black male and female 
offenders, Hispanic male offenders, and 
Other Race male offenders all received shorter 
sentences during the Gall period than during the 
Booker period, whereas the sentences for Hispanic 
female offenders and Other Race female offenders did 
not decrease.  The decreases in sentence length during 
the Gall period also were not evenly distributed among 
race/gender pairs.  The sentences for White female 
offenders were 14.9 percent shorter during the Gall 
period compared to the Booker period, whereas the 
sentences for White male offenders were 5.5 percent 
shorter.  The sentences for Black female offenders 
were 11.8 percent shorter during the Gall period 
compared to the Booker period, while the sentences of 
Black male offenders were 3.6 percent shorter during 
the Gall period.  
In conclusion, although sentence length for 
both Black male and female offenders and White male 
and female offenders have decreased over time, White 
offenders’ sentence length has decreased more than 
Black offenders’ sentence length.  Additionally, while 
Black male offenders received sentences that were not 
statistically different from those of White male 
offenders when both groups received non-government 
sponsored below range sentences, Black male 
offenders have been at least 20 percent less likely to 
receive a non-government sponsored below range 
sentence in the first instance.  Hispanic male offenders 
also have been less likely than White male offenders to 
receive a non-government sponsored below range 
sentence. 
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Recommendations  
 
 
 
 
The Commission continues to believe that a 
strong and effective guidelines system best serves the 
purposes of the SRA.  The importance of achieving the 
goals of the SRA is heightened as the number of 
federal offenders steadily increases over time.  In 
fiscal year 1996, there were 37,091 federal offenders, 
compared to 76,216 in fiscal year 2011.  The number 
of inmates housed by the federal BOP has more than 
doubled, from just below 100,000 in 1996, to more 
than 200,000 in 2011.446  Of note, post-Booker, most 
federal offenders have continued to receive substantial 
sentences of imprisonment without any alternative to 
incarceration.  In fiscal year 2011, 87.8 percent of 
federal offenders were sentenced to serve a term of 
imprisonment only, compared to 76.9 percent in fiscal 
year 1996.   
The continued importance and influence of the 
guidelines on sentencing decisions is evident from 
both Supreme Court decisions and sentencing data, as 
the overwhelming majority of offenders – 80.7 percent 
in the Gall period – still received a sentence either 
within the guideline range or below the guideline 
range for a reason sponsored by the government (most 
often, but not always, congressionally authorized 
reductions for substantial assistance to the government 
or an expedited guilty plea pursuant to an EDP 
approved by the Attorney General).   
However, consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, sentencing decisions increasingly depend 
upon consideration of the section 3553(a) factors other 
than the guidelines (section 3553(a)(4)) and policy 
statements (section 3553(a)(5)).  The Commission’s 
review of sentencing decisions suggests that judges 
view similar circumstances and weigh the section 
3553(a) factors differently, in particular individual 
offender characteristics, much as they did during the 
                                                 
446  See supra note 393.  
 
years leading up to the SRA.  In the wake of these 
changes, the Commission has observed both increasing 
inconsistencies in sentencing practices – nationally, 
locally, and by offense type – and widening 
demographic differences in sentencing.  The 
Commission is concerned about these developments.  
In reaching its recommendations in this report, the 
Commission reviewed various alternative proposals 
for sentencing reform and the criticisms levied against 
those proposals, including the calls by some for 
maintaining the status quo.447  The Commission 
believes the trends demonstrated in this report are 
troubling and should be addressed.  At this time, the 
Commission makes the following recommendations to 
strengthen and improve the sentencing guidelines 
system. 
 
DEVELOP MORE ROBUST SUBSTANTIVE 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
 
The Commission proposes that Congress enact 
a more robust appellate review standard.  Appellate 
review was a key component of sentencing reform in 
the SRA.  Congress envisioned that appellate review 
of sentences would provide the Commission valuable 
information on federal sentencing and ensure certain, 
fair, and more uniform sentences.  Since Booker, 
where the Court anticipated that appellate review 
would tend to “iron out” sentencing differences, the 
role of appellate review remains unclear, the standards 
inconsistent, and its effectiveness in achieving 
uniformity in sentencing is increasingly questionable.  
                                                 
447  Many commentators have made alternative proposals for 
sentencing reform.  Some of these proposals and the 
criticisms against them are discussed in detail in Part F, 
available online. 
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The Commission recommends that Congress revitalize 
appellate review in three ways.   
 
Require a Presumption of Reasonableness for 
Within Range Sentences on Appeal 
 
Appellate courts should be required to 
presume within range sentences to be substantively 
reasonable.  The Supreme Court permits a 
presumption of reasonableness for within range 
sentences only on appeal.  The SRA requires that 
similarly situated defendants be treated similarly, and 
this is hindered by the current appellate review 
dichotomy between those circuits that have adopted 
the presumption of reasonableness and those that have 
not.  It is already the practice in the majority of 
circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits.  
Requiring the presumption of reasonableness in all 
circuits would promote national sentencing uniformity 
by facilitating review of sentences as the SRA 
contemplated.  An appellate review standard that 
presumes within range sentences to be reasonable 
reflects the fact that the Commission’s process for 
promulgating guidelines results in “a set of Guidelines 
that seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both 
in principle and in practice.”448  
 
Require Greater Justification for Sentences 
Substantially Outside the Guideline Range 
 
Congress should require sentencing courts to 
provide greater justification for sentences imposed the 
further the sentence is from the otherwise applicable 
guideline range.449  The greater a sentencing judge’s 
variance from a guideline, the more compelling should 
                                                 
448  Rita, 551 U.S. at 350.  See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 263-
264 (noting that “[t]he Sentencing Commission will 
continue to collect and study appellate court 
decisionmaking.  It will continue to modify its Guidelines in 
light of what it learns, thereby encouraging what it finds to 
be better sentencing practices. It will thereby promote 
uniformity in the sentencing process. . . . the 
Sentencing Commission remains in place, writing 
Guidelines, collecting information about actual district court 
sentencing decisions, undertaking research, and revising the 
Guidelines accordingly.”). 
 
449  See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 
 
be the judge’s justification for the variance.450  This 
reform aligns with Supreme Court doctrine as stated in 
Gall v. United States: it is “uncontroversial that a 
major departure should be supported by a more 
significant justification than a minor one.”451  Such 
explanation would ensure that the vision of a 
transparent system remains intact and would help 
ensure that appellate review remains robust.452  As the 
Court noted in Rita, “The sentencing judge should set 
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has 
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned 
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking 
authority.”453  Any legislative proposal to strengthen 
the guidelines system should require heightened 
justification for a sentence substantially outside the 
guidelines. 
 
Require Heightened Review of Sentences Based 
on Policy Disagreements with the Guidelines  
 
Congress should create a heightened standard 
of review for sentences imposed based on a “policy 
disagreement” with the guidelines.  The Supreme 
Court permitted policy-based variances in Kimbrough 
and Spears.  However, the Commission believes that 
the current lack of rigorous appellate review of policy 
disagreements undermines the role of the guidelines 
system and risks increasing unwarranted sentencing 
disparity as judges substitute their own policy 
judgments for the collective policy judgments of 
Congress and the Commission.  Even in the course of 
declaring that individual judges may categorically 
disagree with the Commission’s policy decisions, the 
Court recognized that “closer review may be in order 
when the sentencing judge varies from the guidelines 
based solely on the judge’s view that the guideline 
range ‘fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) 
considerations’ even in a mine-run case.”454  Judges 
have varied backgrounds and policy preferences, and 
                                                 
450  See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 695 F.3d 672 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
  
451  Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 
 
452  See Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-358. 
 
453  Id. at 356. 
 
454  Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 
352). 
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reducing unwarranted disparity requires that policy-
based variances be subject to heightened scrutiny.   
 
RECONCILE THE STATUTES THAT RESTRICT THE 
COMMISSION’S CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN 
OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS WITH STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATIONS THAT REQUIRE COURTS TO 
CONSIDER MORE EXPANSIVELY THOSE SAME 
OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS. 
 
Section 994 of Title 28 requires the 
Commission to restrict the manner in which certain 
offender characteristics can be considered in the 
guidelines.  In contrast, section 3553(a) of Title 18 has 
been interpreted as instructing courts to give broad 
consideration to some of the same offender 
characteristics restricted by Title 28.  The Commission 
recommends that Congress clarify the relationship 
between 28 U.S.C. § 994 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  In 
Rita, the Supreme Court recognized that “the 
sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge 
and the Commission as carrying out the same basic     
§ 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at 
wholesale.”455   
In the SRA, Congress specifically directed the 
Commission to limit the role certain offender 
characteristics would play at sentencing.  Section 
994(e) of Title 28 directs the Commission to “assure 
that the guidelines and policy statements, in 
recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a 
term of imprisonment, reflect the general 
inappropriateness of considering the education, 
vocational skills, employment record, family ties and 
responsibilities, and community ties of the 
defendant.”456  Even where certain offender 
characteristics may be relevant, Congress directed the 
Commission to take them into account “only to the 
                                                 
455  Rita, 551 U.S. at 348.  Moreover, a statute must be given 
“‘the most harmonious, comprehensive meaning possible’ 
in light of the legislative policy and purpose,” Weinberger v. 
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631-32 
(1973) (quoting Clark v. Uebensee Finanz-Korp, 332 U.S. 
480, 488 (1947)), and it is normally presumed “that a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a 
statute what it says there.”  Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). 
 
456  28 U.S.C. § 994(e). 
 
extent that they do have relevance.”457 Accordingly the 
Commission adopted several policy statements 
limiting the relevance of certain offender 
characteristics to the determination of whether a 
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline 
range in Chapter Five, Parts H and K of the Guidelines 
Manual.  The Commission determined that the factors 
listed in 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) “are not ordinarily 
relevant” to the determination of whether a sentence 
should be outside the applicable guideline range, but 
did not foreclose them from consideration in an 
exceptional case or from consideration for determining 
where to sentence the offender within the guideline 
range. 
The Commission recognized that the 
guidelines could not capture every possible 
circumstance about the offense or the offender, and 
instead intended the guidelines to describe “a set of 
typical cases embodying the conduct that each 
guideline describes.”  Offender characteristics could 
always be considered to determine where within the 
range to sentence an offender.  Moreover, in the SRA, 
Congress explicitly permitted sentences outside the 
guideline range in cases in which “there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to 
a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines.”458  Courts could always choose to depart 
“where conduct significantly differs from the norm.”459  
However, current law as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court directs courts to consider broadly offender 
characteristics (except those that would violate 
constitutional principles) and judges increasingly 
sentence offenders outside the range based on 
characteristics such as education, employment history, 
and family and community ties that not only fail to 
distinguish the case from the norm, but, to the 
contrary, are often present in the typical case. 
Further, the fact that judges weigh section 
3553(a)(1) factors differently results in substantial 
sentencing disparities.  Both the historical 
underpinnings of the SRA and current case law 
demonstrate that judges weigh factors differently and 
have widely divergent views about the relevance of 
                                                 
457  28 U.S.C. § 994(d). 
 
458  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); USSG §5K2.0. 
 
459  USSG Ch.1, Pt.A(4)(b) (Apr. 13, 1987). 
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offender characteristics at sentencing.  To the extent 
the interaction between the SRA’s directives to the 
Commission and its instructions to judges is unclear, 
as is currently the case, unwarranted disparity becomes 
inevitable. 
  
CODIFY THE THREE-STEP PROCESS 
 
The Commission recommends that Congress 
codify the three-step sentencing process in which 
sentencing courts begin by calculating the guideline 
range, proceed to evaluate departures within the 
guidelines, and only then consider the sentencing 
factors listed at section 3553(a).  Codification of the 
three-step process would have the dual benefit of 
working in concert with the substantial weight 
amendment recommended below and of promoting 
uniformity.  Currently the Seventh Circuit does not 
support the three-step process and instead has declared 
departures “obsolete.”  In other circuits, case law does 
not state clearly whether the second step is necessary, 
or states that consideration of departures is 
unnecessary as long as the sentence is reasonable.  
Codification of the three-step process would promote 
uniformity in sentencing and may reduce unwarranted 
disparity.   
The importance of the second step, which 
requires consideration of departure policy statements, 
is often overlooked by parties and courts.  This 
development both deprives the courts from benefitting 
from the Commission’s expertise provided in the 
departure provisions and diminishes the quality of 
feedback from the courts to the Commission regarding 
offense severity, consideration of offender 
characteristics, and other aspects of the guidelines.  
The Commission finds that as courts increasingly rely 
on the broad section 3553(a) factors without providing 
the same level of specificity as required by departure 
provisions, its ability to discern and respond to specific 
areas of concern to the courts is hindered and 
transparency is lessened.  The Commission believes 
that this trend is unlikely to be reversed unless the 
three-step process is formally codified. 
 
RESOLVE THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE 
WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO THE SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 
 
Finally, the Commission believes that 
Congress should require that courts give the guidelines 
substantial weight.  In Booker, the Supreme Court said 
that courts must “consider” the properly determined 
guideline range, but did not express exactly how much 
weight the guidelines should be given.  In Pepper v. 
United States, the Supreme Court noted that the 
guidelines are due “respectful consideration,” but, 
citing Gall, declined to distinguish the guidelines and 
policy statements as deserving any greater weight than 
any of the other section 3553(a) factors.460  As a result, 
the Commission is concerned that judges may give 
insufficient weight to the guidelines relative to the 
other section 3553(a) factors, which would contribute 
to increasing sentencing disparity.  The Commission 
suggested in its October 2011 testimony that Congress 
statutorily require district courts to give “substantial 
weight” to the guidelines.  Other possibilities include 
“due regard” or the “respectful consideration” standard 
adopted by the Court in Pepper.461  
Regardless of the precise wording chosen, the 
Commission believes Congress should impose one 
uniform standard that conveys the importance of the 
guidelines at sentencing.  The guidelines “seek to 
embody the § 3553(a) considerations, both in principle 
and in practice” and they “reflect a rough 
approximation of sentences that might achieve            
§ 3553(a)’s objectives.”462 During the process of 
developing the initial set of guidelines and refining 
them throughout the ensuing years, the Commission 
has considered the factors listed in section 3553(a) that 
were cited with approval in Booker.  By setting a 
uniform standard for sentencing judges and resolving 
existing uncertainty as to the weight sentencing judges 
                                                 
460  131 S. Ct. 1229, 1241 (2011) (“Finally, we note that    
§§ 3553(a)(5) and (a)(6) describe only two of the seven 
sentencing factors that courts must consider in imposing 
sentence.  At root, amicus effectively invites us 
to elevate two § 3553(a) factors above all others. We reject 
that invitation.”).   
 
461  Id. at 1249. 
 
462  Rita, 551 U.S. at 350. 
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should afford the guidelines, Congress would continue 
to move sentencing policy in its preferred direction.  



As envisioned by the SRA, the Commission 
will continue to refine the guidelines in response to 
feedback and information it receives, and remains 
uniquely positioned to provide Congress and the 
criminal justice community with advice and 
information that will help further the goals of 
sentencing.  The guidelines will continue to be 
evolutionary in nature, 463 as the Commission gathers 
and analyzes data from actual practice, receives 
feedback through testimony, sentencing and appellate 
decisions, and various forms of public comment, and 
revises the guidelines over time in response to this 
feedback.  Below range sentences continue to be an 
important mechanism by which the Commission 
receives feedback from courts regarding the operation 
of the guidelines, and the Commission continues to 
examine below range sentence rates to determine 
whether the severity or proportionality of the 
guidelines for particular offenses or offenders should 
be adjusted.  Such feedback from the courts enhances 
the Commission’s ability to fulfill its ongoing statutory 
responsibility under the SRA to periodically review 
and revise the guidelines.464 
The Commission continues to believe that a 
strong and effective guidelines system best serves the 
purposes of the SRA.  The Commission believes that 
the recommendations described in this report, if 
adopted by Congress, would promote those goals, 
although it recognizes that more substantial reforms 
may be necessary in the future if unwarranted 
disparities persist despite such measures.  The 
Commission stands ready to work with Congress, the 
                                                 
463  USSG Ch.1, Pt.A, intro. comment. (“The Commission 
emphasizes, however, that it views the guideline-writing 
process as evolutionary.  It expects, and the governing 
statute anticipates, that continuing research, experience, and 
analysis will result in modifications and revisions to the 
guidelines through submission of amendments to 
Congress.”).  See also Stephen Breyer, Key Compromises, 
supra note 138, at 8. 
 
464  See 18 U.S.C. § 994(o) (“The Commission periodically 
shall review and revise, in consideration of comments and 
data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated 
pursuant to the provisions of this section.”). 
 
federal judiciary, the executive branch, and others in 
the federal criminal justice community to ensure 
certain and fair sentencing that avoids unwarranted 
sentencing disparities while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when 
warranted.465 

                                                 
465  See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). 
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